Locked In and Locked Out:  Reflections in the History of Divorce Law Reform in New York State by Marcus, Isabel
University at Buffalo School of Law 
Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law 
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 
Spring 1989 
Locked In and Locked Out: Reflections in the History of Divorce 
Law Reform in New York State 
Isabel Marcus 
University at Buffalo School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles 
 Part of the Family Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Isabel Marcus, Locked In and Locked Out: Reflections in the History of Divorce Law Reform in New York 
State, 37 Buff. L. Rev. 375 (1989). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles/406 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ University 
at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of 
Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact 
lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
Locked In and Locked Out: Reflections on the




I. Introduction .............................................. 376
II. Five Narratives ........................................... 390
Narrative 1-Property and the Development of Identity for
M arried W omen .......................................... 390
A. Common Law and Equity:
Gendered Access to Property ......................... 390
B. Married Women's Property Acts:
Degendered Access to Property ....................... 398
Narrative 2-Fault-Based Divorce and Its Reform ......... 414
Narrative 3-Alimony: The Nexus of Property and
Fault ..................................................... 428
Narrative 4-Divorce Law Reform:
Property and Alimony Revisited .......................... 434
A. Developments of a Decade:
The Shift from Strict Title to Equitable Distribution... 434
B. The Language of Reform:
Gendered and Degendered Levels ..................... 446
Narrative 5-Implementing Reform: Distributional Results. 458
III. Post-Partum Reflections ................................... 472
* Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. The author acknowledges the
caring, supportiveness, and thoughtful involvement in this work of Guyora Binder, Ellen DuBois,
Martha Fineman, Alan Freeman, Marjorie Girth, Tom Headrick, Janet Lindgren, Betty Mensch,
John Henry Schlegel, Judy Scales-Trent, Nadine Taub, and Wendy Williams. Invaluable is the term
which best characterizes the research assistance of Molly Dwyer, Penny Rubin, Ruth Stem, and Lisa
Morowitz, and the typing by Joyce Farrell, Dina Poeller, and Linda Kosinski. Financial aid for
research was provided by the SUNY Buffalo Research Foundation and the National Endowment for
the Humanities through a Legal History Fellowship at the University of Wisconsin (Madison) Law
School.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
How unpleasant it is to be locked out,
How unpleasant it is to be locked in.
-Virginia Woolfe
I. INTRODUCTION
O N June 3, 1980 New York enacted a divorce law reform.' The old
common law rules, which relied on title to divide marital property,
were replaced with the currently fashionable scheme of equitable distri-
bution, which abandoned the use of title.' The new legislation was her-
alded as a major change, consistent with emerging norms of fairness. Its
passage culminated more than a decade of serious efforts and bitter polit-
ical battles, part of almost two hundred years of intermittent struggles to
reform New York's rules for the dissolution of marriage.
This Article is concerned with those struggles on two levels. On one
level, it is an account of what are said to be important changes in New
York divorce law, documented in five historical narratives. It identifies
and details the social, economic, and cultural experiences in New York
which informed the political and legal choices4 made in the name of di-
vorce law reform. On another level, this Article is only incidentally about
changes in the divorce law of New York. Rather, it uses a series of histor-
ical accounts and an analysis of the implementation of contemporary di-
vorce law reform to explore continuities as well as discontinuities in law.
More particularly, through the five narratives law reform is viewed as
symbolic activity for the wider society and for specific constituencies said
to be the beneficiaries of a specific reform.5
Situating law and law reform in its social context highlights the con-
1. Act of June 19, 1980, ch. 281, 1980 N.Y. Laws 1225, 1227-32 (codified as amended at N.Y.
DoM. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney 1986)).
2. See generally Divorce in the Fifty States: An Overview as of August 1, 1980, Fam. L. Rep.
(BNA), No. 42 (Sept. 2, 1980). New York became the 38th state to institute a system of equitable
distribution for marital property at divorce.
3. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5) (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1985).
4. An underlying theme in this Article is the role of language as "an integral facet of the polit-
ical scene: not simply an instrument for describing events but itself a part of the events, shaping their
meaning." M. EDELMAN, POLITICAL LANGUAGE: WORDS THAT SUCCEED AND POLICIES THAT
FAIL 4 (1977).
5. "[D]iscourse and symbolization are themselves practices, which are structurally connected to
other practices and have a great deal in common with other forms of practice. They too have to be
analyzed with attention to context, institutionalization, and group formation." R. CONNELL, GEN-
DER AND POWER: SOCIETY, THE PERSON AND SEXUAL POLITICS 242 (1987); see also Fineman,
Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change. A Study of Rhetoric and Results
in the Regulation of the Consequences of Divorce, 1983 Wisc. L. REV. 789.
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nection between law and ideology.6 As ideology, law loses its garb of
universality and objectivity. In context, law surrenders its aura of tran-
scendence. Such recasting of law and law reform serves to demystify7 the
enterprise. It allows for the emergence and understanding of underlying
assumptions regarding the nature of legal discourse and the construction
of identity.8
The first narrative focuses on a key component in divorce law re-
form: the legal identity of a married woman. It recounts the struggle for
the development of a separate legal identity for married women through
statutory reform of the common law doctrine of marital unity, which
denied married women a separate identity. The reform, known as the
Married Women's Property Act, enabled married women to have title,
and therefore access, to property. This elimination of sex specific barriers
to property was cast as creating formal equality with men and was said to
be a significant jurisprudential shift with profound consequences for wo-
men. But, as the story unfolds, it becomes apparent that the material and
symbolic dimensions of such a reform must be distinguished. Symboli-
cally, eliminating the appropriation of the legal identity of married wo-
men is a societal statement regarding the formal equalization and scope
of personhood. Materially, such recognition may neither produce, acti-
vate, nor greatly facilitate a change in the condition of the group on
whose behalf the reform is undertaken. In fact, a move to formal legal
equality may be merely "a shift from a direct to an indirect mode of
legitimating the subordination of women." 9
Continuing with the theme of divorce law reform, the second narra-
tive recounts the struggle over the expansion of grounds for divorce in
New York. The narrative explores the use of narrow fault-based grounds
for divorce and details their belated expansion in 1966. As this episode
develops, it becomes apparent that reform of a statute which is facially
gender neutral, but grounded in powerful cultural images of women and
men as wives and husbands, does not change a cultural context for law.
6. See Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1071 (1981); Olsen, The Family
and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1497, 1498 (1983).
7. See THE POLITICS OF LAW (D. Kairys ed. 1979); Freeman, Truth and Mystification in Legal
Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1229 (1981). See generally 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982) (symposium
issue discussing the public/private distinction); Kennedy & Klare, A Bibliography of Critical Legal
Studies, 94 YALE L.J. 461 (1984).
8. See J. Grbich, Coming Face to Face With the Experience of Womanhood: The Body in Legal
Theory (1987) (draft presented at Feminism and Legal Theory Conference, University of Wisconsin
Law School) (discussing feminist legal theorists' use of discourse theory).
9. Olsen, supra note 6, at 1512.
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Thus, formal or facial gender neutrality in a statute may be of little or
modest relevance to its substantive impact.
The third narrative focuses on the payment of alimony to former
wives. It traces the history of the sex specific provisions for alimony and
explores the myths and realities identified with post-divorce maintenance
for women. From this analysis, it becomes apparent that alimony is both
a consequence and manifestation of a power dynamic underpinning the
economic reality between husbands and wives. Alimony recasts the inter-
dependence of marriage into the dependence of wives. It underscores the
harsh reality of women's continuing economic vulnerability after divorce.
The fourth narrative documents the struggle for a major divorce law
reform in New York from 1970 to 1980. Quite early in the decade, the
parameters of the reform debate were established: at divorce, title to mar-
ital property should be set aside in favor of a distributional scheme which
disregarded title; marital property should be divided either according to
a rebuttable presumption of equal distribution or a flexible principle of
equitable distribution. The remainder of the decade was taken up with
political maneuvering through the legislative process. Part A of this nar-
rative outlines the chronology of legislative reform efforts during the dec-
ade. Part B explores the ideological significance of the terms of the
debate. The narrative emphasizes the relationship between the rhetoric of
reform and conditions in the material world which the reform proposes
to remedy or mitigate. As the story unfolds, it becomes apparent that the
images and expectations evoked by formal legal terms deflect popular
attention from key underlying social conditions which influence and even
shape legal outcomes.
The fifth and final narrative reviews the implementation of the 1980
divorce law reform through litigated results and out-of-court settlements.
Both types of legal outcomes impact in a differential and predictable
manner on wives and husbands. Despite the reform, both types of legal
outcomes are informed by norms reflecting pre-reform ideology.
Such a selection of narratives about divorce law reform raises a host
of questions. Why this choice of narratives? What connects them? What
makes them interesting? What do they tell us about our collective past
and, of equal importance, about our contemporary situation and possible
futures?
One response to these questions is to identify the fundamental
themes which infuse each of the five narratives and establish a basic con-
nection among them. These themes are: law operating as ideology; the
sex/gender system manifested in divorce law and its reform; property as
[Vol. 37
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a significant nexus of power in the sex/gender system; and the meta-
theme that I believe unites them all, the social construction of a gendered
legal identity for women.
Theme 1: Law and Ideology
Each narrative is about the connection between law and ideology.
More specifically, each story is about law operating as ideology. Broadly
construed,
[Ideology] is that aspect of the human condition under which human beings
live their lives as conscious actors in a world that makes sense to them in
varying degrees. Ideology is the medium through which consciousness and
meaningfulness operate.
[I]t includes both everyday notions and 'experience' and elaborate intellec-
tual doctrines, both the 'consciousness' of social actors and the institution-
alized thought-systems and discourses of a given society.
10
Dominant power configurations rely upon ideology to reflect, refine, rein-
force, and justify access to and distribution of resources in a society.
Law is one particular form for the articulation of the dominant be-
liefs and practices of a society." It assists in the formulation and the
rationalization of collective self-identity.2 Through the articulation, in-
terpretation, and implementation of rules, law contributes to and rein-
forces shared meanings and aspirations. In so doing, it tests the
presuppositions of a culture. 3 For example, the "giveness" of a mone-
tized contribution to a marriage almost always advantages a husband's
contribution over a homemaker wife's and underscores the extent to
which money is the legally and culturally privileged contribution to mar-
10. G. THERBORN, THE IDEOLOGY OF POWER AND THE POWER OF IDEOLOGY 2 (1980). For
an excellent discussion of the relationship between law and multiple levels of ideology, see Lawrence,
The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317
(1987).
11. See M. GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH (1985) (applying this argument to 19th
century family law). "Legal practices are always enmeshed in ideology but their emergence as spe-
cific, institutionalized practices in a historical division of labour also involves a 'break' or 'rupture'
with surrounding ideologies through the production of specific discourses geared to producing spe-
cific effects, separate from everyday experience and persuasion." G. THERBORN, supra note 10, at 2-
3.
12. C. KELLER, FROM A BROKEN WEB: SEPARATION, SEXISM, AND SELF (1986); Gecas &
Mortimer, Stability and Change in the Self-Concept From Adolescence to Adulthood, in SELF AND
IDENTITY 265-86 (r. Honess & K. Yardley eds. 1987).
13. See White, Law as Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 415,
436 (1982) (analyzing law as a "culture of argument and interpretation through the operations of
which the rules acquire their life and ultimate meaning").
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riage, panegyrics to home and family notwithstanding. Additionally, law
is an instrument of power and politics. It attempts to achieve a vision of
appropriate social arrangements.1
4
Each of the five episodes is a particularization of the general propo-
sition that law operates as ideology. Reform of rules regarding legal iden-
tity in marriage, marital property distribution, the awarding of alimony,
and fault-based grounds for divorce are discourses about our sense of self
in a significant relationship. They are discourses about the meaning we
attach to that relationship, and about the power of the state to regulate
the dissolution of that relationship.
Theme 2: The Sex/Gender System and Identity
in Marriage and Divorce
Each narrative also focuses on one of the most fundamental and
powerful socially constructed15 categories of classification and differenti-
ation in society-sex and gender. "Sex" refers to the bipolar categories
male and female, said to be biologically distinguishable. 6 "Gender" re-
fers to the roles and behaviors identified with each biologically deter-
14. J. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING 267-74 (1984). "The relations and struc-
tures of power produce and are accompanied by forms of knowledge and truth that sustain them and
make them seem natural. Forms of truth conceal the domination and violence inherent in power
formations." M. FOUCAULT, POWER AND KNOWLEDGE 112 (1980); see also Bumiller, Victims in
the Shadow of the Law: A Critique of the Model of Legal Protection, 12 SIGNS 421 (1987). "From a
feminist perspective, legal discourses are problem-solving approaches that reflect the ideology of the
powerful and ignore the realities of the powerless." Id. at 423.
15. See P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A TREATISE
IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 49 (1966). Some of the most thought-provoking scholarship
using this theoretical approach focuses on the social construction of sexuality. See, e.g., 1 M. Fou-
CAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (1978); S. KRIEGER, THE MIRROR DANCE: IDENTITY IN A
WOMEN'S COMMUNITY (1983); J. WEEKS, COMING OUT (1977); Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notesfor a
Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality, in PLEASURE AND DANGER (C. Vance ed. 1984). For an
analysis of the social construction of reproduction, see M. O'BRIAN, THE POLITICS OF REPRODUC-
TION (1981). For a critical analysis of social construction theory, see Epstein, Gay Politics, Ethnic
Identity: The Limits of Social Constructionism, Soc. REV., May-Aug. 1987, at 9; see also Vance &
Snitow, Toward a Conversation about Sex in Feminism: A Modest Proposal, 10 SIGNS 126 (1984).
16. See H. BARBIN, HERCULINE BARBIN: BEING THE RECENTLY DISCOVERED MEMOIRS OF A
NINETEENTH CENTURY FRENCH HERMAPHRODITE (1980). In his introduction to the text, Michel
Foucault asks:
Do we truly need a true sex? With a persistence that borders on stubbornness modern
western societies have answered the question in the affirmative .... Everybody was to
have one and only one sex. Everybody was to have his or her primary, profound, deter-
mined and determining sexual identity; as for the elements of the other sex that might
appear, they could only be accidental, superficial, or even quite simply illusory.
Foucault, Introduction to id. at vii-viii; see also Marcus, Reflections on the Significance of the Sex/
Gender System, Divorce Law Reform in New York, 42 U. OF MIAMI L. REV. 55 (1987).
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mined sex, allegedly based and constructed upon sex-identified
attributes."7 Gender, like sex, is understood and experienced as bipolar.'
8
Together, these two socially constructed, interconnected categories of sex
and gender form the sex/gender system.' 9
At birth each person is assigned a sex category which is a socially
significant classification. Each person interprets received gender norms
based on sex identification in a way that both reproduces gender and
organizes it anew.2" This societal classification of individuals as female or
male includes attendant appropriate behaviors and activities which con-
stitute markers and boundaries21 for each sex/gender identity. It under-
pins and informs knowledge and symbolization. Representations of
biological and social differentiation between the sexes are at its core.22 In
17. Peplau, Roles and Gender, in CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS (H. Kelly ed. 1983); see also Berger &
Kellner, Marriage and the Construction of Reality, in THE FAMILY: ITS STRUCTURE AND FUNc-
TIONS 157-74 (R. Coser ed. 1974). For a review of issues regarding the use of the term "gender
roles," see Atkinson, Gender Roles in Marriage: A Critique and Some Proposals, 8 J. FAM. ISSUES 5
(1987); see also J. GAGNON & W. SIMON, SEXUAL CONDUCT: THE SOCIAL SOURCES OF HUMAN
SEXUALITY 42-45, 290-95 (1973).
18. Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447.
Given the luxuriant diversity among individuals both male and female, the traits associ-
ated with gender-with masculinity and femininity-are multidimensional; they are not
to be found in a bipolar distribution with men at one pole and women at the other.
Nevertheless, we largely experience the idea of gender as bipolar.
Id. at 454.
19. For an argument regarding the interchangeability of the terms, see MacKinnon, Feminism,
Marxism, Method and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 635 n.1 (1982).
20. Butler, Variations on Sex and Gender: Beauvoir, Wittig, and Foucault, 5 PRAXIS 506, 508
(1986). Within a society, the sex/gender system varies across time and among classes in its impact on
the individual or on social units, especially family or kinship units. See M. BARRETT & M. MCIN-
TOSH, THE ANTi-SOCIAL FAMILY (1982).
21. Ortner & Whitehead, Introduction: Accounting for Sexual Meanings, in SEXUAL MEAN-
INGS: THE CULTURAL CONSTRUCTION OF GENDER AND SEXUALITY 1 (S. Ortner & H. Whitehead
eds. 1981) (analysis of gender systems as prestige structures); see also R. CONNELL, supra note 5, at
41-65; D. GrrTINS, THE FAMILY IN QUESTION: CHANGING HOUSEHOLDS AND FAMILIAR IDEOLO-
GIES (1985); Kelly, The Doubled Vision of Feminist Theory, in WOMEN HISTORY AND THEORY 51-
64 (1984) (discussing major frameworks for the social analysis of gender). For an analysis of the
power of sex marking and sex announcing behavior patterns, see M. FRYE, THE POLITICS OF REAL-
ITY: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST THEORY 19-33 (1983).
22. "One cannot speak of woman or of man without being taken inside an ideological theatre
where representations of images, reflections, myths, identifications transform, deform, alter cease-
lessly everyone's imaginary." V. CONLEY, HELENE CIXOUS: WRITING THE FEMININE 58 (1984); see
also Whitford, Luce Irigaray and the Female Imaginary: Speaking as a Woman, 43 RADICAL PHIL.
3, 5 (1986) ("Women are not engulfed in an economy of the same, but have available to them sym-
bolizations of their otherness and difference which can become objects of exchange in the culture at
large.").
[When we think about the sexual, nearly our entire imagery is drawn from the physical
activities of bodies. Our sense of normalcy derives from organs being placed in legitimate
orifices. We have allowed the organs, the orifices, and the gender of the actors to person-
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so marking, bounding, and differentiating human activities, the sex/gen-
der system acts as a major vehicle of social organization and control.
Sex/gender identities channel and control behavior, not just because
deviation from socially prescribed identity provokes harsh sanctions, but
because acceptance of identity bestows social recognition and a sense of
self. In a gendered society, people need their gendered social identities to
be "normal."
As a vehicle for social control, sex/gender differentiation is also one
of the bases for political and economic privileging in a society.23 In the
United States, hierarchical sex structuring through law and ideology has
historically and contemporaneously used male morphology and
metaphoricity as its referent.24 Male is the referent; differences from the
male referent identify the female. The female becomes "other," i.e. other
than male. Her difference can be valued equally with the male referent or
it can be valued differentially.25
ify or embody or exhaust nearly all of the meanings that exist in the sexual situation,
Rarely do we turn from consideration of the organs themselves to the sources of the
meaning that are attached to them, the ways in which the physical activities of sex are
learned, and the ways in which these activities are integrated into larger social scripts
and social arrangements where meaning and sexual behavior come together to create
sexual conduct.
J. GAGNON & W. SIMON, supra note 17, at 5.
23. This appears to be a cross-cultural phenomenon:
Even anthropologists who are critical of feminist tendencies to universalize what are
really only culturally-specific features of the sex/gender system argue that male-domi-
nance, in the form of men's direct control of women's productive and reproductive labor
through control of a broad array of social institutions, appears to be an organic feature of
most recorded social life.
Harding, Why Has the Sex/Gender System Become Visible Only Now? in DISCOVERING REALITY
313 (S. Harding & G. Hintikka ed. 1983); see J. CHAFETZ, SEX AND ADVANTAGE: A COMPARA-
TIVE MACRO-STRUCTURAL THEORY OF SEX STRATIFICATION (1984) (acknowledging that females
are never more advantaged than males, though comparative female disadvantage varies); K. YOUNG,
C. WoLxowrrz & R. MCCULLAGH, OF MARRIAGE AND THE MARKET: WOMEN'S SUBORDINA-
TION INTERNATIONALLY AND ITS LESSONS (1984); MacKinnon, supra note 19, at 635-58; see also
C. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987); Crompton &
Mann, Introduction, in GENDER AND STRATIFICATION 1-10 (1986) (critiquing class and stratifica-
tion theory for its failure to address or its obscuring of gender); Rosaldo, The Use and Abuse of
Anthropology: Reflections on Feminism and Cross Cultural Understanding, 5 SIGNS 389, 394 (1980)
(arguing that male domination is universal though its content or shape is not).
24. Jane Flax illustrates her claim that adult single male behavior is viewed as constitutive of
human nature and experience by exploring classical political theory's identification of the state of
nature with unattached adult males. Flax, Mother-Daughter Relationships: Psychodynamics, Politics
and Gender, in THE FUTURE OF DIFFERENCE 29-31 (H. Eisenstein & A. Jardine eds. 1980); see also
Z. EISENSTEIN, FEMINISM AND SEXUAL EQUALITY: CRISIS IN LIBERAL AMERICA 146 (1984).
25. Martha Minow identifies unstated assumptions characterizing the inquiry into difference:
Difference is intrinsic, not relational. The norm is unstated. The observer can see without a perspec-
tive. Other perspectives are irrelevant. The status quo is natural, uncoerced, and good. Minow, Fore-
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Sex/gender categories are central to our thinking and exert a com-
pelling power to structure consciousness of the world around us.26 "The
sex/gender system appears to be a fundamental variable organizing social
life .... It may be that there has only rarely, anywhere been a human act
performed, or a human thought produced, for acts and thoughts have to
occur within the differential opportunities and limits set by the sex/gen-
der system."'27
Each narrative is about one of the primary institutions of the sex/
gender system-marriage. Marriage is the legitimate form of heterosex-
ual28 connection in American society. Dominant cultural norms have
identified marriage as both an economic arrangement29 and a particularly
word: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REv. 10, 32-33 (1987); see L. NICHOLSON, GENDER AND
HISTORY: THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL THEORY IN THE AGE OF THE FAMILY 3 (1986) (discussing the
connection between the market economy, the individualization of social life, and the different conse-
quences for men and women according to class at different points since the 19th century); see also D.
GrrrENs, supra note 21, at 2; Davidoff, The Rationalization of Housework, in DEPENDENCE AND
EXPLOrrATION IN WORK AND MARRIAGE 121 (D. Bauer & S. Allen eds. 1976).
26. Olsen, supra note 6, at 1498 (characterizing a structure of consciousness as "a shared vision
of the social universe that underlies a society's culture and also shapes the society's view of what
social relations are 'natural' and, therefore, what social reforms are possible"). More particularly, see
Hartsock, The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist Materialism,
in DISCOVERING REALry, supra note 24, at 283-310; Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructed
Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401, 405 n.10 (1987). For a contem-
porary illustration of this proposition, see Poll Shows Bias Against Women in High Offices, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 13, 1987, at A14, col. 3.
27. Kelly, supra note 21, at 52; see also Harding, supra note 23, at 312.
28. Marriage is defined as "the civil status, condition, or relation of one man and one woman
united in law for life, for the discharge to each other and the community of the duties legally incum-
bent upon those whose association is founded on the distinction of sex." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
876 (5th ed. 1979). In all cases, marriage has been considered the union of a man and woman. See,
e.g., B v. B, 78 Misc. 2d 112, 116-17, 355 N.Y.S.2d 712, 716 (Sup. Ct. 1974); see also Jones v.
Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 311-12, 191 N.W.2d
185, 186 (1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). New York neither specifically prohibits
marriage between persons of the same sex nor authorizes issuance of marriage licenses to such per-
sons. However, marriage is and always has been a contract between a man and a woman. Morris v.
Morris, 31 Misc. 2d 548, 549, 220 N.Y.S.2d 590, 591 (1961). Provision for annulment on the
grounds of physical incapacity for a sexual relationship supports the public policy that the marriage
relationship exists with the result and for the purpose of begetting offspring. See Mirizio v. Mirizio,
242 N.Y. 74, 81, 150 N.E. 605, 607 (1926); B. v. B., 78 Misc. 2d at 117, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 717;
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 67 Misc. 2d 982, 984, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
29. "Modern society is built about the home. Its perpetuation is essential to the welfare of the
community." In re Hughes' Will, 225 A.D. 29, 31, 232 N.Y.S. 84, 86 (4th Dep't 1928), aff'd, 251
N.Y. 529, 168 N.E. 415 (1929). "The policy of this State has always been in favor of the preservation
of the marriage relation, and contracts which have a direct tendency to promote a divorce have
always been condemned as contrary to public policy." In re Estate of Fleischmann, 64 Misc. 2d 924,
926, 316 N.Y.S.2d 272, 275 (Sur. Ct. 1970); see In re Estate of Rhinelander, 290 N.Y. 31, 47 N.E.2d
681 (1943); Hettich v. Hettich, 276 A.D. 953, 95 N.Y.S.2d 215, aff'd, 301 N.Y. 447, 95 N.E.2d 40
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desirable form of connection 30 for the formation and maintenance of
family.31 Legally acknowledged failures of marriage result in divorce or
the reorganization and restructuring of families. Historically, divorce has
been viewed as shameful for individuals and harmful to society; 32 today,
it is often considered an undesirable but necessary form of relief.
33
Each of the five narratives addresses the reform of the rules gov-
(1950); Schley v. Andrews, 225 N.Y. 110, 121 N.E. 812 (1919); Lake v. Lake, 136 A.D. 47, 119
N.Y.S. 686 (1909).
This policy has been incorporated into various statutes governing domestic relations. See Married
Women's Act, ch. 381, 1884 N.Y. Laws 465 (later incorporated into the Domestic Relations Law at
Act of Apr. 17, 1896, ch. 272, § 21, 1896 N.Y. Laws 215; Domestic Relations Act, ch. 19, § 51, 1909
N.Y. Laws 14; and now in N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-311, amended by Act of Apr. 27, 1966, ch.
254, § 12. 1966 N.Y. Laws 833).
Faced with the realities of the separation as an accomplished fact, however, courts recognize the
advisability of voluntary accommodations and uphold agreements where the parties themselves de-
lineate the measure of the obligation of support and, indeed, encourage such agreements where possi-
ble, in preference to litigation. See Galusha v. Galusha, 116 N.Y. 653, 22 N.E. 1114 (1889); Pettit v.
Pettit, 107 N.Y. 677, 14 N.E. 500 (1887); Shapiro v. Shapiro, 8 A.D.2d 341, 188 N.Y.S.2d 455 (Ist
Dep't 1959).
30. See C. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLU-
TION TO THE PRESENT (1980); M. GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAM-
ILY IN 19TH CENTURY AMERICA (1985); C. LAscH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD (1977); M.
RYAN, THE CRADLE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS: THE FAMILY IN ONEIDA COUNTY, NEW YORK,
1790-1815 (1981); A. SKOLNICK, THE INTIMATE ENVIRONMENT: EXPLORING MARRIAGE AND THE
FAMILY (1978). But see M. BARRETr & M. MCINTosH, THE ANTI-SOCIAL FAMILY (1982); S.
STEINMETZ, THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE: ASSERTIVE, AGGRESSIVE, AND ABUSIVE FAMILY INTER-
ACTION (1977) (traditional family structure at root of gendered subjectivity and domestic violence).
L. de Mause suggests that social historians have helped to perpetuate the myth of nonviolence in
the family by either denying its existence or assuming that violence only occurs in "other" families-
ghetto families or families characterized by some pathology such as drugs, alcohol, mental illness-
thus meshing the socially desirable view with reality. L. DE MAUSE, THE HISTORY OF CHILDHOOD
(1974).
31. See Collier, Rosaldo & Yanisako, Is There A Family? New Anthropological Views, Rapp,
Family and Class in Contemporary America: Notes Toward an Understanding of Ideology; and Za-
retsky, The Place of the Family in the Origins of the Welfare State, in RETHINKING THE FAMILY:
SOME FEMINIST QUESTIONS (B. Thorne & M. Yalom eds. 1982).
32. See L. HALEM, DIVORCE REFORM: CHANGING LEGAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES (1980);
see also E. FISHER, HELP FOR TODAY'S TROUBLED MARRIAGES (1968).
Divorce, like sex, is much talked about and has an aura that everybody's doing it; but,
like sex, it is an area where there are discrepancies between attitudes, feelings, and be-
havior, and there is widespread ignorance. Nowhere is it more evident than in the area of
divorce how much we tend to say one thing and then proceed to do another. We say we
accept divorce but as a society we are just not ready yet to accept and help those who do
divorce.
Id. at 207. Wilcox argues that the increasing numbers of divorces are due in part to the "populariza-
tion" of the law. "Many a man would live in ignorance that such a thing as divorce existed, were it
not for the conspicuous mention of trials in his morning paper." W. WILCOX, THE DIVORCE PROB-
LEM: A STUDY IN STATISTICS 64 (1969).
33. L. HALEM, supra note 32.
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erning marital dissolution as an aspect of the sex/gender system. By fo-
cusing on the values34 underlying the rules governing the dissolution of
marriage, as well as changes in these rules during the past two centuries,
each episode connects law as ideology to -the sex/gender system.
Theme 3: Property and Power
Each narrative is about property or the social construction of re-
sources. But it would be inaccurate to assume that because each story is
about property, it simply concerns physical objects or papers signifying
assets. Ultimately, each story is about property as a relationship of
power 35-the ability to make a claim to exclude another person from
enjoyment, use, or access to something, and to have that claim recog-
nized and enforced by law.36
In American society, the culturally, socially, and legally recognized
ability and competence to own property is said to be a fundamental
34. "There is perhaps more resistance to introspection and self awareness in this area of law
[family law] than in others." E. RUBIN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN FAMILY: IDE-
OLOGY AND ISSUES 8 (1986).
35. See Freeman, Anti-Discrimination Law: A Critical Review, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 96 (D.
Kairys ed. 1979) (analyzing the creation of wealth and privilege through distributive mechanisms
which, in turn, are legitimated through an ideology of individual merit); see also Macpherson,
Human Rights as Property Rights, and Macpherson, Property as Means or End, in THE RISE AND
FALL OF ECONOMIC JUSTICE AND OTHER PAPERS (1985).
36. Blackstone explained that
[the right of property] is that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and
exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other
individual in the universe. It consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all a
person's acquisitions, without any control or diminution save only for the laws of the
land.
2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 15 (15th ed. 1809). See generally
R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); P.
GROsSI, AN ALTERNATIVE TO PRIVATE PROPERTY: COLLECTIVE PROPERTY IN THE JURIDICAL
CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE 19TH CENTURY (1981) (analysis of the cult of "having"); A. JONES, LIFE,
LIBERTY AND PROPERTY: A STORY OF CONFLICT AND A MEASUREMENT OF CONFLICTING
RIGHTS (1964) (study of people's attitudes toward corporate property in Akron, Ohio and the result-
ing competing property interests in a one-industry town); Cribbet, Concepts in Transition: The
Search for a New Definition of Property to Include Individuals Rights, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 1;
Dowling, General Propositions and Concrete Cases: The Searchfor a Standard in the Conflict Between
Individual Property Rights and the Social Interest, I J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 353-83 (1985);
Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363 (1984). For a discussion of rights as property,
see Lynd, CommunalRights, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1417 (1984); see also Mensch, The Colonial Origins of
Liberal Property Rights, 31 BUFFALO L. REV. 635 (1982). For a discussion of the connection be-
tween property and identity when property is viewed as sustaining autonomy, see Salter, Inherent




source of identity.37 Such ownership is a major vehicle for private self-
expression, for the realization of individuality, and ultimately, for the
ability to exercise autonomy. It is a significant aspect of many liberal
conceptions of freedom.38
In each of the five stories, the power of the connections among for-
mal access to property, actual access to property, and identity for women
in the divorce process is explored. The disparity between formal and ac-
tual access to property has a pronounced impact on married women's
identity. Such a disparity is culturally defined as a wife's dependence on
her husband rather than understood as systematically produced eco-
nomic vulnerability reinforced by her gendered role.
Each of the five divorce law reform narratives incorporates these
three common themes: law as ideology, the sex/gender system as mani-
fested in divorce law and its reform, and property as a nexus of power in
the sex/gender system. Together they explore the complexities arising
from one fundamental issue-legal identity in its social context. This re-
lationship between legal identity and social context is essential to under-
standing the complexities and limitations of undertaking reform in family
law.
Legal identity is a personification in law of values and roles attrib-
uted to individuals, groups, or organizations by courts or legislatures.
The express purpose for this acknowledgment is connected with formal
access to the legal system. The legal identity of parties determines
whether they have standing in a legal contest.3 9
37. See A. RYAN, PROPERTY AND POLITICAL THEORY (1984) (analyzing instrumental and self-
developmental views of property in Western political and social theory). Note the contrast between
this mode of self-realization and an alternative mode, which connects self-realization and the forma-
tion of identity to relationships with others. See, eg., L. HYDE, THE GIFr: IMAGINATION AND THE
ETHIC LIFE OF PROPERTY (1979).
38. See J. LUSTIG, CORPORATE LIBERALISM: THE ORIGINS OF MODERN AMERICAN POLIr-
ICAL THEORY 1890-1920 (1982) (applying this argument to the transformation of Lockean to corpo-
rate liberalism). "Classical liberalism ... embraced the individual's right to a material basis for
liberty, and the right to communicate with others through the market device of contract." Id. at 2;
see also A. GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY: OUTLINE OF THE THEORY OF STRUCTURA-
TION (1984); A. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS (1977). "The claim to the citizen-
ship value of participation is a claim to an opportunity for individualist achievement." Karst, supra
note 18, at 470.
39. J. VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY: THE COMING OF AGE OF PUBLIC LAW 62-63 (1978). Though
Vining devotes his attention to legal identity in administrative law, his analysis is relevant in other
areas. See J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO, HOLMES AND WYTHE AS
MAKERS OF THE MASKS (1976); 0. PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY (1982).
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In fact, legal identity is a social construct-a set of categories4° re-
flecting a socially constructed reality. It is premised upon a multitude of
cultural choices regarding accepted societal arrangements, including a
determination regarding the competence41 of persons or entities to oper-
ate in civil society. It is underpinned by a set of cultural beliefs regarding
the autonomy of persons in a category and a social assessment of their
capacity to make meaningful choices. This competence or capacity is
identified with the ability to recognize and to assume responsibility for
morally differentiable acts, including those acts subject to legal sanctions.
Legal identity is far more than a technical device of the law; it re-
flects an exercise in social recognition and denial. Because the distribu-
tion of resources may turn on legal recognition or denial and because
courts and legislatures have a monopoly to create, refine, or change legal
identity, the definition of legal identity is a particularly dramatic and im-
portant arena for ideological struggles.
Legal identity also demarcates the categorization of claims to par-
ticipate in the ordering of rights and obligations in a society. Conse-
40. The use of such categories rests on several implicit or explicit assumptions. First is the belief
that these categories reflect differences. See Z. EISENSTEiN, supra note 24; Rifkin, Toward a Theory
of Law and Patriarchy, 3 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 83, 84 (1980). But see Minow, When Difference Has
Its Home: Group Homes for the Mentally Retarded, Equal Protection and Legal Treatment of Differ-
ence, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 111, 127-31 (1987) (discussing the "social relations" approach to
difference). "If one assumes that people are related to each other, then assertion of differences are
actually statements of relationships, since they express a comparison between the one doing the
asserting and the one about whom the assertion is made." Id. at 128. In the context of racism, see A.
MEMMI, DOMINATED MAN: NOTES TOWARDS A PORTRAIT (1968). "[I]t is not the difference which
always entails racism; it is racism which makes use of the difference." Id. at 187. Second is the belief
that these differences are coherent and clear-at least sufficiently clear to serve as a basis for catego-
rizing significant segments of a population. Third is the belief that these distinctions are meaningful
and that some socially desirable good or end informs the particular distinction and supports its
perpetuation. In turn, the assumption of meaningfulness is based on an assignment of values to these
differences manifested as a broad based attribution of a measure of "competence" to perform in civil
society. Id. at 188-89; see also D. DINNERSTEIN, THE MERMAID AND THE MINOTAUR: SEXUAL
ARRANGEMENTS AND THE HUMAN MALAISE 108 (1976) (for the "under-personification" of wo-
men). Such circular reasoning operates to create a self-fulfilling prophecy. Finally, there is the belief
that the difference is "totalized." All members of the group are characterized by the difference which
appears to be enduring if not unchangeable, and perceived variations in the category are less impor-
tant than perceived similarities within it.
41. See M. DALY, BEYOND GOD THE FATHER: TOWARD A PHILOSOPHY OF WOMEN'S LIBER-
ATION (1973); M. DALY, GYNECOLOGY: THE METAETHICS OF RADICAL FEMINISM (1978). See also
the writings of such French feminists as Helene Cixous, Julia Kristeva, Catherine Clement, Luce
Irigaray, and Monique Wittig, whose works share the conclusion that "[o]nly one sex has been
represented in Western discourse and the projection of male libidinal economy in all patriarchical
systems-language, capitalism, socialism, monotheism-has been total; women have been absent."
NEw FRENCH FEMINISMS: AN ANTHOLOGY xii (E. Marks & I. de Courtirran eds. 1980); see also
Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1191 (1985).
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quently, a particular construction of legal identity serves as a privileging
mechanism in society.
Legal identities developed and used for the recognition of classes of
human beings42 tend to rely on such socially constructed categories as
age,4 3 race,44 mental ability,45 sex,46 and marital status.47 To the extent
42. But note that legal identity has been tailored to meet the needs of such commercial struc-
tures as corporations by creating a fiction ofpersonhood for them. E. DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF
LABOR IN SOCIETY (G. Simpson trans. 1964); 0. GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE
AGES 67-73 (1900); 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 486-526, 634-
88 (2d ed. reissued 1968); Maitland, Moral Personality and Legal Personality, in COLLECTED PA-
PER S 304-12 (H. Fisher ed. 1911).
A corporation comes into existence when it is needed and dies when its usefulness is
done. It can own property and money... and buy and sell rather eminent men.... It can
make binding contracts, expand, contract, manufacture all goods, perform all services. It
needs no sleep and takes no vacations. It can borrow and steal and even beg.... If you
prick it, it does not bleed; if you tickle it, it does not laugh. It can scream however if
taxed or otherwise annoyed.
M. MAYER, WALL STREET: THE INSIDE STORY OF AMERICAN FINANCE 31 (1959). Recently it has
been suggested that legal identity be extended to entities, such as trees. Stone, Should Trees Have
Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972).
43. Concerning age as a category, it has been written:
Age distinctions pervade our society. They are commonly employed in statutes and
regulations as criteria for the distribution of public resources and for the imposition or
relaxation of legal responsibilities. They are utilized in a less formal, but no less substan-
tively significant, sense as mechanisms and reflect normative values about the proper
roles and rights of individuals whether the individual is a dependent infant or a fully-
employed adult or a frail older person.
Eglit & Neugarten, Introduction: National Conference on Constitutional and Legal Issues Relating to
Age Discrimination and the Age Discrimination Act, 57 CHI[-]KENT L. REV. 805 (1981); see also
Eglit, Of Age and the Constitution, 57 CHI[-]KENT L. REV. 859, 861 (1981) ("Age lines adopted in
statutes and regulations also serve to translate social attitudes into legal norms, thereby satisfying
more intangible, but nonetheless, societal needs."). Most age discrimination litigation has involved
employment bars against the elderly. See, eg., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979) (using rational
basis review to uphold federal law mandating foreign service personnel to rehire at age sixty). See
generally Smith & Leggett, Recent Issues in Litigation Under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 349 (1980).
44. In the United States, legal identity at times has been constructed to define millions of human
beings (both male and female) as a "subcategory of human proprietary objects," in other words,
slaves. 0. PATTERSON, supra note 39, at 21 (referring to M. FINLEY, ANCIENT SLAVERY AND MOD-
ERN IDEOLOGY 73-75 (1980)); see E. GENOVESE, ROLL JORDAN ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES
MADE (1974).
45. Minow, supra note 40.
46. Consider the language used by the court in United States v. St. Clair:
In providing for involuntary service for men and voluntary service for women, Con-
gress followed the teachings of history that if a nation is to survive, men must provide
the first line of defense while women keep the home fires burning. Moreover, Congress
recognized that in modem times there are certain duties in the Armed Forces which may
be performed by women volunteers. For these reasons, the distinction between men and
women with respect to service in the Armed forces is not arbitrary unreasonable or
capricious.
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that these socially constructed categories are visible or ascertainable with
relatively minimal effort, they are treated as self-evident or natural.48
This apparent self-evidentness reinforces the sense of the cultural appro-
priateness of the category and the boundaries embodied in the category.
And so, the fact that each of these categories is socially constructed and
reinforces existing power relationships is easy to ignore. At best, a partic-
ular argument about a hard case involving the margin of a socially con-
structed category49 may be left for the judge or scholar. Lost, forgotten,
suppressed, or unavailable to cultural consciousness is the recognition
that these categories, have as their point of reference the dominant group
in American society: white heterosexual men.5"
The five naratives detail the formal transformation of the legal iden-
tity of married women in New York and place this transformation in its
social context. They are narratives about changes in the legal identity of
women which have been celebrated as progress. 1 As these stories sug-
gest, however, a focus on changes in rules may avoid, evade, or distort
any assessment of the relationship between formal legal change and its
291 F. Supp. 122, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1908); see also United States v. Cook, 311 F. Supp 618 (W.D. Pa.
1970).
47. See United States v. Dege, 364 U.S. 51 (1960) (concerning the presumption against the
existence of a conspiracy between a husband and wife. Justice Frankfurter argued for the majority
that the presumption of "oneness" was simply a legal fiction. In dissent, Chief Justice Warren con-
tended that the presumption should be upheld to protect the confidential relationship of marriage.).
48. Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 205 (1979).
49. For a "hard case" involving race, see Trillin, American Chronicles: Black or White, THE
NEW YORKER, Apr. 14, 1986, at 62 (story of Susie Guillory Phipps, a Louisiana woman, who
considered herself white but discovered that her birth certificate identified both her parents as
"colored"). For hard cases involving sex, see Anonymous v. Mellon, 91 Misc. 2d 375, 398 N.Y.S.2d
99 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (gender is not merely anatomy, but includes psychological identity, acceptability
by others, chromosomal make up, reproductive capacity, and endocrine levels); Richards v. U.S.
Tennis Ass'n, 93 Misc. 2d 713, 400 N.Y.S.2a 267 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (requirement of passage of a sex-
chromatin test to participate in a tennis tournament grossly unfair, discriminatory, inequitable, and
violative of New York Human Rights Law); B. v. B., 78 Misc. 2d 112, 355 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct.
1974) (annulment granted because defendant, a female to male transsexual, did not disclose inability
to consummate marriage); Hartin v. Director of Records & Statistics, 75 Misc. 2d 229, 347 N.Y.S.2d
515 (Sup. Ct. 1973); (upholding board ruling preventing the inclusion of gender on birth certificates
issued to transsexuals). Note that in Hartin the board minutes indicate that surgery for the transsex-
ual is viewed as an experimental form of psychotherapy by which "mutilating surgery is conducted
on a person with the intent of setting his mind at ease, and that nonetheless, does not change the
body cells governing sexuality." Id. at 518. See generally Comment, The Law and Transsexualism:.A
Faltering Response to a Conceptual Dilemma, 7 CONN. L. REv. 288 (1974-75).
50. See Karst, supra note 18, at 452. "The social definition of woman has been constructed
around the needs of men." For an interesting fictional account of one woman's realization of the
effect of social construction on her roles as woman, wife, and mother, see D. LESSING, THE SUMMER
BEFORE THE DARK (1973).
51. See Marcus, supra note 16, at 57 n.10.
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impact on social identity and economic power. An "egalitarian" reform
may produce contrary results if it ignores either the economic or cultural
context. In the instance of divorce law reform, the socially objectified and
individually internalized roles of woman and man, wife and husband,
mother and father have limited the extent of meaningful change between
women and men. The individual identities compelled and enabled by
these roles generate a collective unwillingness to disturb power relation-
ships in which men dominate women. Changing categories fails to
change the lived reality of gender in our culture.
II. FIVE NARRATIVES
Narrative 1-Property and The Development of Legal Identity for
Married Women
A. Common Law and Equity. Gendered Access to Property
Historically in American society, heterosexual5
2 monogamous5 3
marriage has been the legally and socially privileged 4 form of sexual,
intimate connection. Marriage created a recognized social unit. As par-
52. See supra note 28.
53. The Edmunds Act, ch. 47, 225 Stat. 30 (1882) made polygamy illegal and punishable by
imprisonment, disenfranchisement, and the declaration of children born to such marriages as illegiti-
mate. The Act was revised by The Anti-Polygamy Act, ch. 397, 24 Stat. 635 (1887), in which Con-
gress annulled the Mormon Church for its refusal to adhere to the ban on polygamy. Id. § 17, ch.
397, 24 Stat. 635, 638; see also Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v.
United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890) (Congress has power to repeal the charter of the Mormon Church
and to dispose of the church's property if the church does not adhere to the Edmunds Act); Reyn-
olds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (religious belief does not justify overt criminal act; statute
proscribing bigamy does not contravene religious scruples of those practicing bigamist marriage).
But see Miller, A Critique of the Reynolds Decision, 11 W. ST. U.L. REv. 165 (1984); see also Hallo-
well v. Commons, 210 F. 793 (8th Cir. 1914), aff'd, 239 U.S. 506 (1915) (upholding plural marriages
entered by Native American living in tribal relations); La Framboise v. Day, 136 Minn. 239, 161
N.W. 529 (1917); Buck v. Branson, 34 Okla. 807, 127 P. 436 (1912) (Native American marriages
valid according to custom and law of tribe to which the parties belong).
See N.Y. PENAL LAv, § 255.15 (McKinney 1980) (making multiple simultaneous marriages ille-
gal). A person is guilty of bigamy when either party contracts or purports to contract a marriage
with another person at a time when either party has a living spouse.
54. Marriage was viewed as an "exclusive sanctioned form of cohabitation, a divine, monoga-
mous lifelong institution designed to produce and nurture children." Younger, Marital Regimes: A
Story of Compromise and Demoralization Together with Criticism and Suggestions for Reform, 67
CORNELL L. REv. 45, 46 (1981).
[W]hilst marriage is often termed.., a civil contract- generally to indicate that it must
be founded upon the agreement of the parties, and does not require any religious cere-
mony for its solemnization-it is something more than a mere contract. It is ... the
foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be neither civiliza-
tion nor progress.
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210-11 (1888).
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ties to a marriage, men and women were assigned a new status5S--hus -
bands and wives. Embodied in this status relationship was formal
recognition of a societally acceptable assessment of civil capacity. This
recognition was manifested in the legal identity accorded each party.
The assignment of legal identity in marriage was informed by sex
and was structured by the prevailing sex/gender system. Men and wo-
men were husbands and wives. For women and men who married (the
overwhelming preponderance of all adults), 6 the connection between the
sex/gender system and legal identity in marriage under the common law
was dramatic and clear. While the legal and social identity of married
men was expanded, the legal identity of married women was appropri-
ated through coverture. For legal purposes, a married woman had no
separate self.
From the period of British colonial rule 7 until 1848,58 New York
used the common law doctrines and rules regarding marriage and its dis-
solution5 9 to structure the appropriation of married women's legal iden-
tity. As a matter of law and public policy, a complex, intimate, social and
economic relationship involving both production and reproduction was
reduced to a seemingly simple coercive legal fiction-the unity6 ° of hus-
55. See generally Land v. State, 71 Fla. 270, 71 So. 279 (1916) (One permitted to enjoy the
privileges of the marital status must be held to the responsibilities belonging to that status.); Haas v.
Haas, 298 N.Y. 69, 80 N.E.2d 337 (1948); Mirizo v. Mirizo, 242 N.Y. 74, 150 N.E. 605 (1926)
(Before a wife can demand benefits under the marriage contract, the burden is on her to show that
she is willing to discharge the obligations under it.); Coleman v. Burr, 93 N.Y. 17 (1883) (Wife's care
of her husband's sick mother is just service rendered in the discharge of a duty husband owed
mother and in rendering it wife was simply discharging the marital duty owed her husband.).
56. Married women have been the majority of women for the past century, with 59.4% of all
women married in 1890, 60.4% in 1920, 67.4% in 1955, and 60.4% in 1985. U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1957, at 15
(1960); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 38 (107th
ed. 1987).
57. Prior to the permanent conquest of New Netherlands by the English in 1674, both Dutch
and English women living under Roman-Dutch law were permitted to retain their own real and
personal property, own and operate their own businesses without the permission or cosignature of
their husbands, engage in trade on their own, and sue and be sued in court. L. BIEMER, WOMEN
AND PROPERTY IN COLONIAL NEw YORK: THE TRANSITION FROM DUTCH TO ENGLISH LAW,
1643-1727, at 6-9 (1983).
58. Married Women's Property Act, ch. 200, 1848 N.Y. Laws 307, repealed by Domestic Rela-
tions Law of 1896, ch. 272, art. III, 1896 N.Y. Laws 215, 219-22.
59. See N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXV (1797) (adopting common law and statutes as they
formed the law of the colony of New York as of 1775); see also Dean, Economic Relations Between
Husband and Wife in New York, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 175 (1955-56).
60. According to Blackstone, "the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended
during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband: under
whose wing, protection and cover, she performs everything." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
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band and wife in one person, the husband. Culturally, this socially con-
structed rule was identified as part of the "natural order of things."',
Legally, this unity entailed a sex/gendered differential assessment of
competence and capacity to operate in the world. One party in the mar-
riage, the husband, enjoyed heightened social, civil, and commercial ca-
pacity and competence. As a corollary, the wife became the other62
*430 (Oxford 1765). In the common law a married woman was identified as a feme covert. Feme
covert is defined as: "A woman under cover or protection of her husband; a married woman.... A
feme couert cannot make a contract .... An infant, lunatic, feme covert, or [etc.]. humorously:
Wife." 4 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 151 (1961) (citations omitted).
61. See N. BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY IN NINE-
TEENTH CENTURY NEW YORK 42-69 (1982) (discussing power of the metaphor of marital unity).
But see Rowe, Femes Covert and Criminal Prosecution in Eighteenth Century Pennsylvania, 32 AM. J.
OF LEGAL Hisr. 138 (1988) (discussing actual dispositional patterns in prosecutions involving mar-
ried women).
62. The legal options were framed as autonomy or dependence. The dichotomous nature of this
approach did not capture the variety and complexity of mental competence or interpersonal depen-
dencies. Neither did it recognize the historic and culturally contingent nature of the categories, or
that the rules regarding the dichotomy might vary within a culture, thereby allowing for manipula-
tion rather than absolute closure. Minow, supra note 25, at 27-28. Moreover, and perhaps most
importantly, the dichotomy violated experience. Autonomy might have no point without interper-
sonal connection and interpersonal connection need not mean dependency or domination. Id. at 17.
For discussions of dependency and autonomy, see R. BELLAH, R. MADISON, W. SULLIVAN, A.
SWIDLER & S. TIPTON, HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERI-
CAN LIFE (1985) [hereinafter R. BELLAH]; M. DALY, PURE LUST: ELEMENTAL FEMINIST PHILOS-
OPHY (1984); S. DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (1952); D. DINNERSTEIN, supra note 40.
Earlier feminist works sought to place women on the autonomy side of the dichotomy with argu-
ments that a woman was an independent human being capable of rational thought, deserving of
education, and able to earn a living. A Vindication of the Rights of Woman underscores Mary Woll-
stonecraft's concern that women should have power over themselves, to use their own reason and,
thereby, to live up to their potential as human beings. See M. WOLLSTONECRAFT, A VINDICATION
OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMAN (London 1792).
Elizabeth Cady Stanton argued that society would be better off if women were allowed the free-
dom of individual choice enjoyed by men. When "husbands and wives do not own each other as
property, but are bound together only by affection, marriage will be a lifelong friendship and not a
heavy yoke, from which both may sometimes long for deliverance. The freer the relations are be-
tween human beings, the happier . . .". Stanton, Speech to the McFarland-Richardson Protest Meet-
ing, in ELIZABETH CADY STANTON, SUSAN B. ANTHONY: CORRESPONDENCE, WRITINGS,
SPEECHES 134-35 (E. DuBois ed. 1981) [hereinafter STANTON, ANTHONY: CORRESPONDENCE]. In
Stanton's most impassioned plea for women's political equality, she argued that society required the
same duties and sacrifices of both men and women. Each was ultimately required to make' life's
journey alone; therefore, every human soul should be fitted for survival, for independent action. A
dependent woman was "[riobbed of her natural rights, handicapped by law and custom at every
turn, yet compelled to fight her own battles, and in the emergencies of life to fall back on herself for
protection .... Stanton, The Solitude of Self, in STANTON, ANTHONY: CORRESPONDENCE, supra,
at 249.
Charlotte Perkins Gilman identified women's problems as rooted in women's economic depen-
dence on men.
[But] all that she may wish to have, all that she may wish to do, must come through a
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party in the marriage. Her capacity or competence was denied and elimi-
nated by law. Moreover, her "civil disabilities and limitations were mir-
rored by a loss of economic autonomy and sexual integrity.
63
For legal purposes, married women were virtually invisible.' Their
lack of legal capacity, derived from the unity in marriage doctrine, was
particularized as a set of disabilities6" which separated women from the
single channel and a single choice. Wealth, power, social distinction, fame,-not only
these, but home and happiness, reputation, ease and pleasure, her bread and butter,-
all, must come to her through a small gold ring.
C. GILMAN, WOMEN AND ECONOMICS: A STUDY OF THE ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN MEN
AND WOMEN AS A FACTOR IN SOCIAL EVOLUTION 71 (1898). Ironically, the new emphasis on
equating work with economic and emotional self-sufficiency or autonomy kept many middle-class
women from recognizing that most working women were not independent laborers but part of a
family economic unit in which work did not lead to financial independence. See Pye, Creating a
Feminist Alliance: Sisterhood and Class Conflict in the New York Women's Trade Union League
1903-1914, 2 FEMINIST STUD. 24-38 (1975).
63. Speth, The Married Women's Property Acts, 1839-1865: Reform, Reaction or Revolution? in
2 WOMEN AND THE LAW: A SOCIAL HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 69 (D. Weisberg ed. 1982); see M.
SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA 195-97 nn.3-4 (1986) (review
of revisionist and feminist shift in historical interpretation regarding the status of women during the
colonial and early national periods); Gundersen, Independence, Citizenship, and The American
Revolution, 13 SIGNS 59, 74 (1987) (discussing the changing definitions and uses of Revolutionary
rhetoric: "independence," "dependence," "liberty," and "slavery," and the effect of these changes on
the status of women).
64. The Seneca Falls Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions described married women as
civilly dead. Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions, 1848, in THE AMERICAN SISTERHOOD 42-46
(W. Martin ed. 1972).
65. See M. SALMON, supra note 63. Married women acting alone
could not execute a valid contract. Nor could they convey the property they brought to
their marriages or earned with their husbands. They also lost the power to act as execu-
tors or administrators of estates and as legal guardians .... Men... possessed the legal
right to devise their estates, whereas women could do so only with the express consent of
their husbands. Even then their right extended only to personal property.
Id. at 14-15. Tangible personal property belonged to the husband and could be reached by his credi-
tors. Choses in action, when reduced to the husband's possession, also became his property. Title to
land remained in the wife, but the husband was entitled to manage or rent her land during the
marriage and could retain any profits. A husband, however, could not sell or mortgage his wife's real
estate without her consent. The common law permitted conveyances only when wives freely agreed
to them, although "free" consent might be difficult to determine in court despite the protection of a
private examination of a wife by the judge. Id. at 15, 28-30. Moreover, courts in New York adopted
loose, informal standards for conveyancing. Id. at 30. The husband's interest lasted only during his
wife's life unless an issue of the marriage was born alive, in which event the husband's interest
extended during his life under the doctrine of curtesy. The husband could alienate and his creditors
could reach his wife's land to the extent of his interest.
A married woman was unable to enter into a contract with her husband, Winter v. Winter, 191
N.Y. 462, 84 N.E. 382 (1908), or with third parties, Dickerson v. Rogers, 114 N.Y. 405, 21 N.E. 992
(1889). She could not convey either real or personal property to or from her husband or acquire or
dispose of property from third parties without her husband's consent. Hunt v. Johnson, 44 N.Y. 27
(1870). She could not engage in trade or business, Abbey v. Deyo, 44 Barb. 374 (1863), aff'd, 44
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mainstream of civil-and particularly, commercial-society. The pre-
ponderance of a married woman's disabilities stemmed from the lack of
capacity to own, manage, buy, or sell property, and hence, to contract. In
turn, these disabilities reinforced the economic dependence of most mar-
ried women upon their husbands without regard to the wife's social
class.66
The common law legal fiction was that marriage transformed a dual-
ity into a unity. The context in which the doctrine of marital unity oper-
ated-the highly differentiated sex/gender structure of marriage-meant
recognition and retention of duality. Wives and husbands as women and
men were said to be identifiably different, and this recognition of differ-
ence appeared in law as well as in social practices and conventions. Mar-
ried men had no need to call upon their wives to assert and legally act
upon their socially recognized capacities. In contrast, married women
were required by law to need and depend upon their husbands.
The denial of married women's separate legal identity and the le-
gally sanctioned and reinforced dependency for married women that re-
sulted was justified and rationalized by religious, 67 historic, 68  and
N.Y. 343 (1871), unless she had the consent of her husband, Cropsey v. McKinney, 30 Barb. 47
(1859), or sue or be sued without joinder of her husband, Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N.Y. 584, 23 N.E.
17 (1889); see Reynolds v. Robinson, 64 N.Y. 589, 593 (1876) (absent special agreement all married
woman's services and earnings belong to husband who converts his house into hospital); Porter v.
Dunn, 16 N.Y.S. 77, 30 N.E. 122 (1892) (husband entitled to recover value of wife's services as nurse
to invalid renter when wife, acting in service of and subordinate to her husband, makes no claim for
compensation). But see N. BASCH, supra note 61, at 20 (for situations in which the common law
removed or erased the wife's disabilities).
66. While the common law structured and encouraged gendered economic dependency, it
claimed to remain uninvolved in family affairs-the realm of domestic privacy. In contrast, the
family law of the poor attempted to control dependency through forms of public relief which
respected neither domestic privacy or individual rights. M. BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN
A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1776-1876, at 99-104, 122-35 (1976). See generally C. STANSELL, CITY OF
WOMEN: SEX AND CLASS IN NEW YORK 1789-1860, at 3-38 (1986). Stansell notes that widowhood
was a common road to female proprietorship. Id. at 14; see also E. ROSEN, BITTER CHOICES: BLUE
COLLAR WOMEN IN AND OUT OF WORK (1987).
67. 2 H. DE BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND (S. Thorne trans. 1968)
attributed this unity to the biblical teaching that the husband and wife become "one flesh." Genesis
2:24. The biblical demand that wives obey their husbands was used to justify placing sole control of
the marital unit in the husband. Genesis 3:16. Bracton advanced the argument that the husband is
the wife's guardian. "Women differ from men in many respects, for their position is inferior to that
of men." 2 H. DE BRACTON, supra, at 31.
68. Laughrey, Uniform Marital Property Act: A Renewed Commitment to the American Family,
65 NEB. L. REV. 120, 123-25 (1986) explores the argument that English common law marital prop-
erty reflects a strong movement to unify property in one person and is in part attributable to the
consolidation of power in the English king and the development of the common law courts, The
system of primogeniture appears to have been propelled by similar concerns. However, there is a
crucial difference-primogeniture did not deprive younger sons of their separate legal identity.
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pragmatic69 assertions which tended to emphasize the differences be-
tween men and women. Separately and collectively, these assertions were
used to demonstrate either the intrinsic or contingent nature of women's
intellectual, physical, and emotional weakness. In turn, these overinclu-
sive claims reinforced the argument that, given the hierarchically ordered
and legally reinforced power relationships in marriage, women would not
be able to muster or demonstrate the requisite autonomous will to con-
tract,70 or to act in other civil or criminal situations. Capacity and com-
petence were interchangeable. Whether considered singly or paired, they
formed the rationale for denying married women a separate legal iden-
tity. With this last twist of reasoning, the ideological circularity was com-
plete. Nature or history each produced the same result, a result which
was presumed to be socially, culturally, and politically desirable.
The consequences of the appropriation of a married woman's legal
identity were increased legal and economic prerogatives for her husband.
As a married woman's legally designated protector, her husband ac-
quired an expansive legal identity as head of household with financial
power. 1
69. According to Blackstone, the rationale for female coverture is the creation of lawful heirs
for the properties and identification of a responsible party for the care, maintenance, protection, and
education of children in the lower ranks. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 60, at 358, 394-95, 402.
Kent attributed the legal incapacity of married women to their dependent relationship with their
protective husbands, rather than any intrinsic inferiority. 1 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERI-
CAN LAW 129 n.(b) (1884); see also W. PAGE III, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1658, at 2853 (2d ed.
1920) (acknowledging the power differential in marriage relationship and relying on a "rational ba-
sis" for it-the husband's liability for his wife's obligations which thereby removes autonomous
responsibility from her). For a discussion of these various rationales, see Johnston, Sex and Property:
The Common Law Tradition, the Law School Curriculum, and Developments Toward Equality, 47
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1033, 1044-52 (1972); see also M. SALMON, supra note 63, at 40 (In colonies settled
by Puritans and Quakers, the reduction of women's autonomy was viewed as part of the goal of
strengthening the family.).
70. See M. SALMON, supra note 63, at 41-57, for a discussion of the express concern of courts
regarding male coercion of women in contract situations. Salmon details the accommodations made
for married women who were designated as sole traders.
71. P. RABKIN, FATHERS TO DAUGHTERS: THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF FEMALE EMANCI-
PATION 19 (1980). The husband had the status of master and head of the household. The wife was
obligated to render obedience, domestic service, and submission to her husband. He was entitled to
possession, use, and income from her estate for the duration of their marriage. Hiles v. Fisher, 144
N.Y. 306 (1895); Bradley v. Walker, 138 N.Y. 291, 33 N.E. 1079 (1893). He could bind the property
for the duration of his estate. He could grant, convey, or mortgage this interest. Jones v. Patterson,
I 1 Barb. 572 (1852). All personal property owned before the marriage or acquired after the marriage
was placed in her husband's possession. DeBrauwere v. DeBrauwere, 203 N.Y. 460, 96 N.E. 722
(1911); Whiton v. Snyder, 88 N.Y. 299 (1882). While the wife acquired the legal right of dower (one-
third of the value of the lands her husband owned during the marriage), the husband acquired the
legal right of curtesy, a life estate in the real property owned by his wife during the marriage, pro-
vided they had children capable of inheriting the estate.
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Accompanying the psychological and material benefits connected
with this identity was the formal legal obligation that a husband provide
undefined support for his wife and children during the marriage.72 While
New York law declared it a crime for a husband to fail to provide sup-
port, 73 cases underscored the fundamental unwillingness of the courts to
intervene in the private financial ordering of the marriage.74 The actual
standard was minimal. As legal head of household, a husband could de-
cide the appropriate level of support, so long as he prevented his wife and
children from becoming public charges.75 That support obligation might
72. "Although a man was morally obligated to cherish and support his wife, the common law
permitted him to squander her property with impunity, to deprive her at will of creature comforts,
and if she complained to 'chastise' her roundly." M. BLOOMFIELD, supra note 66, at 95. Minow
notes the conflict between the legal rules depriving the wife of property and capacity to contract, and
the language of religious marriage ceremonies in which the husband pledged his new wife all his
worldly goods. Minow, supra note 25, at 45. But see J. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
MARRIED WOMEN 680 (1873) (describing marriage as bargain that freed women from toil and the
burden of care for future support).
The doctrine of necessaries, developed by the English courts, was used as a means of enforcing a
husband's duty to support his wife during an ongoing marriage. See e.g., Mott v. Comstock, 8 Wend,
544 (1832) (A feme covert while living with her husband, can make no contract binding upon him in
her capacity of wife, except for reasonable necessaries having due regard to her condition and quality
in life, and the ability of her husband to pay; nor can she bind him even to this extent, provided he
furnishes the necessaries himself for her and the family.). But see McCutchen v. McGahay, 11 Johns.
281 (Sup. Ct. 1814) (duty existed only when the wife was cohabiting with her husband). Thus, "[h]e
is bound to provide for her in his family; and while he is guilty of no cruelty towards her, and is
willing to provide her a home, and all the necessaries there, he is not bound to furnish them else-
where." Id. at 282. If a woman left her husband without sufficient cause or committed adultery, the
husband was discharged from his obligation to furnish her with necessaries. As one astute observer
pointed out, this limitation, in addition to guarding some innocent husbands against irresponsible or
adulterous wives, surely must have deterred women from leaving their husbands. J. KELLY, CON-
TRACTS OF MARRIED WOMEN 167 (1882). See generally Note, The Unnecessary Doctrine of Neces-
saries, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1767 (1984).
73. Domestic Relations Law, ch. 19, 1909 N.Y. Laws 14 (originally enacted as Act of Apr. 17,
1896, ch. 272, § 21, 1896 N.Y. Laws 220) (later codified as N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 51) (repealed
1964). The subject matter is now covered in N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 19-101, 3-301, 5-311 (Con-
sol. 1977 & Supp. 1988); see also Family Court Act, ch. 6, § 6, 1962 N.Y. Laws 3043 (as amended
Sept. 1, 1983); Law of Apr. 24, 1962, ch. 686, art. 4, pt. 1, § 412, 1962 N.Y. Laws 3079, amended by
Law of June 19, 1980, ch. 281, § 27, 1980 N.Y. Laws 1237.
74. McGuire v. McGuire, 37 Misc. 259, 75 N.Y.S. 302, (Sup. Ct. 1902), aff'd, 81 A.D. 636, 81
N.Y.S. 1134 (1903).
75. Paulsen, Support Rights and Duties Between Husband and Wife, 9 VAND. L. REV. 709
(1956); see Keller v. Phillips, 40 Barb. 390, aff'd, 39 N.Y. 351 (1868) (husband bound to provide for
his wife and children whatever is necessary for their suitable clothing and maintenance, according to
his and their situation and condition in life. Ordinarily, he will be presumed to assent to her making,
upon his credit, such purchases as, in the conduct of the domestic concerns, are proper for her
management and supervision. But, if he sees fit to destroy such presumption by an express prohibi-
tion, no one having notice thereof may trust the wife in reliance upon his credit, unless the husband
so neglects his duty that supplies become necessary. In such case, the party seeking to recover in the
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continue upon dissolution of a marriage, depending on a court's assess-
ment of his wife's conduct during the marriage.
76
In limited instances, colonial and post-revolution New York courts
of equity77 tempered the harshness of the common law doctrine of mari-
tal unity with its clear appropriation of married women's legal identity.
Equity recognized a limited separate legal identity for a married woman
derived from and contingent upon the actions of a male who was either
her father or husband. 78 Either male could provide her with a separate
estate.
Through the recognition of a separate estate for married women,
equity appears to have played some role79 in allowing access to real prop-
erty. However, it was availabile only to a few economically privileged
married women.8° Equity addressed claims for an exception to the pre-
face of such prohibition, takes the burden of proving the neglect of the husband to supply such
necessaries.)
76. See infra notes 214-15 and accompanying text.
77. F. MAITLAND, EQurrY 19 (1926). The distinction between law and equity did not exist
under the Dutch civil law code which was used in New Netherlands. Post-independence revisers of
New York state law also claimed that feudal tenures did not exist while the colony was under Dutch
administration. P. RABKIN, supra note 71, at 100-01 (citing Redfield, English Colonial Polity and
Judicial Administration 1664-1776, in 1 HIsTORY OF THE BENCH AND BAR OF NEW YORK 35, 69
(1897)).
78. Equity recognized the antenuptial contract, under which married women from wealthy fam-
ilies whose fathers preferred to endow their daughters rather than their sons-in-law, held their prop-
erty in a trust separate from the husband's control and managed for the wife's benefit; in some cases,
postnuptial agreements reserved a separate estate for the wife. See Johnston, supra note 69, at 1052-
57 (discussing development of equity doctrines relating to married women). For example, a married
woman could dispose of an estate by sale, gift, or devise, or encumber it unless constrained by the
trust instrument. Yale v. Dederer, 18 N.Y. 265 (1858). She was entitled to the sale, exclusive use,
rents, and profits from the estate. Martin v. Martin, I N.Y. 473 (1848). Her property was secure
from her husband's creditors. Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N.Y. 202 (1854); Shirley v. Shirley, 9 Paige
Ch. 363 (1841); Smith v. Kane, 2 Paige Ch. 303 (1830). Transactions between husband and wife
were enforceable. Hendricks v. Isaacs, 117 N.Y. 411, 22 N.E. 1029 (1899). Each could be sued by the
other. Moore v. Moore, 47 N.Y. 467 (1872). Contracts with third parties which benefited or charged
the estate and which did not conflict with the trust instrument were valid and enforceable. Yale, 18
N.Y. at 265; see N. BASCH, supra note 61, at 89 (for situations involving postnuptial agreements).
Basch notes, "If the common law disabilities of married women were restrictive, the economic op-
portunities open to unmarried women were even more restrictive. Marriage was a partnership that
promised support by the husband in return for the lifelong services of the wife." Id. at 111.
79. See M. SALMON, supra note 63, at 81-119. Evidence suggests that the creation of a separate
estate was used in early 19th century New York, although precise data are not available. N. BASCH,
supra note 61, at 73-74, 108-09. A study of marriage settlements in South Carolina concluded that no
more than two percent of wives created a separate estate in equity in the years 1730 to 1830. Salmon,
Women and Property in South Carolina: The Evidence from Marriage Settlements, 1730 to 1830, 39
WM. & MARY Q. 655 (1982).
80. Equitable instruments which permitted the carving ott of limited individual exceptions for
elite married women were unwieldy and costly. Johnston, supra note 69, at 1059. They required legal
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vailing common law rule of marital unity. It was not a vehicle for a direct
challenge to the common law.
As equity identified some of the limitations in the application of the
common law fiction of marital unity, the common law, infused with pre-
vailing cultural norms and expectations of married women's submission
and subservience, set the parameters for equity's results. Equity's deal-
ings with married women were informed and framed by the in loco
parentis doctrine which classified women in the same category as idiots
and children.8" Thus, while courts of equity might be inclined to secure
to privileged married women needing support the benefits of their own
assets, judges were less responsive to claims Which might vindicate the
rights of married women to power or independence.82
B. The Married Women's Property Acts:
Degendered Access to Property
In the period following the American Revolution, it became appar-
ent that major aspects of the legal system, largely imported from Britain,
were unsatisfactory.8 3 Attacks were mounted on both the common law
and equity. The common law was viewed as rigid and constraining; eq-
uity, especially when applied to the transmission of property, was confus-
ing. 4 Between 1782 and 1848, New York legislators passed a series of
sophistication and care in their drafting, lest they be declared invalid and the common law rules
prevail. N. BASCH, supra note 61, at 25-26. Nor were the rules readily available in statutes governing
the formation of such estates. M. SALMON, supra note 63, at 86.
81. L. KANowITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 39-40 (1969).
82. N. BASCH, supra note 61, at 76-77, 82.
83. The codification movement of the 1820s and 1830s envisioned the creation of a body of
indigenous American law. It identified legislatures, rather than judges exercising their discretion and
prerogatives in either courts of common law or equity, as the source of law. P. RABKIN, supra note
71, at 52-60. Allied with the codifiers were those who were concerned with debtor/creditor issues in
the unstable Jacksonian era economy. In addition, pressure for significant revision of the laws was
generated by changes in the technology of commerce-the development and the treatment by the
law of new property forms such as savings accounts and life insurance. (I am indebted to my col-
league Tom Headrick for this insight as part of the larger issue of the relationship between techno-
logically based change and social consciousness.) Advocates of women's rights also were identified
with law reform efforts. See B. TAYLOR, EVE AND THE NEw JERSUSALEM: SOCIALISM AND FEMI-
NISM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1983) (arguing that reform of marital property laws was a
strong element in the utopian socialist program of the Owenites in both the United States and Eng-
land and influenced the thinking of 19th century American advocates of women's rights); see also
STANTON, ANTHONY: CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 62.
84. Thomas Jefferson characterized chancery as "a chaos, irreducible to a system, insusceptible
to final rules and incapable of definition and explanation." J. NOONAN, supra note 39, at 16. More-
over, equity was viewed as advantaging a small segment of the population. G. WOOD, THE CREA-
TION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 292-93 (1969). For a general discussion of the
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important property law reforms. These reforms were directed toward the
commercialization and simplification of property law, including the free
alienation of land.85 Initially, efforts to reform both the common law and
equity were unconnected with the issue of access of married women to
property.8 6 However, while not intended to degender access to property,
the enacted legislation served to lay the ground and to facilitate the de-
mand for such access.87
In the spring of 1837, Assemblyman Thomas Hertell from New
relationship between equity and codification, see L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW
210-11 (1973).
85. The Revised Statutes of 1828 abolished passive or formal trusts in which the trustee had no
active duty to perform. Such trusts were converted to the legal estate of the beneficial owner, thereby
making assets available to creditors. N.Y. REv. STAT. vol. 1, pt. II, ch. 1, § 48 (1828); see also P.
RABKIN, supra note 71, at 77.
86. For married women in New York who relied upon such trusts for access to their family
assets, thereby avoiding the common law marital unity doctrine, the impact of a "progressive" re-
form for men did not create a legal breakthrough for married women. Although a married woman,
as prior equitable owner or the beneficiary of the use of a trust, became the legal owner under the
reform, prior to 1848, under the common law, married women could have no separate legal estate. It
belonged to her husband. N. BASCH, supra note 61, at 81-88. Under the reform, the equitable estate
became a legal estate. With the execution of the equitable estate into a legal estate, the wife would
lose her equitable or beneficial ownership without gaining a corresponding legal estate. Thus, the
unintended consequence of the reform was to recreate the precise situation which the trust sought to
avoid, namely control by a husband over a married woman's property. P. RABKIN, supra note 71, at
75. Moreover, the 1828 Revised Statutes permitted the creation of trusts in real estate only.
§ 23 All provisions contained in this Article, relative to future estates, shall be construed
to apply to limitations of chattels real, as well as of freehold estates, so that the absolute
ownership of a term of years, shall not be suspended for a longer period than the abso-
lute power of alienation can be suspended, in respect to a fee.
N.Y. REv. STAT., pt. II, ch. 1, tit. II § 5. According to Speth, a father who wished to transfer other
types of wealth (personal property) was unable to do so. Speth, supra note 63, at 77.
87. From 1832 to 1848, support for further reforms-identified as a married women's property
bill-was garnered from a shifting coalition of forces with differing agendas. Proponents included
those who favored more lenient debtor laws in an unstable antebellum economy, those who advo-
cated more legislative and less judicial control of the legal system, and those who wanted to improve
the status of women. More conservative opponents sought only to restore the trust to its former
position as the legal device to hold married women's property separate from their husbands. See
Basch, The Emerging Legal History of Women in the United States, 12 SIGNS 99 (1986) (review of
scholarly literature on thelega status of American women between the Revolution and the passage
of the Married Women's Property Acts); see also P. RABKIN, supra note 71, at 86-87.
If one were to identify a single smoldering issue that symbolized the subordinate status
of women in the wake of the Revolution and sparked the rise of the women's movement
in the antebellum years, it would have to be the inability of married women to control
their property.... By launching a series of impassioned attacks on coverture, the com-
mon law term for the restricted legal status of married women, and by sustaining voluble
campaigns for legislative reform, feminists attached their own political agenda to a legal-
reform trend that was already underway.
Basch, supra, at 97, 99; see also L. KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC: INTELLECT AND IDEOL-
OGY IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1980). Once the common law disabilities for married wo-
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York City introduced a bill to protect and preserve the rights and prop-
erty of married women.88 Although his bill never emerged from the Judi-
ciary Committee, it generated widespread public discussion which
structured many of the arguments that surfaced in the next ten years.89
Between 1840 and 1848, several bills proposing changes in the legal
status of married women were introduced in the New York legislature.
"Unlike clashes over banks, canals, and rent ... clashes over the legal
status of married women were relegated to the private recesses of succes-
sive judiciary committees."90 Women who petitioned the legislature ar-
gued that the status quo fostered a dependency relationship which
destroyed household harmony.9 The bills failed to emerge from the Judi-
ciary Committee, though occasional reports issued by the committee re-
vealed a level of internal controversy. 92 Nor did advocates of access for
men's property rights had been removed, it was a logical step to demand the suffrage. P. RABKIN,
supra note 71, at 10. But see Johnston, supra note 69, at 1062 n.120.
88. N. BASCH, supra note 61, at 115; N.Y. ASSEM. J., Apr. 24, 1837, at 121. Hertell character-
ized the law giving a married woman's property to her husband as "a law which originated in the
dark ages, in a foreign country, in which an absolute and despotic king, and an intolerant and perse-
cuting clergy, ruled a people oppressed, demoralized and degraded, by an unhallowed combination
of political and ecclesiastical tyranny . . . ." P. RABKIN, supra note 71, at 87.
89. P. RABKIN, supra note 71, at 85-90; see also N. BASCH, supra note 61, at 115-19. Hertell's
bill contained provisions which went beyond the Married Women's Property Act (MWPA) of 1848
and anticipated the provisions of the 1860 amendments to the MWPA. See infra notes 103-06 and
accompanying text. It recognized a married woman's legal title to property acquired by her own
industry and management. This could be interpreted to include wages, and obliterated the distinc-
tion between dower and curtesy by equalizing the entitlement of either surviving spouse upon the
demise of a spouse. P. RABKIN, supra note 71, at 85. Hertell argued that his proposals would rein-
force rather than weaken traditional notions of good family relationships by increasing the likelihood
of harmony, rather than fueling the resentment generated by the wife's legal obligation to submit. Id.
at 89 (citing T. HERTELL, THE RIGHT OF MARRIED WOMEN To HOLD AND CONTRACT PROPERTY
SUSTAINED BY THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 67, 71 (1839)); see also S.
GRIMKE, LETrERS ON THE EQUALITY OF THE SEXES AND THE CONDITION OF WOMAN 74-83
(1838) (identifying "husband" as synonymous with tyranny).
90. N. BASCH, supra note 61, at 136. In the New York debates, there is no evidence or acknowl-
edgment of the developments occurring in other states. For example, in 1839, Mississippi had be-
come the first common law state to enact legislation permitting married women to hold property as a
separate estate. See Comment, Husband and Wife-Memorandum on the Mississippi Woman's Law
of 1839, 42 MICH. L. REv. 1110 (1944). Feminists hailed New York as the "first State to emancipate
wives from the slavery of the old common law of England, and to secure to them equal property
rights." 1 HISTORY OF WOMEN SUFFRAGE 63-64 (E. Stanton, S. Anthony & M. Gage eds. reprint
1970). One commentator suggests that this view may simply reflect an exaggerated perception of
New York's place in 19th century legal culture. Ely, Book Review, 31 UCLA L. REV. 294, 295 n.4
(1983) (reviewing N. BASCH, supra note 61.)
91. P. RABKIN, supra note 71, at 89 (citing N.Y. Ass. Doc. No. 96, at 3 (Feb. 26, 1844)).
92. N. BASCH, supra note 61, at 144-48. In 1842, the Judiciary Committee issued a report favor-
ing the liberal extension and protection of the rights and property of married women. N.Y. Ass.
Doc. No. 189 (Apr. 12, 1842). In 1844, the Judiciary Committee issued a report indicating a prefer-
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married women to property enjoy success during the 1846 convention
called to consider revisions of the New York State Constitution.93
Failing in their efforts to achieve a constitutional guarantee for at
least some rights of women, proponents of the married women's property
reform, spurred by feminist pressure, rallied for the 1848 session of the
New York legislature.94 Within four months the bill was enacted into
law.
95
There is little evidence that many partisans of the Married Women's
Property Act sought to alter traditional marriage patterns or to produce
a major shift in gendered roles, although such women as Elizabeth Cady
Stanton, Ernestine Rose, and Fanny Wright were important excep-
ence for the trust over a married women's property act. N.Y. ASSEM. Doc. No. 96 (Feb. 26, 1844);
see P. RABKIN, supra note 71, at 78-82.
93. Concerned with improved administration and greater simplification of the law, the dele-
gates, of whom one third were lawyers, voted mostly on administrative and procedural reforms. N.
BASCH, supra note 61, at 149. The courts of chancery were abolished by failing to provide for their
existence in article VI. Law and equity were merged in article VI (§ 3). P. RABKIN, supra note 71, at
9 1. In addition, after strenuous debate, the convention first voted to insert and, then, three days later
to rescind, a constitutional clause recognizing a separate legal identity for married women by al-
lowing them to own property in their own name. See N. BASCH, supra note 61, at 150-55 (summary
of the debates).
94. None of the measure's opponents from the 1846 convention sat in the session. N. BASCH,
supra note 61, at 156. Debate pitted opponents of the reform-who argued for the maintenance of
domestic tranquillity and the Anglo-American common law in part by attacking France, French
women, and French civil law-against proponents-who identified the common law as feudal, irra-
tional, and barbarous in its treatment of women. P. RABKIN, supra note 71, at 97. Rabkin argues
that minimal resistance to the legislation is explained by the identification of the measure with
defeudalization, rather than with feminist arguments regarding dependency and equality in the
home. Id. at 89. The legislation was introduced by a conservative judge from St. Lawrence who
wanted to safeguard his wife's property from his creditors. Speth, supra note 63, at 78.
95. Law of Apr. 7, 1848, ch. 200, 1848 N.Y. Laws 307-08 (codified as N.Y. DOM. R.EL. LAW
§ 50 (McKinney 1988)).
§ 1. The real and personal property of any female who may hereafter marry, and
which she shall own at the time of marriage, and the rents issues and profits thereof shall
not be subject to the disposal of her husband, nor be liable for his debts, and shall con-
tinue her sole and separate property, as if she were a single female.
§ 2. The real and personal property, and the rents issues and profits thereof of any
female now married shall not be subject to the disposal of her husband; but shall be her
sole and separate property as if she were a single female except so far as the same may be
liable for the debts of her husband heretofore contracted.
§ 3. It shall be lawful for any female to receive by gift, grant, devise or bequest, from
any person other than her husband and hold to her own and separate use, as if she were
a single female, real and personal property, and the rents, issues and profits thereof, and
the same shall not be subject to the disposal of her husband, nor be liable for his debts.
§ 4 All contracts made between persons in contemplation of marriage shall remain in
full force after the marriage takes place.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 50 (McKinney 1988).
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tions.9 6 The reform obliterated the formal legal distinction between single
and married women in terms of access to inherited wealth in real prop-
erty, but it failed to give married women owning the legal estate any
contractual powers.97 It codified the equitable rights in real property that
wealthy daughters had enjoyed for centuries,9" and protected the real
property of those married women whose debtor husbands sought protec-
tion from the reach of creditors.99
Thus, the impact of the Act was limited to a small segment of mar-
ried women in New York who were the daughters of the landed elite.
The statutory emphasis on access to inherited property ignored the larger
number of married women whose property consisted of an interest in
such commercial activities as boarding houses or retail stores, as well as
married women whose property consisted of earnings from household
manufactures or wages from labor outside the home. Such exclusion ac-
celerated feminist efforts at further reform.
Given the narrow scope of the Married Women's Property Act of
1848, incremental legislative activity was needed to completely degender
access for married women to various forms of property in an expanding
and changing commercial economy. Between 1849 and 1860, recognition
of women's separate legal identity in marriage was extended to the con-
veying and devising of real and personal property,' ° as well as to the
protecting of married women's savings deposits a01 and their right to vote
as stockholders in elections.1
02
96. See E. DuBois, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT WO-
MEN'S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 1848-1869 (1978).
97. N. BASCH, supra note 61, at 161. Chused notes that the similarity of the statute's "sale and
separate use" phraseology to typical language in equitable instruments, and its presence in sections
dealing with debt, made narrow construction almost inevitable. Chused, Married Women's Property
Law 1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359, 1411 (1983).
98. The legislature which passed the Act also abolished feudal common law forms of actions
and pleadings, and the distinction between equitable and legal remedies, in favor of a uniform course
of proceedings in all cases. P. RABKIN, supra note 71, at 103; see also N. BASCH, supra note 61, at
157-58.
99. M. SALMON, supra note 63, at 93-97; N. BASCH, supra note 61, at 122-26.
100. Law of Apr. 11, 1849, ch. 375 § 1, 1849 N.Y. Laws 528 (codified as N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 50 (McKinney 1988)).
Property, real or personal, now owned by a married woman, or hereafter owned by a
woman at the time of her marriage, or acquired by her as prescribed in this chapter, and
the rents, issues, proceeds and profits thereof, shall continue to be her sole and separate
property as if she were unmarried, and shall not be subject to her husband's control or
disposal nor liable for his debts.
Id.
101. Act of Mar. 25, 1850, ch. 91, 1850 N.Y. Laws 142.
102. Law of Apr. 17, 1858, cl. 321, 1858 N.Y. Laws 515.
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The second major step in the campaign to develop a full legal iden-
tity for married women was taken in 1860. The 1860 amendments to the
Married Women's Property Act of 1848103 contained a series of provi-
sions designed to expand the separate legal identity of married women.
Married women were allowed to bring actions in their own names for
damages or personal injury. Husbands' rights in intestacy cases were re-
duced. Women were permitted to be joint guardians of their children
along with their husbands. Of greatest importance, however, were provi-
sions recognizing married women's right to conduct a separate business,
to contract with respect to it,"° and to keep their own earnings. 10 5 (By
1878 it was apparent that middle class women owning their own busi-
nesses were more likely to benefit from this provision than working class
women.)
10 6
In contrast to the reforms of 1828 and 1848, passage of the 1860
amendment, as well as later amendments, 0 7 reflected the impact of femi-
103. Law of Mar. 20, 1860, ch. 90, 1860 N.Y. Laws 157 (codified as N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 50) (McKinney 1988)).
104. Id.
105. See Birbeck v. Ackroyd, 74 N.Y. 356 (1878) (presumption that all services of a wife be-
longed to her husband could be rebutted only by evidence of an election on her part to labor on her
sole and separate account); see also Holcomb v. Harris, 166 N.Y. 257; 59 N.E. 820 (1901); Klapper
v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 34 Misc. 528, 69 N.Y.S. 955 (Sup. Ct. 1901). In 1902, the legislature re-
versed the presumption by providing that the married woman alone is entitled to earnings resulting
from her services unless evidence to the contrary appears. Act of Apr. 2, 1902, ch. 289, 1902 N.Y.
Laws ch. 844 (codified as N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3-315).
106. A. KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT To WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE EARNING WOMEN IN THE
UNrrED STATES 46 (1982) (estimates that in 1860 15% of all married women worked in the wage
labor force). Working class women participated in the wage labor market and as a partner in the
marriage market to survive economically. D. GITTINS, supra note 21, at 28. After marriage, poor
women shuttled between the formal economy and the informal one, which relied upon links among
households and included such work as taking in lodgers, laundress, and charwoman. Id. at 27; see
also L. WEINER, FROM WORKING GIRL TO WORKING MOTHER (1985); C. STANSELL, supra note
66.
Emphasis on the gendered roles of women as mother and on the dignity and self-reliance of the
man as bread winner was buttressed by the move for the "family wage" adequate to support a man
and his dependent wife and children. The idea of a family wage gained popularity during the struggle
to shore up/maintain family life during the Progressive era. W. LAUCK, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION AND WAGES 19 (1929). At a time when it took the wages of an entire household to
support a family and when a woman's lifespan could be gauged by pregnancy and child-bearing, the
thought of the husband earning enough to support a family had a certain appeal. The slogan of the
Woman's Trade Union League, the primary working women's association, was: "The eight hour
day; a living wage, to guard the home." L. WOODCOCK TENTLER, WAGE-EARNING WOMEN: IN-
DUSTRIAL WORK AND FAMILY LIFE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1900-1930 (1979); see also Zaretsky,
supra note 31, at 215-18. The emphasis on the father/husband as the sole earner was a powerful
factor in the development of modern notions of masculinity and coincided with middle class notions
of family structure. See D. GrTINS, supra note 25, at 27.
107. Legislation passed in the late 1800s erased the formal legal barriers remaining for married
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nist mobilization and an organized women's movement concerned with
the legal and cultural identity of women. Pronounced differences in polit-
ical rhetoric began to appear. Feminists began to talk about women's and
men's interests as not only distinct 108 but even antagonistic.10 9 In the
shift from the issue of gender-free access to real property to broader wo-
man-oriented goals of autonomy and dignity which culminated in de-
mands for suffrage, the issue of married women's legal identity became
part of the larger issue of the legal identity and status of all women in
American society.' 10
Feminists tended to regard the Married Women's Property Acts of
1848 and 1860, which created a separate legal identity for married wo-
men, as constituting a legal and social revolution. Ownership of property
and civil capacity were severed from their gendered linkage. In develop-
ing this separate legal identity, the Acts were an ideological challenge to
patriarchy and paternalism. The appealing quality of a legal doctrine
speaking to separateness and individuation is readily understandable
where the alternative was coercive unity and subordination enforced by
law.
Virtually excluded from the legal profession,"' women hoped to
achieve their goals of changing the status of women in American society
through legislation.I 2 While not incorrect as a basic tactical choice, this
women's separate legal identity. Law of May 28, 1884, ch. 381, 1884 N.Y. Laws 465 (freedom to
contract extended to all of a married woman's property acts); see Speth, supra note 63, at 70.
108. "The mass of people commence life with no other capital than the union of heads, hearts
and hands. To the benefit of this best capital, the wife has no right. If they are unsuccessful in
married life who suffers more the bitter consequences of poverty than the wife? But, if successful, she
cannot call a dollar her own." I HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 240-41 (E. Stanton, S. Anthony &
M. Gage eds. reprint 1970) (speech of Ernestine Rose).
109. "The care and protection" that men give women is "such as the wolf gives the lamb, the
eagle the hare he carries to his eyrie." Stanton, Address at Seneca Falls, in STANTON, ANTHONY:
CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 62, at 33.
110. N. BASCH, supra note 61, at 174-83. Stanton raised the issue in 1854 at the New York State
Women's Rights convention "What is property without the right to protect that property by law?
... The right to property will, of necessity, compel us in due time to the exercise of our right to the
elective franchise, and then naturally follows the right to hold office." Address by E. Stanton to the
Legislature of New York, adopted by the State Women's Rights Convention (Albany, N.Y. Feb, 14,
1854) (quoted in P. RABKIN, supra note 71, at 113).
111. In denying Myra Bradwell admission to the Illinois bar in 1870, the Illinois Supreme Court
paid lip service to the existence of a wider sphere of activities for women but felt that for a woman
"to engage in the hot strifes of the Bar, the presence of the public, and with momentous verdicts the
prizes of struggle, would [not] tend to destroy the deference and delicacy with which it is the pride of
our ruder sex to treat her." In re Bradwell, 55 Ill. 535, 542 (1869); see also II HISTORY OF WOMAN
SUFFRAGE 611-12 (E. Stanton, S. Anthony & M. Gage eds. 1881).
112. Elizabeth Cady Stanton referred in her autobiography to the passage of the 1848 Act.
"This encouraged action of the part of women, as the reflection naturally arose that, if the men who
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posture tended to ignore the role of the courts'13 as crucial political ac-
tors in the interpretation of statutes. Courts could become the articula-
tors of deep social ambivalence and resistance to change regarding the
role of women, especially married women, in American society.
114
Shielded from popular scrutiny, judges clearly exploited the weak-
ness of the statutes relative to the strengths of the common law by inter-
preting the New York reform legislation as narrowly as possible." 5
Most litigation under the acts involved debtor-creditor relations rather
than husband-wife relations. In most cases, the family property was safe-
guarded from creditors by recognizing the separateness of the wife's
property.
Fears that the creation of a separate legal identity for married wo-
men would foster the decline of family" 6 proved to be unfounded. 117 The
make the laws were ready for some onward step, surely the women themselves should express some
interest in the legislation." E. STANTON, EIGHTY YEARS AND MORE: REMINISCENCES OF 1815-
1897, at 150 (1898 & reprint 1971).
113. N. BASCH, supra note 61, at 208.
114. Grossberg argues that during the 19th century, the rigid segregation of worldly males and
homebound females assisted courts in maintaining power over families. Judicial hegemony over do-
mestic relations perpetuated patriarchal authority for the production of stable families and male
governance within republican society. M. GROSSBERG, supra note 11, at 300-01.
115. P. RABKIN, supra note 71, at 126. Courts often wrote dicta into their opinions indicating
that the Married Women's Property Act did not destroy the common law unity of husband and wife.
See id. at 129-37 (for a review of the cases); see also BLOOMFIELD, supra note 66, at 113-17 (review-
ing conservative interpretations of the statute in New York and comparable trends in other jurisdic-
tions).
See Nash v. Mitchell, 71 N.Y. 199, 204 (1877) ("The disabilities of a married woman are general
and exist at common law. The capabilities are created by statute, and are few in number, and excep-
tional."). In Bradwell, Justice Bradley wrote that it had never been the case that women could
engage in any and every enjoyment of civil life.
On the contrary, the civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide
difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should
be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which
belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The
constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well
as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs
to the domain and functions of womanhood. The harmony, not to say identity, of inter-
ests and views which belong, or should belong, to the family institution is repugnant to
the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her
husband.
Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring). Acknowledging that
there were some unmarried women not affected by the incapacities arising out of the married state,
Bradley viewed them as exceptions to the general rule and noted that "[the rules of civil society
must be adapted to the general constitution of things, and cannot be based upon exceptional cases."
Id. at 141.
116. For an eloquent expression of this fear, see Schindel v. Schindel, 12 Md. 294 (1858):
For let it once be understood that a wife, whenever she may become tired of her hus-
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expansion of the category of persons deemed competent to own and man-
age property constituted acknowledgment of the separate legal identity of
each party to a marriage, and therefore was legally significant for some
purposes. But this reclassification of married women was not paralleled
by a shift in cultural norms and expectations for such women. Courts
strengthened and reinforced the family as an economic unit when con-
fronted with the possibility of married women as separate providers of
tangible resources for their families. They did not, however, reject Victo-
rian notions of a separate sphere for married women."' Instead, they
relied upon notions of a male-dominated, unequal marital partnership to
replace notions of marriage as a formal unity with the appropriation of a
woman's legal identity. Each partner had a separate, formally equal,
gender neutral identity for legal purposes. Culturally, marriage was un-
derstood to be a hierarchically ordered, gendered duality.
Interestingly, changes such as the creation of a separate legal iden-
tity for married women and the recasting of marriage as a partnership
did not necessitate the substitution of a different marital property regime
in New York. The new legal separateness of husband's and wife's assets
band, or moved by any whim or caprice, may leave him, and take with her the whole
property that she ever owned, and enjoy it exclusively, and thus become independent of
that superiority and controlling power which the law has wisely recognized in the hus-
band, what incentive would there be for such a wife ever to reconcile differences with her
husband, to act in submission to his wishes, and perform the many onerous duties per-
taining to her sphere? Would not every wife, with property enough to sustain herself
independently of her husband, when becoming impatient of his restraint and control,
however necessarily exercised over her, take the refuge such a law would give her, and
abandon her husband and her home?
Id. at 307-08 (R. Alvey for the appellee).
117. P. RABKIN, supra note 71, at 156. Chused finds a partial explanation for the rash of Mar-
ried Women's Property Acts in the 1840s in the economic climate following the Panic of 1837.
During that era, protection of debtors was sought at state and national levels. The Acts provided
husbands and families with access to assets, despite harsh economic times. Chused, Married Wo-
men's Property Law 1800-1850, 71 GEo. L.J. 1359, 1400-04 (1983).
118. Chused, supra note 117, at 1414. The stress on the self-reliant individual male was comple-
mented by a new emphasis on the woman's responsibility to maintain the ties of dependency in the
context of a wage economy. In interpreting the Married Women's Property Act of 1860, the New
York Court of Appeals noted that it was not the purpose of the Act
to absolve a married woman from the duties which she owes her husband, to render him
service in his household, to care for him and their common children with dutiful affec-
tion when he or they need her care, and to render all the services in her household which
are commonly expected of a married woman, according to her station in life. Nor was it
the purpose of the statute to absolve her from due obedience and submission to her
husband as head and master of his household, or to depose him from the headship of his
family, which the common law gave him.
Coleman v. Burr, 93 N.Y. 17, 24 (1883).
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acquired during a marriage was easily accommodated within the prevail-
ing New York common law marital rule of strict title. Strict title gov-
erned the ownership of property brought to or acquired during a
marriage, as well as distributed at divorce.1 19 Strict title as a distribu-
tional rule presented the appearance of formal fairness. The degendering
of access to marital property through the Married Women's Property
Acts meant that no legal barriers existed to placing either or both
spouses's names on the title to marital assets. In fact, strict title appealed
to the same abstract notions of individuation and autonomy which made
the Married Women's Property Acts philosophically consistent with late
nineteenth century jurisprudence. 120 Not only could such a seemingly
major reform as the development of a separate legal identity for married
women be readily incorporated into New York's existing ordering of
marital property arrangements, it could also be acknowledged without
undermining the economic vulnerability of married women, their depen-
dence on their husbands. 121
119. Under the common law, title established ownership; ownership determined the distribution
of assets at the dissolution of a marriage. Property which was not designated as jointly owned
through title, even if it was accumulated during the marriage, was awarded to the titleholder. Unlike
other jurisdictions, New York did not experience a flurry of legislative efforts to establish community
property regimes in response to Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930). Poe raised the issue of the
rights of spouses in community property states to file separate income tax returns, with each spouse
reporting one half the community income even when it was attributable to the husband. Id. at 108-
09, 111, 112. The court permitted income splitting and, as a consequence, permitted taxpayers in
community property jurisdictions to avail themselves of lower federal income tax brackets. As
Younger points out, spouses in community property states acquired a clear advantage over those in
common law states. Younger, supra note 54, at 69.
Subsequent to Poe but prior to the Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 301, 62 Stat. 110, 114-15
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § l(a)(1986)), which permitted wife and husband to be taxed on family income
as if they were members of a marital partnership regardless of their state's marital property regime,
six common law jurisdictions adopted the community property system (the territory of Hawaii and
the states of Michigan, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Pennsylvania). See Laughrey, supra note
68, at 129 n.48. Upon passage of the 1948 legislation, five of the jurisdictions repealed their commu-
nity property laws and the Pennsylvania statute was declared unconstitutional. Id.
120. M. HORwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1979); D. SPEAK,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE IN THE EARLY 20TH CENTURY (1987);
Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 18 (D. Kairys ed.
1979); see also H. JAMES, H. GREELY & S. ANDREWS, LOVE, MARRIAGE, AND DIVORCE, AND THE
SOVEREIGNTY OF THE INDIVIDUAL (1889). For works on individualism and its connection to Amer-
ican political theory and beliefs, see Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1933); see
also R. BELLAH, supra note 62; R. WILLIAMS, KEYWORDS: A VOCABULARY OF CULTURE AND
SOCIETY 136 (1976).
121. Zaretsky observes:
The spread of a society organized around self reliance, the market, and wage labor
marked a great advance, perhaps especially for women, but we should also mark its costs
and limits. By the time our nation reached the twentieth century, the attempt to shore up
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Formal legal access to property and wages appears to have had little
impact on the economic status of most married women. In part, this lack
of impact was a reflection of the prevailing image of married women's
work-biological and social reproduction inside the home. Such work
was viewed as wageless activity, a constant factor of nature122 rather than
activity with a rich, largely unexplored, social history. 123 Married women
were identified as rendering their contributions to their family in service,
a dependent status."2 This cultural image was reinforced by the com-
mon law which placed no economic value on an unwaged wife's contri-
bution to the assets of a marriage.1 25 It permitted a wife's entire
economic worth to be absorbed into the marital unit. 126 In effect, aboli-
tion of the formal common law doctrine of the unity of husband and wife
independence through economic individualism largely betrays the promise it once held
out. Neither the attempt to extend the traditionally male idea ofindividual independence
to women nor the attempt to extend the traditionally female idea of nurturance to men
can be based on an economic system that fosters a one-sided ideal of economic indepen-
dence and correspondingly hollow collectivity.
Zaretsky, supra note 31, at 218-19.
122. See Bock & Duden, Labor of Love-Love As Labor On the Genesis of Housework in Capi-
talism, in FROM FEMINISM TO LIBERATION 155 (E. Altbach ed., rev. ed. 1980). As traditional im-
agery would have it, the married woman's activity originates in love and is rewarded by love. In
reality, the essence of this work is the production and maintenance of the social labor force-physi-
cally, emotionally and sexually. Id. at 156. "If a mother dominates the home, however, she does not
do it by right or by legal position but because of the power of love." E. RUBIN, supra note 34, at 19.
123. See Farajher & Stansell, Women and Their Families on the Overland Trail to California
and Oregon 1842-1867 and Genovese, Life in the Big House, in A HERITAGE OF HER OWN: To-
WARD A NEW SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN WOMEN (N. Cott & E. Pleck eds. 1979) [hereinafter
A HERITAGE OF HER OWN]; see also N. CoTr, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: "WOMEN'S SPHERE"
IN NEW ENGLAND 1780-1835 (1977); A. DOUGLAS, THE FEMINIZATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE
(1977); D. KATZMAN, SEVEN DAYS A WEEK: WOMEN AND DOMESTIC SERVICE IN INDUSTRALIZ-
ING AMERICA (1978); A. SCOTT, THE SOUTHERN LADY: FROM PEDESTAL TO POLITICS 1830-1930
(1970).
124. In feudal times, rendering service was the corollary of dependence. D. GITTNS, supra note
21, at 38. While men and women performed service and the work of both was economically essential,
a man could always claim service from a woman or a child, even if he served others. Authority was
implicitly patriarchal. The ideological conflict between spiritual equality and the need for authority
was resolved by elevating the status of women within the household. For men, marriage was a cru-
cial status passage from dependence or semi-dependence to independence and authority, an explicit
part of which was being able to command the services and deference of a wife and children. Id. at 44.
Women, however, were, by definition, always dependent.
125. L. HOLCOMBE, WIVES AND PROPERTY: THE REFORM OF THE MARRIED WOMEN'S PROP-
ERTY ACT IN NINETEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND 7-8 (1983). The classification of women's work as
nonproductive is institutionalized; housework is not considered in the gross national product. Bock
& Duden, supra note 122, at 154; see also Hauserman, Homemakers and Divorce: The Problem of the
Invisible Occupation, 17 FAM. L.Q. 41 (1983). Homemakers are not eligible for unemployment or
workers compensation and are considered unskilled when hired outside the home. Id. at 57-58.
126. Krauskopf, A Theory for 'Just' Division of Marital Property in Missouri, 41 Mo. L. REV.
165, 168 (1978).
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was replaced by a less formal state of perpetual economic dependence 27
for wives working as homemakers.
While the economic significance and the constancy of women's un-
waged labor was denied, the fact that women worked outside the home to
contribute to their family's survival, both before and during marriage, 12 8
was accorded at best modest cultural significance. Consonant with this
image were the sex-stereotyped occupations available to women. Women.
were paid to do women's work outside the home'29 in the service sector.
Historically, wages for this work were only sufficient to allow unmarried
women to contribute to their family before marriage, but too low to be
the basis of or provide an incentive for an independent way of life.13 In
The common law system is based on the assumption that the wife's place is in the
home. Although it fosters the homemaker's role as proper and necessary, the common
law provides no economic reward for the wife's contributions to the family assets or for
her lost opportunity to develop earning power outside the home.
Id. It has been suggested that the role of the housewife is helpful to an economy which depends on
increasing consumption. "The conversion of women into a crypto-servant class was an economic
accomplishment of the first importance.... The servant role of women is critical for the expansion
of consumption in the modem economy." J. GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE
35 (1973).
127. The possibility that this dependence is historically contingent is obscured by such ideologi-
cal devices as religious figures representing gendered virtues as well as unacceptable gendered behav-
ior. See IMMACULATE & POWERFUL: THE FEMALE IN SACRED IMAGE AND SOCIAL REALITY (C.
Atkinson, C. Buchanan & M. Miles eds. 1985). "The religious myth of the Christian West insists
that Eve, the innovator, can lead her followers only to evil; Mary, the passive, submissive, obedient
woman is urged as the model." Id. at 2.
128. See Lewis, This Work Had an End: African-American Domestic Workers in Washington
D.C., 1910-1940; Palmer, Housewife and Household Worker: Employer-Employee Relationships in
the Home, 1928-1941; Plewett, The Sexual Division of Labor and the Artisan Tradition in Early
Industrial Capitalism: The Case of New England Shoemaking 1780-1860; and Ruiz, By the Day or
Week' Mexicana Domestic Workers in El Paso, in To TOIL THE LIVELONG DAY (C. Groneman &
M. Norton eds. 1987).
Kessler-Harris contends that proposals to get unmarried women to emigrate west in search of
husbands in the latter half of the 19th century were premised on the belief that, once married, they
would remove themselves from the workforce. This would create more openings for men and, osten-
sibly, a return to traditional notions of "family." A. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 106, at 71-72, 98-
99; see also AMERICA'S WORKING WOMEN 245 (R. Baxandall, L. Gordon & S. Reverby eds. 1976).
129. A. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 106, at 128.
130. Id. The wage is an expression of a multi-dimensional power relationship. It performs differ-
ent functions in different settings. In the market, it serves to identify buyers and sellers of labor. It is
also often a vehicle for mobility, though a highly gendered one. Marriage offers a chance of upward
mobility for women. For men, mobility is less affected by marriage, unless a wife's wealth or earnings
mean additional capital or support while getting a degree. Men depend on the labor market for
mobility. D. GITINS, supra note 21, at 78. In fact, the lack of opportunity and of social mobility for
women is one way in which men and boys are able to achieve mobility for themselves. Id. at 120. In
the single wage home, the wage serves to identify those who have and those who lack external
resources; in dual wage households, it determines differential sex-based social importance and pres-
tige or status.
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effect, cultural continuities were at least as powerful and significant as a
major law reform.
13 1
Despite degendered access to property, the gendered hierarchical re-
lationship between spouses and the dependent status of women, in reality
a sex-based division of labor with implicit economic meaning, was not
only culturally endorsed, it also was legitimated by law. As a matter of
law, a husband was head of the household.132 He was responsible for and
capable of its support. 133 The wife was the provider of domestic services
and coipanionship.13 1 She was the upholder of the social fabric by her
caring for and about others.
135
Since the passage of the Married Women's Property Acts, access to
property, including wages, does not appear to have served as an incentive
for married middle and working class women to acquire sole or joint title
to many of the assets accumulated during marriage. Under the common
law strict title marital property regime, a married woman's name might
appear on the title to the the family home (or at a later point in time to
the family automobile), if it appeared at all. 136 Both in the nineteenth and
131. A. DOUGLAS, supra note 123; see also S. EISENSTEIN, GIVE US BREAD BUT GIVE Us
ROSES: WORKING WOMEN'S CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE UNITED STATES (1983); E. SHORTER, THE
MAKING OF THE MODERN FAMILY (1975).
132. See Glendon, Marriage and the State: The Withering Away of Marriage, 62 VA. L. REV.
663 (1976) (discussing rules governing domicile and name involving wife's assumption of husband's
identity).
133. McGuire v. McGuire, 37 Misc. 259, 75 N.Y.S. 302 (Sup. Ct. 1902), aff'd, 81 N.Y.S. 1134
(1st Dep't 1903). Teitlebaum suggests that the emphasis on the family makes Mrs. Maguire invisible.
L. Teitlebaum, Family History and Family Law Working Paper #1, at 64 Institute for Legal Stud-
ies, U. Wise. (n.d.).
134. A wife's duty was
to be his [her husband's] helpmeet, to love and care for him in such a role, to afford him
her society and her person, to protect and care for him in sickness, and to labor faithfully
to advance his interests... [and to] perform her household ... duties .... A husband is
entitled to the benefit of his wife's industry and economy.
Rucci v. Rucci, 23 Conn. Supp. 221, 181 A.2d 125, 127 (1962) (quoting 26 AM. JUR. 637, § 9); see
also Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) (finding in the
female role the "noble and benign office of wife and mother").
135. Weitzman & Dixon, The Alimony Myth: Does No Fault Make A Difference? 14 FAM. L.Q.
141 (1980); see also OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION, NEW YORK, NEW YORK TASK FORCE
ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS (Mar. 1986) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE NEW YORK TASK FORCE]
(cultural stereotypes of women distort courts' application of substantive law.)
136. Although abundant information exists analyzing the Married Women's Property Act,
which gave women unrestricted disposition and title to their own earnings and whatever property
they might own through inheritance or other forms of transfer, the practical consequences of the
reform for individual women have not been adequately addressed. The author has not been able to
uncover any direct data regarding the percentage of women who actually held title to marital prop-
erty after passage of MWPA. Despite the absence of direct data, less obvious sources may shed some
light on this matter. For example, the Intergenerational Wealth Study, prepared by the IRS, ana-
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twentieth centuries, title to the overwhelming preponderance of liquid
assets and businesses was held solely by husbands. 137 In fact, women
were more likely to acquire title through bequest or devise, or taking an
elective share upon the death of their spouse, 138 than through access to
title as contemplated in the Married Women's Property Acts.
The persistence of this pattern over the 140 years since the passage
of the first Married Women's Property Act demands explanation. Three
alternatives, by no means mutually exclusive, suggest themselves. All
three underscore the power of sex/gender ideology.
One explanation is connected to class-based differences in the rate of
lyzes social trends of work among the nation's top wealthholders. The intergenerational data base,
derived from estate tax returns filed from 1916 to the present after the death of a relatively wealthy
individual, contains information on the composition of assets and holdings as well as demographic
characteristics of the decedent. These returns reveal that, "the percentage of male millionaire estate
tax decedents was about 70% in 1931 contrasting to 61 percent in 1982. For all years men were
wealthier than women; indeed, the difference remained fairly constant, at about 14 percent for the
1916-31 period as well as for 1982." DEPT. OF TREASURY, IRS STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN,
VOL. 6, No. 4, Rnv. 4-87 (1987).
Nevertheless the absence of hard data on what is to all appearances a crucial issue is a striking
one. One may well conclude that such absence is an indicator of the self-evident nature of the pat-
terns of title to marital property-women's names have not been included on the title to most mari-
tal property.
137. Collateral support for this claim may be found in the court's seeking to avoid unjust en-
richment or unjust deprivation of one spouse by the imposition of a constructive trust upon the
property. Elements of a constructive trust are: an express or implied promise to share in the benefits
of the property, transfer of the property in reliance thereon, a confidentihl relationship, and unjust
enrichment. See Janke v. Janke, 47 A.D.2d 445, 366 N.Y.S.2d 910 (4th Dep't 1975); see also Liamari
v. Liamari, 40 A.D.2d 845, 337 N.Y.S.2d 463-64 (2d Dep't 1972), aff'd, 33 N.Y.2d 572, 347
N.Y.S.2d 448 (1973); Marks v. Marks, 250 A.D. 289, 291, 294 N.Y.S. 70 (1937). Contra Saffv. Saff,
61 A.D.2d 452, 458, 402 N.Y.S.2d 690, 694 (4th Dep't 1978), appeal dismissed, 46 N.Y.2d 969, 389
N.E.2d 142,415 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1979); Fischer v. Wirth, 38 A.D.2d 611, 612, 326 N.Y.S.2d 308, 311
(3d Dep't 1971).
Where the parties held property as cotenants, the court could award the property to the deserving
spouse as justice required. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 234 (McKinney 1986); see Biven v. Biven, 62
A.D.2d 1145, 404 N.Y.S. 2d 185 (4th Dep't 1978); Weseley v. Weseley, 58 A.D.2d 829, 830, 396
N.Y.S.2d 455, 456 (2d Dep't 1977).
138. See M. SALMON, supra note 63, at 141-84 (discussing provisions for widows in the colonial
and early national period). In response to criticism of common law dower, which allowed a widow to
acquire lifetime protection as a dependent by entitling her to a life estate in one-third of the real
property of which her husband had been seized during the marriage, New York enacted an elective
share statute which allowed a widow to take a statutory share of one-half of the real and personal
property in lieu of the devise. See Act of Apr. 1, 1929, ch. 229, § 4, 1929 N.Y. Laws 499, 500-02. See
generally 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §§ 209, 213 (1984) (discussing common law
dower). In 1966, New York strengthened the partnership notion for the survivor's elective share
through the inclusion of an augmented estate when determining the surviving spouse's elective share.
Inter vivos transfers of property over which the deceased spouse had retained substantial control
were included in the deceased spouse's estate. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1(b)(1)
(McKinney 1981).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
wage labor force participation among married women. Whereas working
class wives of all races have always worked outside the home, 139 the par-
ticipation of significant numbers of middle class married women in the
wage labor force and their wage contribution to families is a relatively
recent phenomenon." 4 A middle class couple with only one wage earner
was more likely to accumulate marital assets than working class couples
in which both spouses worked outside the home or the husband worked
for a family wage.14 Since middle and upper class married women
worked inside rather than outside the home, they may well have per-
ceived themselves as not entitled to title to marital property, despite the
rubric of marriage as a partnership.
Another explanation identifies the persistence of the pattern with
sex/gender system cultural norms regarding femininity-characterized
either as "a nostalgic tradition of imposed limitations" 142 or as an adap-
tive response to the recognition that anatomical differences have
profound social consequences. 43 "The feminine principle is composed of
vulnerability, the need for protection, the formalities of compliance, the
avoidance of conflict-in short an appeal of dependence and good will
.... ,,144 Such behavioral norms, combined with the normative masculine
principle of mastery and competence in the wider world,145 impose con-
straints on the range of behaviors, interests, and ambitions of many wo-
men. The gendered cultural prescription of vulnerability and the
consequent need for protection translate into a series of culturally ap-
proved behaviors for wives, especially in the middle class where subsis-
tence was not and is not an issue.
Women's acceptance of the social and legal structuring of their de-
pendence included the demonstration of deference to their husband's
knowledge and expertise in financial matters outside the home.146 This
deference was and is sometimes manifested as a professed lack of interest
139. See T. DUBLIN, WOMEN AT WORK: THE TRANSFORMATION OF WORK AND COMMUNITY
IN LOWELL, MASSACHUSETTS, 1826-1860 (1979); C. STANSELL, supra note 66; B. WERTHEINER,
WE WERE THERE: THE STORY OF WORKING WOMEN IN AMERICA (1977).
140. See A. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 106; see also L. WEINER, FROM WORKING GIRL TO
WORKING MOTHER: THE FEMALE LABOR FORCE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1820-1980 (1985).
141. See Zaretsky, supra note 31, at 215-18. See generally E. ZARETSKY, CAPITALISM, THE
FAMILY AND PERSONAL LIFE (rev. ed. 1986).
142. S. BROWNMILLER, FEMININITY 14 (1984).
143. Willis, The Politics of Dependency, Ms., July/Aug. 1982, at 182.
144. S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 142, at 16.
145. Willis, supra note 143, at 182.
146. See Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 95, 124-60 (1974).
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in or knowledge of financial matters, or an unwillingness to insist upon
the inclusion of a wife's name on the title to property or assets accumu-
lated during a marriage.147
Mindful of the risk of fallaciously relying on contemporary behavior
to illuminate the past, it appears that the heightened conflict between
wives and husbands over such marital assets as businesses'48 under the
1980 New York divorce reform (in which title to marital assets is set
aside for divorce distribution purposes) marks a continuation of earlier
behavior responses. It suggests the power of resistance by husbands to
what they perceive as their wives' overreaching.
Yet a third explanation suggests that, despite the elimination of the
Blackstonian doctrine of marital unity and identity appropriation, the
idea of a wife separating herself as a self from her husband is threatening
to women who are not conscious feminists. Such separation undermines
romantic love, which women are taught to identify as the basis for mar-
riage. 14 9 Separation can be interpreted as a limitation on trust-a crucial
component of marital success and happiness. Such trust feeds back into
sex/gender norms. The cultural prescription is that wives should trust
their husbands as providers.150 A demand for legal title to all marital
147. See Fisher v. Wirth, 38 A.D.2d 611, 326 N.Y.S.2d 308 (1971). Respondent used part of his
salary for a crash savings program "for the two of us." Id. at 612. Though the appellant, who
divorced the respondent in 1970, complained of lack of funds and used her funds for household
purposes, she evidenced no interest in the title to the savings until 1967. The court characterized the
appellant's claims as an attempt to get a community property division under the guise of equitable
relief.
148. See infra notes 318-61 and accompanying text.
149. For analyses of romantic love, see Snitow, Mass Market Romance: Pornography For Wo-
men Is Different; and Thompson, Search for Tomorrow: On Feminism and the Reconstruction of Teen
Romance, in POWERS OF DESIRE: THE POLITICS OF SEXUALITY (A. Snitow, C. Stansell & S.
Thompson eds.) (1983) [hereinafter POWERS OF DESIRE]. But note that the proliferation of prenup-
tial decrees can be interpreted as the growing lack of prenuptial trust among previously divorced
women and men planning to remarry and among first time newlyweds whose parents were divorced.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1985, at 16, col. 1.
150. See B. EHRENREICH, FLIGHT FROM COMMITMENT (1983) (analyzing post-WWII moves
toward the breakdown of this norm). But note the persistence of the connection between money and
the ideology of gendered roles in family life.
'It's a fact that the higher the woman's earnings, the higher the chance for divorce'
says David E. Bloom, an economist at Harvard University. 'We don't know exactly
why'.... Most experts agree, that when a wife earns more than her husband, the mar-
riage is bound to be altered permanently ... Adds Rosann Hertz, Assistant Professor of
Sociology at Wellesley College 'Money is the key to understanding authority in the fam-
ily'... Many breadwinner wives say they also succeed in masking the salary difference by
filling traditional roles at home. For example, Mrs. Stephens (a 28 year old manager for
Bell of Pennsylvania who earns $46,000 while her husband Carl, a Pennsylvania State
trooper earns $31,000) makes a point of washing dishes and ironing her husband's shirts.
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assets is easily construed as the absence of trust.
Legislative abrogation of the common law appropriation of married
women's identity was the necessary condition for the beginning of the
development of women's formal equal legal identity with men. During
the nineteenth century, such formal legal individuation within the com-
plex relationship of connection which is marriage was enacted by New
York legislators. Unity was replaced by partnership. But the deeply
gendered context in which formal legal individuation and partnership
were embedded reveals the power of sex/gender system ideology to mini-
mize the impact of law reform. The elimination by statute of formal legal
barriers for access to property was not translated by the courts of the
culture into material results empowering women in their marriages or at
divorce.
Narrative 2-Fault-Based Divorce
In American society, the historical identification of divorce as a
moral pathology 151 rests on the assumption that marriage and the family
unit which it creates and fosters are essential for society.IS2 By dissolving
'I want to make him realize that even though I make more money, I can do all those
womanly things,' she says. 'I don't mind treating him like a man'... One 31 year old
corporate manager who out earns her husband says she rises at 5 a.m. to fold laundry,
finish the previous nights dishes and do housecleaning. She also shops, cooks dinner,
bathes their younger daughter and puts her to bed. 'Dollars and cents have no value
there,' she explains. 'It's the same old chauvinism. Trying to change him is too much
trouble. It's easier if I do it myself.'
Hayes, Pay Problems: How Couples React When Wives Out-Earn Husbands, Wall St. J., June 19,
1987, § 2, at 23, col. 4. While the article does indicate that some wage-earner reversal arrangements
are successful, without conflict and resentment, its tenor makes clear that this is far less likely to
occur than traditional gendered wage earner arrangements.
151. L. HALEM, supra note 32, at 9; see Younger, supra note 54, at 46 n.4. But see T. STOEHR,
FREE LOVE IN AMERICA (1979) (analyzing the anti-marriage political tradition).
152. As the New York Court of Appeals explained it:
Marriage is more than a personal relation between a man and a woman. It is a status
founded on a contract and established by law. It constitutes an institution involving the
highest interests of society. It is regulated and controlled by law based on principles of
public policy affecting the welfare of the people of the state.
Fearon v. Treanor, 272 N.Y. 268, 272, 5 N.E.2d 815, 816 (1936); see also Pierone v. Pierone, 57
Misc. 2d 516, 293 N.Y.S.2d 256 (Sup. Ct. 1968); Helford v. Helford, 53 Misc. 2d 974, 280 N.Y.S.2d
990 (Sup. Ct. 1907); Morris v. Morris, 31 Misc. 2d 548, 220 N.Y.S.2d 590 (Sup. Ct. 1961). Rubin
summarizes the ideology of the family which informed many Supreme Court decisions in these
terms: "The family is monogamous, marital, a sacred private relationship, a small government
within the larger social unit of the state, paternalistic, patrilineal, justified by its primary function of
procreation and the raising, socializing and education of the children." E. RUBIN, supra note 34, at
20; see also J. FLIEGELMAN, PRODIGALS AND PILGRIMS: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AGAINST
PATRIARCHAL AUTHORITY 1750-1800 (1982). Fliegelman maintains that marriage served sex-differ-
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the family unit, divorce was said to jeopardize fundamental values essen-
tial to the well being of the individual and the preservation of society.
Given these beliefs, it is not surprising that, as a matter of public policy,
marriage was viewed historically as either indissoluble or dissoluble only
under very limited circumstances.
153
In colonial America, civil authorities responded to the message and
mandate of Christian doctrine, that divorce was a possible but shameful
act, by limiting its availability. 154 Marital dissolution proceedings re-
quired a detailing of the socially, culturally, and morally unacceptable
conduct of a blameworthy spouse. Such conduct was evaluated to deter-
mine whether there was sufficient basis for the state to grant permission
to sever the marital bond."15 Fault was viewed as essential to the dissolu-
entiated functions. For a woman, a happy marriage served the function that education did for men.
It protected her from corruption and ensured personal happiness. Id. at 126; see also Laslett, The
Significance of Family Membership, in CHANGING IMAGES OF THE FAMILY 231 (B. Myerhoff & V.
Tufte eds. 1979); Teitlebaum, supra note 133, at 32-40 (for a succinct analysis of the broadened
involvement of the state in domestic relations, especially marriage).
153. See P. GRIB, DIVORCE LAWS AND MORALITY: A NEW CATHOLIC JURISPRUDENCE
(1985); J. NOONAN, THE PowER TO DISSOLVE: LAwYERS AND MARRIAGES IN THE COURTS OF
THE ROMAN CURIA (1972); W. O'NEILL, DIVORCE IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (1967). Historically,
this position has been identified with either the Catholic adherence to the principle of complete
indissolubility or the Protestant guilt principle as the basis for dissolution. Both churches relied on
Old and New Testament sources for their positions. Codified in Deuteronomy, traditional Mosaic law
provided that if a wife found no favor in her husband's eyes because of something unseemly, he could
give her a bill of divorce and send her from the house, after which she was free to marry another
man. Deut. 24:1-2. Broad constructionists held this power to be unlimited; strict constructionists
argued that the husband could do so only on grounds of the wife's adultery. In the New Testament,
various passages allowed for different interpretations Matthew 19:4-9, 31-32; Mark 9: 2-9; Luke
16:18; 1 Cor. 7:15.
Efforts at maintaining the principle of indissolubility were more successful in theory than in prac-
tice. Over time, ecclesiastical courts-initially of the Catholic and later of the Anglican churches-
responded to pressures for annulment which allowed for remarriage, or for judicial separation for
causes arising after marriage, which precluded remarriage. Other Protestant churches which limited
the grounds for dissolution to adultery allowed only the innocent partner to remarry. Institutional
oversight of dissolution was identified with churches until 1669 when Parliament granted its first
legislative divorce by passing a bill permitting Lord Roos, to whom an ecclesiastical court had al-
ready granted a judicial separation, to marry again. J. MACQUEEN, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE
APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS & PRIVY COUNCIL 554 (1842). Between 1668
and 1715, five parliamentary divorces were granted. From 1715 to 1775 there were 60 and from 1776
to 1800 there were 74. Lord St. Helier, VIII ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, Divorce 339 (1 1th ed.
1910), noted in N. BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO 32 (1962). Three trials were required for absolute
divorce: one in church court; one in civil court where the husband sued the wife's lover; and one in
the House of Lords. MACQUEEN, supra, at 496, 505-06. For a wife seeking divorce there was an
additional evidentiary burden; she had to demonstrate that her husband had aggravated his offense
of adultery by extreme cruelty. Id. at 474-82.
154. L. HALEM, supra note 32, at 11-12.
155. "Statutes were never simple facilitative laws .... The law recognized no such thing as
consensual divorce. Divorce was a privilege granted to an innocent spouse." Friedman, Rights of
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tion process.
During the colonial period, divorces were granted occasionally in
New Netherlands156 and later in New York.157 However, commencing
with the struggle over its first general divorce bill in 1787,158 New York
Passage: Divorce Law in Historical Perspective, 63 OR. L. REv. 649, 653 (1984). Note that fault
incorporated gender-differentiated norms. In Puritan New England, adultery alone was not sufficient
ground for a woman to be granted a divorce, although it was sufficient for a man. For a woman to
prevail, the act of adultery had to be compounded by desertion, cruelty, or failure to provide. Weis-
berg, Under Great Temptations Here: Women and Divorce Law in Puritan Massachusetts, in 2 WO-
MEN AND THE LAW 122 (1982). On marital norms revealed in divorce records, see Cott, Divorce and
the Changing Status of Women in Eighteenth-Century Massachusetts, 33 WM. & MARY Q. 586, 611-
14 (1976); Cott, Eighteenth-Century Family and Social Life Revealed in Massachusetts Divorce
Records, 10 JOUR. Soc. HIST. 30-31 (1976); see also M. BEARD, WOMEN AS A FORCE IN HISTORY
(1962); Morris, Women's Rights in Early American Law, in STUDIES IN THE HISTORY "OF AMERI-
CAN LAW 126-200 (1930).
For an excellent compilation of the divorce requirements and proceedings in colonial New York,
see Spelleta, Divorce in Colonial New York, 39 N.Y. HIST. Soc. Q. 442 (1955). Spellata notes that
prior to 1665, while the Dutch were in control of New Netherlands, the colonial government con-
formed generally to the jurisprudence of Holland including its liberal divorce laws. When the Eng-
lish conquered the colony in 1664, the Duke of York's laws were adopted, including the provision
that "in all cases of adultery, all proceedings shall be according to the laws of England, which was by
divorce from bed and board (a mensa et thoro) if sued, corporal punishment and fine or imprison-
ment." However from 1665 to 1675, the English governors still proceeded to grant divorces on the
theory that the granting of divorces by the Dutch had established a common law of the colony. For
example, divorces were granted to men on the grounds of their having committed, "carnall copula-
cion with a stranger," "defiling the marriage bed and committing adultery with several persons." A
woman was granted a divorce after her husband had been convicted of "rape, incest, and adultery
perpetrated on his daughter." Spellata notes that when the English King and his council learned of
these divorces, some time after 1675, the practice of granting divorces in New York seems to have
come to an abrupt stop.
156. N. BLAKE, supra note 153, at 42. Three divorces are recorded.
157. Blake claims that at least six divorces are known. Clues regarding others barely survived
the New York State Capitol fire of 1911 which badly damaged the colonial records. N. BLAKE, supra
note 153, at 42. Foster and Freed fix the number at four. Foster & Freed, A Bill of Rights for
Children, 6 FAM. L.Q. 343 (1972). In 1675, New York reversed its policy regarding absolute divorce
(a vinculo matrimoniz) to allow remarriage after absolute divorce. Spelletta, supra note 155. After
1675, there is no evidence of absolute divorces being granted. N. BLAKE, supra note 153, at 42. In
1773, the British government issued an instruction to all royal governors to withhold their assent to
any divorces granted by the colonial legislatures. NEW YORK COLONIAL DOCUMENTS VIII, at 402,
noted in L. HALEM, supra note 32, at 17.
158. The stimulus for the bill was a petition by community notable Isaac Gouverneur to the
New York legislature for a divorce from his adulterous wife. The special committee, chaired by
Assemblyman Alexander Hamilton, to which the matter was assigned, reported out a general bill
with provisions permitting remarriage only for an innocent spouse. L. HALEM, supra note 32, at 19;
N. BLAKE, supra note 153, at 64-65. The proposal was vetoed by the Council of Revision, whose
objection to the proposed legislation was premised on the belief that application of the prohibition to
the adulterous spouse would have a powerful negative effect on public morality because it allowed
for only two unsatisfactory options: renunciation of connection between the sexes or encouraging
open violation of the rules of chastity and decency. N. BLAKE, supra note 153, at 65 (citing Minutes
of the New York Council of Revision, Mar. 19, 1787) (microfilm copy of original ms. in Records of
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demonstrated notable resistance159 to the divorce law liberalization
trends in other states.
1 60
Between 1787 and the advent of the Civil War, despite swirls of leg-
islative activity in New York to expand the grounds of divorce,1 61 adul-
tery remained the sole ground for the dissolution of a marriage16 ' and the
number of divorces was few. For the period following the Civil War and
until 1966, New York continued to allow divorce on only one formally
gender neutral fault ground-adultery.
1 63
the States). In response, both houses of the legislature overrode the veto by substantial majorities. N.
BLAKE, supra note 153, at 65.
159. New York was the last state to move toward liberalizing its divorce laws. Since the New
York divorce statute of 1787, the only major modification before the 1966 reform occurred in 1879,
when the prohibition on remarriage was repealeI. It would seem that resistance to liberalization was
a manifestation of the legislature's desire to avoid dealing with such a controversial topic. See L.
HALEM, supra note 32, at 254-60. New York's resistance to reform meant that the law on the books
satisfied those who wanted a deterrent to divorce, recognition of the sanctity of marriage, and the
preservation of the traditional norms of the nuclear family.
160. See N. BLAKE, supra note 153, at 48-63; L. HALEM, supra note 32, at 18-21. Liberalization
trends included expansion of the grounds for dissolution beyond the English common law to include
acts other than adultery and the entrusting of courts rather than legislatures with sole jurisdiction
over divorce. The New York legislature did not grant the court sole jurisdiction over divorce until
the state constitutional convention of 1846.
No law shall be passed, abridging the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to
petition the government, or any department thereof, nor shall any divorce be granted,
otherwise than by due judicial proceedings, nor shall any lottery hereafter be authorized
or any sale of lottery tickets allowed within the state.
N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. I, § 10.
161. In 1813, an amendment to broaden the basis for divorce, by adding desertion for five years,
failed. N. BLAKE, supra note 153, at 66. The revised divorce law contained only one significant
innovation-the empowering of the court of chancery to grant judicial separation and separate main-
tenance in cases where the husband had been guilty of cruel and inhuman treatment, had conducted
himself in such a manner as to render it unsafe for the wife to cohabit with him, or had abandoned
her and refused to provide for her. Act of Apr. 13, 1813, ch. 102, 1813 N.Y. Laws 200. Judicial
separation on the same grounds was extended to husbands in 1824. Act of Apr. 10, 1824, ch. 105,
1824 N.Y. Laws 249. In 1827 habitual drunkenness was proposed unsuccessfully as a ground for
divorce or for judicial separation. N. BLAKE, supra note 153, at 66. For the first time, however, the
legislature did define the five grounds for annulment. Domestic Relations Act, ch. VII, § 20, 1 N.Y.
REv. STAT. 138, 142 (1828); see also N. BLAKE, supra note 153, at 76-79 (for an account of the
legislative maneuvers surrounding attempted reform efforts in 1840, 1849, 1850, 1852, 1855, and
1860-61).
162. See N. BLAKE, supra note 153, at 67-75 (describing major cases which resulted in passage
of private bills between 1802 and 1846).
163. Adultery was a violation of the Seventh Commandment. The American colonies passed
draconian measures against its violation. For an excellent discussion of these measures, see G. How-
ARD, 2 A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUUTONS 121-327 (1904). Initially in all the New Eng-
land colonies except Rhode Island and Plymouth, the death penalty was prescribed for adultery with
a married or espoused wife. In Plymouth, the punishment was the wearing of the "scarlet letter," a
permanent badge proclaiming one's adulterous behavior. In Rhode Island, the adulterer was to be
publickly set on the Gallows in the Day Time, with a Rope about his or her neck, for the
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As a matter of law, the substantive ground for fault divorce was
ostensibly fair and formally gender neutral. It paralleled the formal gen-
der neutrality of title to marital property after the passage of the Married
Women's Property Acts.'6 As a matter of fact, gender neutral fault in a
gender differentiated cultural, social, and economic context for marriage
had gender specific outcomes. It paralleled the impact of the Married
Women's Property Act on actual title to marital property, which in turn
reflected the power of the sex/gender system.
Like couples seeking divorce in other jurisdictions, couples seeking
divorce in New York would tailor their claims to meet the state's single
fault ground for divorce. In so doing, they would tell a story of sexual
lapse in which husband or wife could be either sinner or victim. Such
tales can be viewed as "morality scripts" 16 -- formulaic story lines166 in
which culturally acceptable images of behavior were evoked. Given mar-
riage as a gendered institution and divorce as a gendered process, images
were gender specific. Though either husband or wife might be the sinner
or adulterer, the most common pair of images in such proceedings were
the wayward husband and the long-suffering, virtuous wife.
In part, this choice of culturally acceptable images may have been
the consequence of the gender specific statutory provisions for alimony
which existed in New York from 1789 to 1980.167 In part, these images
reflected the prevailing gendered double standard of sexual morality.
Adultery was a far more serious accusation when made against a
Space of One Hour; and on his or her Return from the Gallows to the Gaol, shall be
publickly whipped on his or her naked Back not exceeding Thirty Stripes; and shall
stand committed to the Gaol of the County wherein convicted until he or she shall pay
all Costs of Prosecution.
Act of 1749, in ACTS AND LAWS OF RHODE ISLAND (Newport 1767), cited in G. HOWARD, supra,
at 173. In colonial New York, sexual transgressions were severely dealt with, although not with the
same rigor as in New England. Illustrations from the judicial records in adultery cases reveal that
among the punishments were the whipping and banishment of Yutie Jansen
for living in adultery with Jan Parcel, and also the sentence of Laurens Dutys who, for
selling his wife, Yutie Jansen, and forcing her to live in adultery was "to have a rope"
tied around his neck and to be severely flogged, to have his right ear cut off, and to be
banished for fifty years.
NEw YORK COLONIAL MS. 1630-1664, cited in G. HOWARD, supra, at 280.
164. See supra notes 86-157 and accompanying text.
165. Fault-based divorce, viewed as a morality script, is an excellent illustration of Foucault's
thesis that power's hold on sex is maintained through the act of discourse which creates a rule of
law. See M. FOUCAULT, supra note 15. However, the absence of reference to gender in Foucault's
analysis limits its utility when the scripts evidence reliance on gender-based dualities.
166. These ideas were generated in discussions during July 1984 at the University of Wisconsin
(Madison) Legal History Program, at which the author was a fellow.
167. See infra notes 205-09 and accompanying text.
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married woman than a married man. As loss of virginity was interpreted
as the loss of virtue for an unmarried woman, so the commission of adul-
tery was interpreted as the loss of virtue for a married woman. In a soci-
ety in which virtue was considered a form of sexual currency or measure
of worth for women, such a loss entailed a significant downward shift in
status. To the extent that a husband had an absolute property right in his
wife's body, adultery represented the violation of that right.'6 Moreover,
absent the availability of birth control, 1 69 there was no guarantee that a
child was biologically the husband's if his wife committed adultery.
In addition to the long-suffering, virtuous wife, the other prevailing
gender specific image for women in such formulaic sexual morality
scripts was the other woman of loose morals with whom the wayward
husband consorted. Such a woman served two functions symbolically.
She was a threat to all wives who, no matter how good and dutiful they
were, might fail to satisfy their husbands; she was also the female outcast
who assisted in setting the boundaries for control of female sexuality.170
For husbands the morality script implied far fewer costs. The sinner
did not bear his burden. Adulterous husbands might have been driven to
such behavior by their wives' failures and limitations. Or, as the double
standard suggested, male sexuality might not be containable and, there-
fore, responsibility in some sense might be diluted. Wives need guard
their sexuality;"' husbands need not; boys would be boys. Adulterous
husbands might be ordered to pay alimony to economically vulnerable
wives but, as the discussion of alimony below 172 suggests, payments were
low, enforcement procedures for alimony arrearages were costly, and
judges often were lenient with delinquent men.
During the nineteenth century, debate regarding divorce law reform
in New York as well as in other jurisdictions was ostensibly a struggle
168. According to Elizabeth Cady Stanton, conventional sexual morality was one of the means
by which women were kept in their place. Stanton, Patriotism and Chastity, 135 WESTMINSTER
REV. 3 (1891).
169. See L. GORDON, WOMAN'S BODY, WOMAN'S RIGHT: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF BIRTH CON-
TROL (1978).
170. See Sigsworth & Wyke, A Study of Victorian Prostitution and Veneral Disease, in SUFFER
AND BE STILL: WOMEN IN THE VICTORIAN AGE 77-99 (M. Vincinus ed. 1972) (discussing the
Victorian debate about prostitution, specifically the necessity for prostitutes if the premarital virtue
of upper-class females was to be preserved).
171. See Cott, Passionlessness: An Interpretation of Victorian Sexual Ideology, 1790-1850, in A
HERITAGE OF HER OWN, supra note 123, at 162 (discussing the cultural prescription and women's
consciousness).
172. See infra notes 205-29 and accompanying text.
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over the desirability of expanding the grounds for divorce. 173 Of particu-
lar importance in these debates were the roles of the organized women's
movement174 and organized religion. 175 Underpinning the debates were
several explosive, value-laden questions. What would be the impact of
legislation upon competing gender specific notions of human nature?
What type of society would such a reform produce and was this antici-
pated society a good one? While differences between liberal reformers
and conservatives were deep, both the liberal reformers, who argued for
greater access to marital dissolution by an expansion of the grounds for
divorce, and their conservative opponents, who argued for strict limits on
divorce and the retention of permanent separation from bed and board176
as an alternative to dissolution, came to similar self-serving conclusions.
Each proclaimed with equal fervor that domestic felicity and purity, mat-
rimonial concord, virtue, and unblemished morals would be fostered and
preserved by their respective proposals.
177
173. L. HALEM, supra note 32, at 27-30; see C. DEGLER, supra note 30, at 165-66 (for an histori-
cal comparison of the number of permanent separations and divorces). For an example of the tenor
of the debate, consider this statement of E.D. Leach from West Virginia at the National Congress on
Uniform Divorce Laws:
It does not make any difference how high you make the ground for divorce, people are
going to meet it, if they cannot live together by the laws of nature. You cannot suspend
those laws by any Act of Legislature; and until we come in this country to understand
that the main duty, the chief purpose, and the end of an organization of this kind is to
increase the sum total of human happiness in the country, I think we are searching after
false gods. If we can do so by increasing the standard of divorce, well and good; if we
cannot, better lower it.
N. BLAKE, supra note 153, at 143 (citing Proceedings of the National Congress on Uniform Divorce
Laws, held at Washington, D.C., Feb. 19, 1906, at 75-76 (Harrisburg 1906)). Friedman notes the
paradox that "[the immorality of divorce depends on the sacredness of marriage, but this can only
increase the demand for divorce-to legitimate any second arrangement, and thus avoid an even
greater immorality." Friedman, supra note 155, at 658-59.
174. L. HALEM, supra note 32, at 32-33.
175. See W. O'NEILL, supra note 153, at 198-230.
176. See N. BLAKE, supra note 153, at 80-96 (reviewing major interventions in the debate).
177. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, articulating the connection between family, law reform, and
equality, wrote to Susan B. Anthony:
It is vain to look for the elevation of woman so long as she is degraded in marriage. I say
it is a sin, an outrage on our liberal feelings, to pretend that anything but deep and
fervent love and sympathy constitute marriage. The right idea of marriage is at the foun-
dation of all reforms.
Letter from E. Stanton to S. Anthony (Mar. 1, 1853), reprinted in N. BLAKE, supra note 153, at 88.
In 1860, Stanton attacked restrictive divorce laws on the ground that they violated the right of all
to be happy. Marriage had no moral supremacy over the rights of individuals who entered into it.
See Debates on Marriage and Divorce, Tenth National Woman's Rights Convention, May 10-11
1860, in THE CONCISE HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 170-89 (J. & P. Buhle eds. 1978). Stanton's
proposals included a resolution
that an unfortunate or ill assorted marriage is ever a calamity, but not ever, perhaps
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Conservatives held up New York as a model state, whereas liberal
reformers questioned the impact of the state's rigid law on domestic
morals. 178 Reformers recognized that a statute designed to prevent di-
vorce in New York did not suppress the desire of New Yorkers for di-
vorce. A rigid statute had the effect of encouraging New Yorkers to rely
on migratory divorces179 in more liberal jurisdictions with expanded
never a crime-and when a society or government compels its continuance, always to
the grief of one of the parties, and the actual loss and damage of both, it usurps an
authority never delegated to man, nor exercised by God himself.
Id. at 171. In the same debate Stanton is reported to have said, "There is one kind of marriage that
has not been tried and that is a contract, made by equal parties to live an equal life with equal
restraints and privileges on either side. Thus far we have had the man marriage and nothing more."
Id. at 176.
Feminist perceptions that New York's divorce law was intolerable were fueled by the McFarland-
Richardson affair of December 1869. The defendant, a known alcoholic, killed the man his former
wife intended to marry after she moved to Indiana, fulfilled the temporary residence requirements,
and obtained a divorce from him. The defendant was acquitted and granted custody of the elder son.
See N. BLAKE, supra note 153, at 101-04. See generally W. O'NEILL, supra note 153.
178. One writer reflected:
It would be truly instructive to know what the influence of such laws is on the frequent
seductions, developments, and other crimes in the metropolis. It would be equally in-
structive to know what proportion of the applications for divorce in Connecticut, Indi-
ana, and other States are made by those who, not willing to avail themselves of the
fraudulent divorces so common in New York where they reside, temporarily remove to
some other State to obtain a legal release from bondage which they cannot obtain at
home.
J. POWER, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 111-12 (1870), cited in N. BLAKE, supra note 153, at 189; see
also Larremore, American Divorce Law, 183 N. AM. REV. 73-74 (1906), cited in N. BLAKE, supra
note 153, at 189-90.
179. Early in the 19th century, Chancellor Kent noted the problem:
[Flor many years after New York became an independent state, there was not any lawful
mode of dissolving a marriage in the lifetimes of the parties but by a special act of the
legislature. This strictness was productive of public inconvenience, and often forced the
parties, in cases which rendered a separation fit and necessary to some other state, to
avail themselves of a more easy and certain remedy.
2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 98 (2d ed. 1832), cited in N. BLAKE, supra note
153, at 117. Initially, nearby Atlantic and New England states were refuges for the party seeking the
divorce. Liberal grounds for divorce, which included desertion and extreme cruelty, with modest
residency requirements, were the attraction. N. BLAKE, supra note 153, at 117.
After 1840, divorce seekers began the move westward-initially to Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana. As
conservative pressures against corruption in the family, said to be manifested by easy divorce, forced
state legislatures to pass more restrictive legislation, divorce seekers sought relief further west in
Nevada and California and in Mexico. 3 G. HOWARD, HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS
136-43 (1904). By 1935 it was estimated that transients from New York and New Jersey were parties
to approximately three-fifths of Nevada's divorce cases. Ingram & Ballard, The Business of Migra-
tory Divorce in Nevada, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 302, 305 (1935), noted in N. BLAKE, supra note
153, at 171. In 1959, estimates of the number of New York marriages dissolved each year were
probably one-third to one-half greater than the number recorded in the state. P. JACoBSON, AMERI-
CAN MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 116 (1959), cited in N. BLAKE, supra note 153, at 171.
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fault-based grounds for divorce. It also encouraged the seeking of mail
order divorces."'° Both consequences were seen as unsavory practices. At
the same time, the possibility of migratory divorce, acting as it did as a
safety valve, encouraged the retention of rigid legislation in conservative
states like New York.'
Not only did the New York statute encourage evasion of the law, it
fostered widespread collusion to procure a divorce, 8 2 the sale of bogus
decrees, and ingenious developments in the area of fraud'8 3 leading to an
annulment, 184 even when no alimony was legally available. 8  "Formal
law bore little relation to law in action; moreover the latter was frankly
engaged in nullifying the former." '186 In effect, New York developed a
180. Lawyers procured mail order out-of-state divorces for New Yorkers as well as other cli-
ents. For example, newspaper advertisements appeared promising: "Absolute divorces obtained in
any state without publicity or exposure; good anywhere. No fee charged until divorce is obtained."
N.Y. Herald, Sept. 18, 1870, quoted in N. BLAKE, supra note 153, at 118. The New York Times
reported that "the divorce lawyer keeps his standing card in papers of large circulation... and a
considerable share of his business is transacted on behalf of parties whom he never sees and never
expects to see." N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1870, at 8, col. 2, quoted in N. BLAKE, supra note 153, at 119.
181. "The easier it is made for those who through affluence are able to exercise disproportion-
ately large influence on legislation to obtain migratory divorces, the less likely it is that the divorce
laws of their home States will be liberalized insofar as that is deemed desirable." Sherrer v. Sherrer,
334 U.S. 343, 370 n.18 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
182. In 1869 the New York Times reported:
The husband or wife who wishes to get rid of a disagreeable partner has only to go to
some sharper calling himself an attorney .... If there is no evidence he forges or invents
as much as he wants. If the man or woman against whom he is employed is innocent, he
finds someone to lay all sorts of crime to their charge.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1869, at 4, col. 2, quoted in N. BLAKE, supra note 153, at 190. The following
year, a professional peijurer in divorce cases was sentenced to a nine year prison term. N.Y. Times,
Oct. 20, 1870, at 2, col. 5, cited in N. BLAKE, supra note 153, at 191. In 1934 the New York Mirror
featured a series entitled "I Was the 'Unknown Blonde' in 100 New York Divorces." N.Y. Mirror
(Sunday Magazine), Feb. 18, 25, Mar. 4, 1934, quoted in N. BLAKE, supra note 153, at 193-94.
183. N. BLAKE, supra note 153, at 191-92 (citing New York newspaper articles, 1884-90).
184. JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMM. ON MATRIMONIAL AND FAMILY LAWS, REPORT TO THE
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, 189th Sess., at 42 (1966). The report included a
typical annulment script:
[A] week before they were married.... the young man and the young lady, who he is
going to marry, have talked it over in the presence of other members of the family and he
said to her, "Yes, I love children. I want at least two children." Then they get married.
Then he uses contraceptives. After a lapse of time she protests and says "Stop it. You
said we'd have two children." He said "I didn't mean it. I'm not going to have any
children. I hate little brats." Fraud. Annulment granted.
In the same report, Buffalo was described as the "Little Reno in the East." Id. at 43.
185. Though no statute providing for alimony in an annulment existed in New York until 1940,
Act of Mar. 21, 1940, ch. 226, § 1140-a, 1940 N.Y. Laws 821, New York courts exercising their
discretionary authority did grant alimony in limited types of annulment cases. See Note, Legislation:
Right to Alimony in Action for Annulment, 10 BROOKLYN L. REV. 96 (1940).
186. L. Teitelbaum, supra note 133, at 9. Note also the willingness of the bench to judge possible
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system of consensual divorce despite the statutory prohibition against
such an action.
187
The social consequences of this extreme bifurcation between law-as-
statute and law-in-action bred cynicism and contempt for the law among
the wealthy and encouraged the creation of "irregular" social relation-
ships by persons too poor and/or upright to secure a divorce through
fraud or perjury. It likewise invited economic warfare by the spouse ap-
parently less eager to terminate the marriage as a condition for coopera-
tion in a foreign or collusive New York action.
Despite repeated expos6s of the sordidness of proceedings in the
New York courts and the continuing problem of migratory divorce, 188
incriminating evidence against husbands and wives according to class-based standards such as status
and social position, occupation, and character of places of cohabitation. Pollock v. Pollock, 71 N.Y.
137 (1877); see also N. BLAKE, supra note 153, at 194-98. Although state figures are lacking, in New
York City courts approximately 18% percent of all dissolutions were annulments in 1932. By 1946
the number rose to 35. Note, Annulments for Fraud-New York's Answer to Reno? 48 COLuM. L.
REV. 900, 900-04 (1948). According to one commentator, marriages in New York might be annulled
"for misrepresentations as to age, business or profession, civil or ceremonial marriage, character,
chastity or purity, citizenship, disease or disability, drug addiction, epilepsy, education, love and
loyalty, marital relations, mental incapacity, and property." Moreover, each category was subject to
almost indefinite subdivision.
In addition to fraud, some 50 other particular grounds for annulment were available. N. BLAKE,
supra note 153, at 197 (citing J. CLEVENGER, ANNULMENTS OF MARRIAGE BEING A TREATISE
COVERING NEW YORK LAW AND PRACTIcE WrrH COMPOSITE FORMS 27 (1946)). Blake notes the
paradox that, when called "divorce," the dissolution of marriage was restricted to the narrowest of
grounds, but when called by any other name, marriage dissolution was regarded with "easygoing
tolerance." Id at 198-99; see also L. HALEM, supra note 32, at 255 ("Owing to the remarkable
ingenuity of the legal profession, the laxity of their judiciary, and the tacit approval of the clergy, the
causes for granting annulments multiplied geometrically along with the number of marriages termi-
nated under this contingency.").
For scholarly articulations of the law on the books v. the law in action approach to legal analysis,
see McCaulay, Changing a Contemporary Relationship Between a Large Corporation and Those Who
Deal With It: Automobile Manufacturers, Their Dealers and the Legal System (pts. I & II), 1965 Wis.
L. REV. 483, 740; see also McNeil, Nevin, Trubeck & Miller, Market Discrimination Against the Poor
and the Impact of Consumer Disclosure Laws: The Used Car Industry, 13 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 695
(1979).
187. Mutual consent was not adopted as a ground for divorce in New York. Act of Apr. 27,
1966, ch. 254, 1966 N.Y. Laws 833. Husbands and wives cannot contract away the marriage or the
support obligations each owes to the other. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-311 (Consol. 1987) (for-
merly N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 51). However, there has been some attempt to argue that a mutually
agreed-upon separation agreement (part of the 1966 reform) is close to the spirit, if not the letter, of
consensual divorce. See Comment, Old Wine in New Wineskins or Mutual Consent Divorces for New
Yorkers, 18 SYRACUSE L. REV. 71 (1966).
188. In 1889, Governor David B. Hill, prompted in part by the migratory divorce problem,
began a drive for interstate cooperation in the planning of uniform legislation for a range of issues,
including marriage and divorce. Disagreement among the state representatives regarding the kind
and number of grounds for divorce undermined the commitment to uniformity. L. HALEM, supra
note 32, at 30, 37-38.
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the New York legislature remained responsive to heightened conserva-
tive pressure. 189 Initially, it enacted several statutes designed to increase
the difficulty of obtaining a divorce. Between 1900 and 1933, bills ex-
panding the grounds for divorce were proposed by at least fifteen differ-
ent legislators; almost without exception they were buried in
committee. 190 Nor were the proponents of liberalization successful in a
major 1934 floor battle.191
During the period following World War II, the marital dissolution
trend soared, 192 abetted by such factors as efforts to push women back
189. In 1877 courts were empowered to deny divorces even when adultery had been proved if
the plaintiff condoned the offense, had connived at the procurement of evidence, or was guilty of
similar misconduct. Act of Apr. 20, 1877, ch. 168, 1877 N.Y. Laws 179, noted in N. BLAKE, supra
note 153, at 200. In 1899, stricter proof of plaintiff's charges was required. Act of May 25, 1899, ch.
661, 1899 N.Y. Laws 1471, noted in N. BLAKE, supra note 153, at 200. In 1902, advertising for the
procurement of divorces became a misdemeanor and a three-month waiting period between the
granting of a divorce and the issuance of a final decree was imposed. Act of Mar. 21, 1902, ch. 203,
1902 N.Y. Laws 536, Act of Apr. 3, 1902, ch. 364, 1902 N.Y. Laws 951, noted in N. BLAKE, supra
note 153, at 200. The only significant liberalization during the period 1877-1919 was to permit re-
marriage of an adulterous defendant. N. BLAKE, supra note 153, at 200-02.
190. Blake attributes this situation to the fact that the impetus came from Jewish lawyers who
were Democratic legislators from New York City. Despite reformers' efforts, the combination of the
apportionment of representation which discriminated against New York City and the Democratic
party's dependence on the urban Catholic vote meant that many Democrats were unlikely to propose
or support fundamental changes in the law. And many Republicans "preferred to duck the issue."
N. BLAKE, supra note 153, at 203. Even the more modest and novel route of proposing legislation
authorizing the creation of a temporary state commission to study the issue was unsuccessful. N.
BLAKE, supra note 153, at 202.
191. Two proposals sponsored by a New York City Republican recognized one new ground for
divorce, willful desertion, and hedged it with restrictions-such as occurring without reasonable
cause and extending over the three years immediately preceding the commencement of the action. N.
BLAKE, supra note 153, at 204. The proposal received support from various bar associations and
distinguished religious leaders. But it did not get massive endorsement from Protestant and Jewish
quarters to counter formidable Catholic opposition. That opposition framed the issue in terms of the
family as the basis of stability for the state and noted that divorce was "directly contrary to the
religious faith of more than a third of our people." C. TOBIN, MEMORANDUM IN REGARD TO As-
SEMBLYMAN Ross's BILL ALLOWING DESERTION FOR THREE YEARS AS AN ADDITIONAL
GROUND FOR DIVORCE IN THIS STATE 8 (Apr. 9, 1934), quoted in N. BLAKE, supra note 153, at
207. The opposition defeated a Republican attempt to revive the desertion bill two years later. On
the day of the vote each Assembly member found in their mail a warning that 400,000 Catholics in
the state were opposed to the bill's passage. N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1936, at 9, col. 4, noted in N.
BLAKE, supra note 153, at 211; see H. JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
DIVORCE LAW IN THE UNrrED STATES 36-37 (1988) (discussing the opposition of the Catholic
Church to divorce reform in New York during the 1950s and '60s).
192. Although there are no accurate records, it was estimated that New York courts were grant-
ing 1000 divorces per month and that 99 out of 100 suits were undefended. N. BLAKE, supra note
153, at 211. It was estimated that 30% of New York divorces were secured out of state. Jacobsen,
Marital Dissolutions in New York State in Relation to their Trend in the United States, 28 MILBANK
MEM. FUND Q. 25, 38 (Jan. 1950). From 1940 to 1948, annulments averaged 4,000 annually, almost
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into traditional roles.' 93 Amidst increasing evidence of widespread cor-
ruption and abuse in the procuring of divorces,194 "conscientious judges
and lawyers believed that reform was essential, lest growing public cyni-
cism toward divorce and annulment laws undermine respect for the
whole judicial process."' 95
By 1966 it was apparent that New York's 1787 statute was neither a
deterrent to divorce nor a reflection of the norms and attitudes of many
state residents. 196 Public hearings regarding reform proposals included a
number of speakers recounting a parade of horribles fostered or con-
doned by the status quo. The dominant image in their testimony was a
gendered one-wife as innocent victim of the harsh one-ground stat-
ute.197 Expanded grounds for divorce would provide freedom for such
deserving sufferers.
In 1966 political, social, and professional pressure produced a legis-
lative compromise which converted New York into a fault-option juris-
diction. 198 The historic objection that the expansion of grounds would
increase the number of divorces was accorded little significance. In all
one third of the total number in the United States. W. GELLHORN, CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN
THE COURTS OF NEW YORK CrrY 274 (1954); see also Note, Divorce Reform in New York, 4 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 149 n.2 (1966-67). "Easier access to divorce ... both redefined women's legal relation-
ship to the family and provided women with some form of limited relief." N. BASCH, supra note 61,
at 106.
193. See A. FERRISS, INDICATORS OF THE TRENDS IN THE STATUS OF AMERICAN WOMEN
(1971); V. KINCADE, OPPENHEIMER, THE FEMALE LABOR FORCE IN THE UNITED STATES: DEMO-
GRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC FACTORS GOVERNING ITS GROWTH AND CHANGING COMPOSITION
(1970).
194. In 1947 it was estimated that at least 75% of New York divorces were based on phony
raids. JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE OF NEW YORK STATE, REPORT TO -HE COMMITTEE ON
MATRIMONIAL AND FAMILY LAWS OF 1966, at 19 (Mar. 31, 1966). A 1951 grand jury investigation
and presentment affirmed the widespread nature of fraud, collusion, and perjury in matrimonial
actions. N. BLAKE, supra note 153, at 216; see also W. GELLHORN, supra note 192, at 285-90; Foster,
Common Law Divorce, 46 MINN. L. REV. 43 (1961) (describing the "where there's a will, there's a
way" phenomena as applied to divorce: a married couple, or an individual partner to a marriage,
desirous of dissolving the relationship, will find a way of doing so). If the formalities of the law make
divorce expensive and/or difficult-desertion or other "self-help" provided the solution.
195. N. BLAKE, supra note 153, at 212. Despite this concern, even modest measures-such as a
proposal to make fraud or collusion in matrimonial actions a misdemeanor-were rejected by the
legislature. 181 Ass. JOURN. 2897 (Mar. 18, 1958).
196. L. HALEM, supra note 32, at 264.
197. JoINT COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 194, at 24-47. Like California, there is no evidence
of participation in the reform debates by an identifiable woman's group or organization. Kay attrib-
utes this to the fact that the modern women's movement was just emerging in 1963. Kay, Equality
and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 56
(1987).
198. See H. JACOB, supra note 191, at 37-42 (discussing legislative activities and actors involved
in the 1966 reform).
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likelihood a combination of factors, including sordid tales of fraud and
perjury connected with the status quo, and the growing recognition that
marital stability was not achieved or enhanced by making divorce an ex-
ceptionally difficult and punitive legal proceeding, led to the compromise.
The new statute expanded the number of fault grounds to include cruel
and inhuman treatment, abandonment, and imprisonment, as well as
adultery.199 It also added a no-fault option: a no-fault separation by
agreement which could be converted, after a designated waiting period,
into a divorce.2°
199. Act of Apr. 27, 1966, ch. 254, 1966 N.Y. Law 833 (codified in N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 170 (McKinney 1966)).
An action for divorce may be maintained by a husband or wife to procure a judgment
divorcing the parties and dissolving the marriage on any of the following grounds:
(1) The cruel and inhuman treatment of the plaintiff by the defendant such that the
conduct of the defendant so endangers the physical or mental well being of the plaintiff
as renders it unsafe or improper for the plaintiff to cohabit with the defendant.
(2) The abandonment of the plaintiff by the defendant for a period of two or more
years.
(4) The commission of an act of adultery, provided that adultery for the purposes of
articles ten, eleven, and eleven-A of this chapter, is hereby defined as the commission of
an act of sexual or deviate sexual intercourse, voluntarily performed by the defendant,
with a person other than the plaintiff after the marriage of plaintiff and defendant.
In 1968 the Legislature amended Section 170 to read:
(4) The commission of an act of adultery, provided that adultery for the purposes of
articles ten, eleven, and eleven-A of this chapter, is hereby defined as the commission of
an act of sexual or deviate sexual intercourse, voluntarily performed by the defendant,
with a person other than the plaintiff after the marriage of plaintiff and defendant. Devi-
ate sexual intercourse includes, but not limited to, sexual conduct as defined in subdivision
two of Section 130.00 and subdivision three of Section 130.20 of the penal law.
Act of June 16, 1968, ch. 700, 1968 N.Y. Laws 2314.
In 1970, Section 170 was amended to read:
Section 1. Subdivision two of section one hundred seventy of the domestic relations
law, as added by chapter two hundred fifty-four of the laws of nineteen hundred sixty-
six, is hereby amended to read as follows:
(2) The abandonment of the plaintiff by the defendant for a period of... one or more
years.
Act of May 18, 1970, ch. 835, 1970 N.Y. Laws 2653.
There are very few reported cases in which divorce has not been granted. See Kennedy v. Ken-
nedy, 91 A.D. 2d 1200, 459 N.Y.S.2d 188 (4th Dep't 1983). But see Math v. Math, 31 N.Y.2d 693,
289 N.E.2d 549, 337 N.Y.S.2d 505 (1972); Pfeil v. Pfeil, 100 A.D.2d 725, 473 N.Y.S.2d 629 (4th
Dep't 1984). New York courts have held the parties to a higher standard of proof where a marriage
is of long duration. Johnson v. Johnson, 103 A.D.2d 820, 478 N.Y.S.2d 54 (2d Dep't 1984); Passan-
tino v. Passantino, 87 A.D.2d 973, 450 N.Y.S.2d 98 (4th Dep't 1982).
200. It provides:
(5) The husband and wife have lived apart pursuant to a decree of separation for a
period of two years after the granting of such decree, and satisfactory proof has been
submitted by the plaintiff that he or she has duly performed all the terms and conditions
of such decree.
(6) The husband and wife have lived separate and apart pursuant to a written agree-
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With the 1966 expansion of the grounds for divorce and the availa-
bility of a no-fault separation leading to a divorce, it became unnecessary
to resort to the traditional gendered morality scripts associated with the
one-ground statute. Accusations of adultery, which often evoked
gendered images of husband as agent and wife as victim, became only
one of a number of options for couples seeking dissolution. It is undenia-
ble that such a law reform was desirable and, in fact, long overdue.
Nevertheless, acknowledgement of the need for reform ought not be
confused with its impact. Facilitating access to divorce with an expansive
gender neutral statute speaks symbolically to yet another aspect of for-
mal equality. There is no evidence that the reform was connected to a
desire to facilitate, assist, or ensure substantial equality in family life or
economic justice for women.20 1 Nor is there evidence that women actu-
ally received larger property settlements under the reform between 1966
and 1980 than under the one-ground statute. In most instances, they
ment of separation, subscribed and acknowledged by the parties thereto in the form
required to entitle a deed to be recorded, for a period of two years after the execution of
such agreement and satisfactory proof has been submitted by the plaintiff that he or she
has duly performed all the terms and conditions of such agreement. Such agreement
shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the county where in either party resides within
thirty days after the execution thereof.
N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney 1966).
Subsequent to 1966, N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 was amended in 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971,
1972, 1974, and 1975. The current provision reads:
(5) The husband and wife have lived apart pursuant to a decree or judgment of sepa-
ration for a period of one or more years after the granting of such decree or judgment,
and satisfactory proof has been submitted by the plaintiff that he or she has substantially
performed all the terms and conditions of such decree or judgment.
(6) The husband and wife have lived separate and apart pursuant to a written agree-
ment of separation, subscribed by the parties thereto and acknowledged or proved in the
form required to entitle a deed to be recorded, for a period of one or more years after the
execution of such agreement and satisfactory proof has been submitted by the plaintiff
that he or she has substantially performed all the terms and conditions of such agree-
ment. Such agreement shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the county wherein either
party resides. In lieu of filing such agreement, either party to such agreement may file a
memorandum of such agreement, which memorandum shall be similarly subscribed and
acknowledged or proved as was the agreement of separation and shall contain the fol-
lowing information: (a) the names and addresses of each of the parties, (b) the date of
marriage of the parties, (c) the date of the agreement of separation and (d) the date of
this subscription and acknowledgment or proof of such agreement of separation.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney 1988).
201. See Kay, An Appraisal of California's No Fault Divorce Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 291 (1987)
(claiming a developing connection between no-fault law in California and efforts to ensure substan-
tial equality in family life). But see Kay, supra note 197, at 26-27 (arguing that initially no-fault
reformers did not identify equality between men and women as the goal of the reform effort).
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were unlikely to have title to marital property" 2 and under the prevailing
strict title regime were forced to rely on the uncertainties of alimony.20 3
Nor does the retention of fault grounds as an option in the statute appear
to have created opportunities for wives to obtain more favorable treat-
ment than they had in the past, or in comparison with in-court or out-of-
court settlements in pure no-fault jurisdictions. 2° In sum, if it does not
affect the context in which divorce occurs, formal gender neutrality in
the rules regarding grounds for the dissolution of a marriage fails to have
a measurable impact on the outcome.
Narrative 3-Alimony: The Nexus of Property and Fault
Prior to 1980, fault was said to have no bearing on the distribution
of marital property under New York's strict title regime. Proven allega-
tions of fault notwithstanding, title was dispositive for the distribution of
marital assets. But fault was integrally connected to and had a dramatic
impact upon the awarding of continuing maintenance or alimony-a pri-
vate financial transfer between the parties.
Historically, alimony has been connected to the support obligation
of a husband during a marriage and the obligations incurred by a wife in
return for such support. Under New York law, a husband was required
to support his wife during marriage °5 and was forbidden from relieving
202. See supra note 136 accompanying text.
203. See infra notes 213-26 and accompanying text.
204. See Kay, supra note 197, at 70-71.
205. A husband's obligation to support his wife has a long common law tradition in which a
husband's duty is said to "spring from the marital relationship itself." Haas v. Haas, 298 N.Y. 69, 80
N.E.2d 337 (1948). This obligation was not affected by the creation of a separate legal identity for
married women in the Married Women's Property Acts. "These acts were not intended to relieve
husband and wife of their mutual responsibilities and disabilities toward one another." Coleman v.
Burr, 93 N.Y. 17, 20 (1883). "[The husband] remains liable to support and protect his wife and [is]
responsible to society for good order and decency of household." Id. at 24; see also DeBrauwere v.
De Brauwere, 203 N.Y. 460, 464, 96 N.E. 722, 725 (1911) (wife who has applied her separate estate
to the purpose of support obligation resting primarily on her husband may recover amounts ex-
pended); Ruhl v. Heintz, 97 A.D. 442, 446, 89 N.Y.S. 1031, 1033 (2d Dep't 1904); Little v. Willetts,
37 How. Pr. 481, 493 (Sup. Ct. 1869).
Even though the husband had the primary duty to support his family by his labor, the wife had
the duty to assist him in that obligation to the extent of any property she owned. Comment, Marital
Property: A New Look at Old Inequities, 39 ALB. L. REv. 52 (1974). "The obligation to support a
wife is principally statutory in New York and the statutes are scattered confusingly and illogically in
the Civil Practice Act, in various of the Consolidated Laws, and in the Unconsolidated Laws."
Dean, supra note 59, at 196; see id. at 199-203 (summarizing the different New York courts with
jurisdiction to address the need of wives for support). The failure to support a wife was criminalized.
1833 N.Y. Laws 11, § 7, and was later compiled into the N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 899 subd. 1
(1881). There were no fines or penalties unless repeated requests for compliance went unanswered.
Butsee Kane v. Kane, 101 Misc. 2d 143, 420 N.Y.S.2d 627 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (N.Y. GEN. OBLIa. LAW
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himself of this responsibility by contract.2 "6 As a condition of her sup-
port, a wife was required to cohabit with her husband" 7 and to avoid
misconduct 20 8 which would constitute grounds for separation or divorce.
Under the common law, a wife who was separated from her hus-
band and was not guilty of such misconduct as adultery was permitted to
invoke the law of agency 20 9 in her efforts to secure support for herself.
But practical difficulties21° and legal hurdles 211 limited the use of this
§ 5-311 unconstitutionally denies equal protection since it advances gender-based discrimination and
is incapable of 'gender neutral' interpretation.")
This support obligation was recognized as continuing after a husband's demise through the com-
mon law provision of dower for widows. At the death of her husband, a widow was entitled to one
third of the real property owned by her husband at any time during the marriage. If the marriage
was childless, the widow could claim one half of the real property. She could also claim her para-
phernalia (clothing and other personal items appropriate to her status). This dower right however
represented only a life interest. If a husband died testate and left specific property to his widow, she
could choose between the devises and dower. See M. SALMON, supra note 63, at 141-84 (for further
discussion of provisions for widows). It is clear that widows who lacked independent income or
wealth could experience by operation of the law an enforced reduction in their standard of living
unless their husbands chose to be generous. In effect, law protected a woman's interest only in a
small way if she was forced to rely on it.
206. Belaustegui v. Belaustegui, 85 Misc. 2d 1015, 380 N.Y.S.2d 950 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
207. An aspect of women's "otherness" in the prevailing sex/gender system is men's insistence
on the sexual functioning of women in relation to them. 3 H. ELLIS, STUDIES IN THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF SEX 152-202 (1908) (describes women as interested in sex, a novel idea at the time). However, a
woman was clearly in need of a man to initiate any sexual activity and therefore was dependent on
him for pleasure. See Freud, Some Physical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction Between the
Sexes, in THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND
FREUD 248 (J. Strachey ed. 1963); see also Gordon & Shankweiler, Different Equals Less: Female
Sexuality in Recent Marriage Manuals, 33 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 459-66 (1971).
208. "Married women should so live that the electric light of truth, when turned upon them,
will reveal nothing but honor and purity." Auld v. Auld, 16 N.Y.S. 803, 806 (Sup. Ct. 1891). While
courts were willing to examine the character of a married woman when she was the plaintiff in a
divorce action, the importance of a presumption of innocence for married women should not be
underestimated. The stakes were very high for women whose husbands questioned their fidelity.
209. In addition to being the legal representative and moral guardian of his wife, the common
law presumed the husband to be the family breadwinner. While ownership and control of his wife's
property might assist him in fulfilling that responsibility, no direct effective means was provided for
ensuring that he met those obligations since the common law doctrine of unity in marriage precluded
spouses from suing each other. Nor was the common law's indirect cumbersome and limited means
of attempting to ensure that the husband met his responsibility by his wife's invoking the law of
agency (permitting her to pledge her husband's credit for her support) likely to be successful. In so
doing she was acting as her husband's agent only with his express consent or with his consent im-
plied by their living together and by her responsibility for management of the household. Despite the
formal existence of this remedy, obtaining supplies on credit was probably a practice more prevalent
among the prosperous classes. L. HOLCOMBE, supra note 125, at 31.
210. A married woman had to find tradespeople willing to supply her with necessaries and who
if necessary were willing to sue her husband to recover debts she had incurred in his name. Id. at 32.
211. A husband could rebut the presumption that his wife acted as his agent of necessity by
claiming that she had left him without good cause, that she had committed adultery after their
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device. Two alternatives were available to ensure the support of spouses
in New York. The chancery courts were prepared to recognize voluntary
private separation agreements made through the medium of trustees" 2 in
which provision was made for the support of a wife. In the alternative,
the courts were prepared to award permanent alimony in an absolute
divorce.
The first statutory authority for such an allowance of permanent
alimony in New York was enacted in 1813.213 It provided for an award
of alimony only to divorced non-adulterous wives. Not only did the pro-
visions identify gender-based statutory disparities, they underscored the
gender-based differential risks of divorce. A defendant husband might
commit flagrant adultery, but the court would fix his financial responsi-
bility only on the basis of his income. Despite the court's power and dis-
cretion to determine the amount of the allowance in each individual case,
general rules were developed to allow a plaintiff wife a quarter or possi-
bly a third of the defendant husband's annual income from real estate.214
A defendant wife, on the other hand, might lose her rights to support if
she committed one indiscretion.215 Moreover, even if she were the com-
separation, that he had paid her an adequate allowance or an allowance that they had agreed upon
however inadequate it was, that she had other means of support, that he had warned suppliers not to
give her credit, that the debts she incurred were extravagant, and that she had refused his offer to
return to cohabitation. In each case the burden of proof rested on the creditor. Id.
212. Salmon points out the contradiction between allowing a voluntary private post-nuptial
agreement to live apart and divide the property, which virtually constituted a divorce a mensa el
thoro and the courts' insistence, as a matter of public policy, that it scrutinize all separations to
prevent the parties from consenting to a divorce without an allocation of fault. M. SALMON, supra
note 63, at 71-72.
213. The statute provided:
[I]f wife is the complainant... it shall be lawful for the court of chancery to make a
further decree or order against the defendant, compelling him to provide for the mainte-
nance of the children of the marriage ... and to provide a suitable allowance to the
complainant for her support as to the said court shall seem reasonable and just, having
regard to the circumstances of the parties respectively ......
An Act Concerning Divorces, and for other Purposes, ch. 102, 1813 N.Y. Laws 197, 199 [hereinafter
Act Concerning Divorces].
214. See Miller v. Miller, 6 Johns. Ch. 91, 93 (1822).
215. Act Concerning Divorces, supra note 213.
Cultural images connected with an adulterous married woman reveal its connection to patriarchal
ideology. See, eg., Pacheco v. Pacheco, 246 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1971), dismissed, 404 U.S. 804 (1971)
(upholding a Florida statute denying adulterous wives alimony). The court saw adultery as a source
of domestic discord, family disruption, and social scorn. These results were particularly the products
of the conduct of an adulterous wife and mother. The court also noted that no other breach of the
marital contract has received such universal condemnation. In fact, of all the fault-based grounds for
divorce, adultery is the only one that has ever been criminalized. See e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 255.17 (McKinney 1985) (adultery is a class B misdemeanor); see also Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S.
473 (1904) (for a discussion of a husband's rights to his wife's sexual services).
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plainant in a divorce action, the courts were prepared to review her con-
duct in determining her worthiness for an award. 16
Viewed as a substitution for a husband's duty to support his wife,
alimony was considered legally distinguishable from a property settle-
ment. It provided a divorced woman with no meaningful assets to which
she had title. It was neither the separate property nor the estate of the
wife.217 In addition, alimony served other overlapping functions. An ali-
mony award could prevent a nonadulterous former wife who remained
unmarried2" 8 from becoming a public charge. And by virtue of its judg-
ment regarding the moral character of both wife and husband, alimony
justified the state's severance of the marital relationship.
There appears to have been a fairly widespread concensus during the
late nineteenth and most of the twentieth centuries on the need, at least
in theory, to provide alimony for morally deserving, economically vul-
nerable, divorced women.219 Nevertheless, critics of the system of per-
manent alimony remained vocal, virulent, and misogynistic in their
condemnation. Though they acknowledged the need for alimony for
some deserving women, they characterized most women who were
awarded permanent alimony as "parasitic," "exploiters," or
"[a]limoniacs." "[S]hameless greed" and "hateful malice" became such
We think the authorities show the husband has certain personal and exclusive rights
with regard to the person of his wife which are interfered with and invaded by criminal
conversation with her; that such an act on the part of another man constitutes an assault
even when, as is almost universally the case as proved, the wife in fact consents to the act
Id. at 481.
216. Peckford v. Peckford, 1 Paige Ch. 274 (1828). Despite the conduct of the adulterous hus-
band, the judge noted that the wife-by traveling to England against her husband's wishes-had
exposed him to temptation. Her failure to be "perfectly discreet, prudent and submissive to her
husband" provided the judge with the rationale for awarding her a life annuity of one third rather
than one half of their property. Id.
217. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 441 (1968); see
also Comment, supra note 205, at 57.
218. Courts interpreted the statute to recognize a wife's entitlement to alimony notwithstanding
her misconduct, unless it would constitute grounds for separation and divorce. See Mann v. Wasser-
berger, 65 A.D.2d 717, 718, 410 N.Y.S.2d 590, 591 (1st Dep't 1978), appeal denied, 46 N.Y.2d 709,
386 N.E.2d 1338, 414 N.Y.S.2d 1026 (1979); Schwartzman v. Schwartzman, 62 A.D.2d 988; 403
N.Y.S.2d 317, 318-19 (2d Dep't 1978); Math v. Math, 39 A.D.2d 583, 331 N.Y.S.2d 964, 965 (2d
Dep't 1972), aff'd, 31 N.Y.2d 693, 289 N.E.2d 549 (1972), 337 N.Y.S.2d 505. Such a response may
well have been prompted by the desire to prevent former wives from going on welfare. Moreover, the
court had the discretion not to award alimony where the wife was self-supporting. See Kover v.
Kover, 29 N.Y.2d 408, 416, 278 N.E.2d 886, 889, 328 N.Y.S.2d 641, 645 (1972) (couple was child-
less, wife was in her 30s, marriage of short duration, and income of spouses was almost equal).
219. But see N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1922, at 14, col. 8 (for official recommendation of the Na-
tional Women's Party Conference that alimony be available for men as well as women).
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women's motives. Alimony itself had become "perverted, either as graft
for those who do not need it, or as a weapon for the satisfaction of female
spitefulness." For men, marriage could become a "life sentence to ali-
mony." Alimony often meant "man's servitude under female
tyranny.
220
Although no systematically gathered statistics exist regarding the
amount of alimony awarded before or after the 1966 expansion of
grounds for divorce, some evidence suggests that assertions of large sums
of money frequently awarded were highly inaccurate.221 Sparse data indi-
cate that alimony may not have been granted or possibly even requested
in many cases, despite what can be assumed to be married women's wide-
spread economic vulnerability. 222 Moreover, it appears that numerous
undocumented claims of extravagant alimony awards were fueled by an
occasional highly publicized struggle in a wealthy household.223 In fact,
when alimony was granted, it was likely to be meager.224 Additionally,
limited evidence indicates that, whatever the amount awarded, the likeli-
hood of arrearages was high and that attorneys were reluctant to pursue
contempt actions against a debtor husband.225
220. C. WILNER, ALIMONY: THE AMERICAN TRAGEDY 6-15 (1952) (quoting newspaper re-
ports in the 1930s and '40s).
221. See W. GELLHORN, J. HYMAN & S. ASCH, CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE COURTS OF
NEW YORK CITY 340-43 (1953) [hereinafter W. GELLHORN].
222. Relying on Census Bureau data, one study estimated that alimony was requested in 13.4%
of divorce cases from 1887 to 1903, but was awarded in 9.3% of the cases. In 1916, 20.3% petitioned
for alimony, but awards were granted in 15.4% of the cases. Id. There is no class or income break-
down for these statistics. See also P. JACOBSON, AMERICAN MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 127-28
(1959).
223. S. HEWLETr, A LESSER LIFE: THE MYTH OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION IN AMERICA 60
(1986); C. WILNER, supra note 220, at 49-56; Norman, Miss Goiddigger of 1953, PLAYBOY, Dec.
1953, at 6; see also Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 135.
224. In New York County, 60% of the temporary awards reported for the year ending June 30,
1962 were for less than $40 per week and 14% were for less than $20 per week. W. GELLHORN,
supra note 221, at 341. The authors comment, "There can be no wholly satisfactory solution to the
problem of dividing up inadequate funding." Id. Although these data were gathered for temporary
alimony awards, "there seems to be a tendency for the trial judge, when he fixes the final figure, to
give very considerable weight to the temporary alimony award." Id. at 343; see also id. at 344. For
other jurisdictions see 1 L. MARSHALL & G. MAY, THE DIVORCE COURT 312 (1932) (Maryland)
(Approximately 50% of the payments for alimony and child support totaled $33 per month or less.);
2 L. MARSHALL & G. MAY, THE DIVORCE COURT (1933) (Ohio). Although statistics are difficult to
obtain because court records are sealed for the protection of the family, a study by the Tax Founda-
tion indicated that the average alimony received by divorced wives in New York in 1975 was $2,932.
This average does not include women who were awarded no money and those who were unable to
collect what they were awarded.
225. "During the year ended June 30, 1952, in New York County, when about 400 applications
for temporary alimony were submitted to the Court, 271 applications were made in matrimonial
actions to punish for contempt." W. GELLHORN, supra note 221, at 343. A wide range of reasons
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In sum, there is little evidence that the narrow New York fault
ground of adultery, combined with the irrebutable legal presumption that
only a wife was eligible for alimony, benefited divorced women in a sig-
nificant economic manner. The system of gender specific alimony re-
vealed the seeming paradox of formal societal recognition of women's
economic vulnerability coupled with substantive societal failure to act
upon that recognition. Prevailing cultural norms prescribed depen-
dency 226 for women and reinforced women's economic vulnerability.
From 1966 until 1980, when alimony became bilateral, the availabil-
ity of less restrictive fault grounds and the option of converting a consen-
sual separation to divorce were said by some members of the legal
profession to alter the bargaining power of the parties. Whereas previ-
ously women tended not to be the defendants, after the 1966 reform there
was a marked increase in the appearance of men as plaintiffs in divorce
litigation.227 The significance of this development is more complicated
than some commentators would suggest. To assume that women prior to
1966 had more meaningful bargaining power requires acceptance of the
tenuous assumption that pre-1966 alimony awards to wives were com-
mon, adequate, and collected. 228 Despite the reassurance proffered by
ideology and legal identity, the actual existence of a likelihood of obedi-
ence to law was and is a matter of contingent fact.2 29
While loss of respectability, that powerful Victorian bar to many
women considering divorce, has virtually disappeared, the prospect of
significant material deprivation after divorce was and is a reality. Until
have been given for failure to enforce alimony awards. See, eg., Kover v. Kover, 29 N.Y.2d 408,
414, 278 N.E. 886, 888, 328 N.Y.S.2d 641, 644 (1972) ("The times have changed owing not alone to
the coequal status which a married woman today shares with her husband but also to the increase in
the number of married women working in gainful occupations."); Phillips v. Phillips, 1 A.D.2d 393,
150 N.Y.S.2d 646 (Ist Dep't 1956), aff'd, 2 N.Y. 2d 742, 138 N.E. 738, 157 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1956);
Peele, Social and Psychological Effects of the Availability and the Granting ofAlimony on the Spouses,
6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 283 (1939) ("Alimony... continues and even increases former antago-
nism."). Data from other jurisdictions at other points in history also reveals the same pattern of non-
payment. See Cott, Eighteenth Century Family and Social Life Revealed in Massachusetts Divorce
Records, in A HERITAGE OF HER OWN, supra note 123, at 121 (discussing allegations of failure to
pay alimony in New England).
226. See Harth, How the Angel Got Into the House, 4 WOMEN'S REV. BooKs, Oct. 1986, at 18-
19 (domesticity promoting the companionate marriage did not displace patriarchy); see also M.
GROSSBERG, supra note 11 (law was interested in stable families and male governance); L. KERBER,
supra note 87 (women were always the recipients ofjustice, men the dispensers); Olsen, supra note 6
(analyzing the simultaneous glorification and downgrading of home and market).
227. Conversations with attorneys in author's pilot study.
228. See supra note 225.
229. See H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); see also H. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND
MORALITY (1963) (nature and boundaries of compliance with law).
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1980 women incurred economic risks connected with divorce regardless
of the change in rules governing the grounds for dissolution and despite
the theoretical availability of alimony for innocent wives.
Narrative 4-Divorce Law Reform: Property and Alimony Revisited
A. Developments of a Decade:
The Shift from Strict Title to Equitable Distribution
During the seventies, large numbers of American women began
rediscovering, reemphasizing, and identifying a range of systematically
based disadvantages operating to exclude or constrain them from full and
equal participation in American society.230 This enterprise was a mani-
festation of long-term historical continuities within American culture,
231
as well as a response to shorter-term historical events which often create
experiential discontinuities between generations.232
Central to the undertaking was the issue of access to politics and the
market. Such access was identified as a prerequisite to the achievement of
formal, if not substantive, equality in American society.233 The agenda
for achieving this access was a broad one.234 It included passage of an
Equal Rights Amendment to both the federal2 35 and state constitu-
230. P. CONOVER & V. GRAY, FEMINISM AND THE NEw RIGHT: CONFLICT OVER THE AMER-
ICAN FAMILY 1 (1983) ("The decade of the 1970s was the women's decade.").
231. Newman, Symbolic Dialects and Generations of Women: Variation in the Meaning of Post
Divorce Downward Mobility, 13 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 230, 232 (1986) (identifying long-term continu-
ities as symbolic systems).
232. Newman identifies discontinuities as symbolic dialects emerging from the historically
bound experiences of a particular group. Discontinuities can produce any or all of the following
effects: introduce symbols unique to one group, thereby demarking its cultural repertoire from that
of other groups with whom it shares many parts of its symbolic system; interpret or construct a
symbol differently from another generation or highlight the significance of some symbols for one
group while the same symbols remain less salient for others not affected by the historical events, Id
at 232. Contemporary discontinuities may stem from experience in civil rights and anti-war move-
ments as well as liberal politics. See S. EVANS, PERSONAL POLITICS: THE RooTs OF WOMEN'S
LIBERATION IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE NEW LEFr (1979).
233. H. JACOB, supra note 191.
234. See R. CoB & C. ELDER, PARTICIPATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1972). For an issue to
become part of a legislative agenda, Cobb and Elder list several prerequisites: widespread attention,
shared concern of a sizable portion of the public that some type of action is required, and shared
perception that the matter is appropriate for governmental intervention. Id. at 86.
235. The proposed Equal Rights Amendment reads:
§ 1 Equality of rights under law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or
by any state on account of sex. § 2 The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this Article. § 3 This Amendment shall take
effect two years after the date of ratification.
H.R. REP. No. 359, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S. REP. No. 689, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1972).
The proposed federal amendment was ratified by Hawaii, New Hampshire, Delaware, Iowa, Idaho,
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tions,236 as well as a host of specific measures designed to change the
status of women in American society.237 These measures and the strate-
gies to achieve them were formulated by liberal feminists within the con-
text of traditional institutions; their moderate presentation of issues
allowed liberal feminists to be influential in law reform campaigns.2 3
Despite the sharp increase in the divorce rate during the decade,239
which in part reflected the impact of feminism, 24° feminists tended to be
occupied intensely with worthwhile and pressing issues other than family
Kansas, Nebraska, Texas, Wisconsin, New York, Michigan, Maryland, Massachusetts, Kentucky,
Pennsylvania, California, Wyoming, South Dakota, Oregon, Minnesota, New Mexico, Vermont,
Connecticut, Washington, Maine, Montana, Ohio, North Dakota, and Indiana. Kentucky, Ne-
braska, Idaho, and Tennessee later voted to rescind. See also 3. MANSBRiDGE, WHY WE LOST THE
ERA (1980). See generally THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF
THE ISSUES, 1976-1985 (R. Feinberg comp. 1986).
236. Sixteen states have their own equal rights amendments: ALASKA CONT. art. I § 3 (1956,
amended 1972); COLO. CONsT. art. 2, § 29; CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 20 (1965, amended 1974); HAw.
CONST. art. 1, § 21; ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 18; MD. CONST. art. 46; MASS. CONST. part I, art. 1;
MONT. CONST. art. 2, § 4; N.H. CONST., part I, art. 2; N.M. CONST. art 2, § 18; PA. CoNsT. art. 1,
§ 28; TEX. CONST. art 1, § 3a; UTAH CONST. art. 4 § I; VA. CONST. art 1, § 11; WASH. CONST. art.
31, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. 1, §§ 2, 3 & art. 6, § 1. Wyoming and Utah adopted equality provisions in
the 1890s as part of their original constitutions apparently as a means of attracting women settlers in
an attempt to increase the number of registered voters. See Note, State Equal Rights Amendments:
Legislative Reform and Judicial Activisim, 4 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 227, 230 n.51 (1978); see also
Avner & Greene, State ERA Impact On Family Law, 8 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 4023, 4025 (1982).
237. During the 1970s women demanded equal representation in state party delegations at pres-
idential nomination conventions as well as the inclusion of issues with which women were particu-
larly concerned in Democratic and Republican party platforms. "The 1972 conventions of both
major parties had a higher proportion of women in their delegations than in any previous years;
almost 40 percent of the Democratic delegates and nearly 30 percent of the Republicans were wo-
men." S. BAXTER & M. LANSING, WOMEN AND POLITICS 132 (1981). This period also witnessed
the development and financing of such organizations as in the National Women's Political Caucus
devoted to encouraging the election of female candidates at every level of government. On July 10th,
1971 more than 200 women-Republicans, Democrats and independents from 27 states-met to
inaugurate a new organization aimed at increasing the number of women holding public office. See
Shanahan, Women Organize for Political Power, N.Y. Times, July 11, 1971, at 1, col. 1. See generally
B. BURRELL, A NEw DIMENSION IN POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: THE WOMEN'S POLITICAL CAU-
CUS, A PORTRAIT OF MARGINALITY: THE POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF THE AMERICAN WOMAN (M.
Githens & J. Prestage ed. 1977).
238. See Fineman, supra note 5, at 813-14 (analyzing the role of liberal feminism in Wisconsin
divorce law reform).
239. The number of households headed by divorced women rose dramatically from 1,259,000 in
1970 to 2,807,000 in 1979. By 1981, an additional 470,000 households were headed by divorced
women, bringing the figure to 3,277,000. USBC, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF UNITED STATES 62
(1972); id. at 80 (1985).
240. As a far-reaching social movement, feminism has impacted on the ways in which people
view marriage and divorce. Early feminists advocated divorce as a means of freeing women from
undesirable unions. See I HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 90. For a recent analysis of
the critique of the feminist position, see P. CONOVER, FEMINISM AND THE NEW RIGHT (1983).
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law reform. Initially, feminists made little concerted effort to anticipate
the multiplicity of problems for women generated by the reorganization
and restructuring of families through divorce.241 The explanations for
this lacuna are many; they reflect the complexity of undertaking actions
designed to lead to social change.
Historically, in political theory and jurisprudence as well as in the
practice of law, family issues including divorce have been considered
"private" matters, best left to governance and ordering within a family
unit.242 Feminist reformers, perhaps not fully immunized from this cul-
turally prevailing characterization of issues, may have tended to view di-
vorce law reform as less significant than issues identified with the
"public" arenas of politics and the market.243 Prevailing wisdom sug-
gested that money and political power were the key to meaningful social
change2 " despite feminist recognition that the "personal is the
political.
24 5
Not only did "private" family law reforms appear to pale in impor-
tance besides "public" issues of workforce participation and political rep-
resentation, they also presented complex issues not subject to dynamic
civil rights or constitutional litigation. Such recognition significantly di-
minished the symbolic vitality and appeal of these issues. The hallmarks
of liberation-change, expansive growth, autonomy-were not to be
found in the revision of marital property distribution statutes and the re-
education of lawyers and judges. In addition, the likelihood of having to
241. "Most of these [divorce reform laws] were enacted after 1965. No party platform or social
protest spurred legislators to accept them. Neither national politicians nor congress played a part in
their adoption. No Bureaucracy or national interest group promoted them. Little political conflict
accompanied them." H. JACOB, supra note 191, at 3; see also id. at 33 (discussing New York reform).
However, some organizations did focus on legal issues of concern to women, for instance, "Women
in Transition," an effort undertaken by the Women's Law Project in Philadelphia in 1970. (I am
indebted to Nadine Taub for this observation.) See also G. STEINER, THE FUTILITY OF FAMILY
POLICY 8-13 (1981) (pessimistic assessment of the prospect for improved policies designed to assist
what the author characterizes as "dysfunctional families").
242. See L. CLARK & L. LANGE, THE SEXISM OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY: WOMEN
AND REPRODUCTION FROM PLATO TO NIETZSCHE (1979); J. ELSHTAIN, PUBLIC MAN, PRIVATE
WOMAN: WOMEN IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT 12 (1981); Olsen, supra note 6.
243. See Freeman & Mensch, The Public-Private Distinction in American Law and Life, 36 BUF-
FALO L. REV. 237 (1987); see also J. ELSHTAIN, supra note 242; G. MATrHEWS, JUST A HOUSE-
WIFE: THE RISE AND FALL OF DOMESTICITY IN AMERICA 32 (1987).
244. See I. MARCUS, DOLLARS FOR REFORM: THE OEO NEIGHBORHOOD HEALTH CENTERS
(1981) (discussing perceived connection between money and power in capital war on capital poverty
programs).
245. S. EVANS, supra note 232, at 105; J. FREEMAN, THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION:
A CASE STUDY OF AN EMERGING SOCIAL MOVEMENT AND ITS RELATION TO THE SOCIAL POLICY
PROCESS 12-43 (1975).
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wage legislative and/or judicial struggles over the web of connected is-
sues (property distribution, alimony, and child support) in each of the
fifty states was a daunting prospect.246
Finally, feminist activists in the seventies held a wide variety of atti-
tudes toward marriage. While some of these attitudes echoed the senti-
ments and concerns of the nineteenth century women's movement,2 47 the
change in material conditions for twentieth century feminists permitted a
critique based on the availability of a wider range of options for women.
Some women challenged the cultural, social, and economic prioritization
of marriage as a privileged form of family life. They identified the hetero-
sexual nuclear family as an institution of patriarchal oppression but-
tressed by the state which was virtually unreformable from within. 48 For
these women, law was a vehicle for reproducing an oppressive, hierarchi-
cal family structure; divorce law reform was irrelevant; their energies
were directed toward the establishment of other forms of social connec-
tion. For heterosexual women, the availability of contraceptives2 49 and
abortion250 made both casual sex and cohabitation possible alternatives
to marriage.2"' For lesbians, the critique of marriage was an opening for
public acknowledgment of intimate relationships between women.
2 52
Mostly young and often unmarried or without children, educated
and relatively privileged, these feminists possessed credentials and skills
246. See N. HARWOOD, A WOMAN'S LEGAL GUIDE TO SEPARATION AND DIVORCE IN ALL 50
STATES 3-7 (1985).
247. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
248. See A. RICH, OF WOMAN BORN (1976); S. STEINMETZ, THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE: As-
SERTIVE, AGGRESSIVE AND ABUSIVE FAMILY INTERACTION (1977). For an analysis of this rela-
tionship in Europe, see J. DONZELOT, THE POLICING OF FAMILIES (1979).
249. L. GORDON, supra note 169; see also B. HARTMANN, REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND
WRONGS: THE GLOBAL POLmCS OF POPULATION CONTROL AND CONTRACEPTIVE CHOICE 286-
89 (1987); J. REED, FROM PRIVATE VICE TO PUBLIC VIRTUE: THE BIRTH CONTROL MOVEMENT
AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 128-31 (1983).
250. See N. DAVIS, FROM CRIME TO CHOICE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF ABORTION IN
AMERICA (1985); C. FRANCOME, ABORTION FREEDOM: A WORLDWIDE MOVEMENT (1984); R.
PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN'S CHOICE: THE STATE, SEXUALITY AND REPRODUCTIVE
CHOICE (1984).
251. Macklin, Heterosexual Cohabitation Among Unmarried College Students, and T. Wells, L.
Wells & S. Christie, Living Together: An Alternative to Marriage, in INTIMATE LIFESTYLES 291 (J.R.
& J.S. Delora eds. 1972); see also RENOVATING MARRIAGE: TOWARD NEW SEXUAL LIFESTYLES
(R. Libby & R. Whitenhurts eds. 1973) (exploring ideas and research on the role of sex after mar-
riage and emerging sexual lifestyles including the reevaluation of monogamous marriage).
252. See L. FADERMAN, SURPASSING THE LOVE OF MEN: ROMANTIC FRIENDSHIP AND LOVE
BETWEEN WOMEN FROM RENAISSANCE TO THE PRESENT (1981); see also Lord, Uses of the Erotic
as Power, in SISTER OUTSIDER 53 (1984); Rich, Compulsing Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence,
in POWERS OF DESIRE, supra note 149, at 177.
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which permitted them to be economically self-sufficient.25 3 In their cri-
tique of marriage, they failed to recognize that divorce was an economic
risk for many less privileged, economically vulnerable women. Inadver-
tently perhaps, "they threw away their mothers for their dreams. 254
By the 1970s, most jurisdictions which followed common law strict
title marital property and marital dissolution rules had already modified
them to avoid their harsh effects at divorce. These jurisdictions, relying
on contemporary notions of mariage as a partnership,25 adopted rules of
equitable distribution for marital property which bypassed title for di-
vorce distribution purposes.216 Feminists in New York, however, contin-
253. For middle class aspects of the Women's Movement, see Blackwell, On Marriage and
Work, in ROOT OF BITTERNESS 351 (N. Cott ed. 1972) (calling on women of the "leisured" classes
to use their time to test themselves and their capacities through work); see also C. EPSTEIN, WO-
MEN'S PLACE: OPTIONS AND LIMITS IN PROFESSIONAL CAREERS (1970). For criticism of the cen-
trality of middle class concerns within the women's movement, see B. HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY:
FROM MARGIN TO CENTER (1984).
254. Interview with Lillian Kozak, lobbyist for New York chapter of the National Organization
for Women (June 1985) [hereinafter Interview].
255. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION THE STATUS OF WOMEN (1963) (recommending a full reappraisal of marital property
rules):
Marriage is a partnership in which each spouse makes a different but equally important
contribution .... During marriage each spouse should have a legally defined and sub-
stantial right in the earnings of the other spouse and in the real and personal property
acquired as a result of such earnings as well as in the management of such earnings and
property. Such a right should survive the marriage and be legally recognized in the event
of its termination by annulment, divorce or death.
Id. at 16; see UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT, 9A U.L.A. 147 (1973) [hereinafter UMDA] (ap-
plying notions of partnership). According to Robert Levy,
[Tihe recommendations made in the text are designed to permit the court to recognize
what most members of families would recognize-that husband and wife are partners in
an enterprise which produces income (the husband's wages), maintains a household and
nurtures children (the wife's tasks as housewife and mother).
R. LEVY, UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS (1969)
(prepared for the Special Committee on Divorce of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws); see also id. at app. B (summary of property division statutes).
It is instructive to contrast these conceptualizations with the view of partnership in the commer-
cial context. The latter relies upon notions of equal contribution, risk, and benefit, and is character-
ized by equal obligations, rights to possession of property, free entry and exit, and equal rights to a
return of contribution upon dissolution with equal division of profits and losses regardless of the
form or amount of the contributions. N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW art. 4 § 40 (McKinney 1988) (rules
determining rights and duties of partners); id. at art. 6 § 71 (rules for distribution); see also Bayer v.
Bayer, 215 A.D. 454, 214 N.Y.S. 322 (1st Dep't 1926) (partnership-at-will dissolved at the moment
when either of the partners expresses an intent not to continue longer.); Application of Lester, 87
Misc. 2d 717, 386 N.Y.S.2d 509 (Sup. Ct. 1976) ("A partnership is fiduciary in character.... Where
one partner takes on the role of a 'manager' or 'director' of a partnership his obligation to deal fairly
and openly and disclose completely is heightened.").
256. Prior to the enactment of the 1980 Equitable Distribution Law, New York was one of the
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ued to confront the traditional common law, strict title, divorce
distribution rule.257
In 1971, the Women's Strike for Equality Coalition (a New York
group composed of a broad base of women's organizations) added to its
priority list the need for legislation creating more equitable divorce settle-
ments.258 The group was aided by widespread recognition in legal and
legislative circles that major problems existed in New York divorce law.
More specifically, criticisms were made regarding the fairness of marital
six "title" states in which marital property was limited to jointly owned property, unless a construc-
tive trust could be imposed to prevent unjust enrichment. Act of July 19, 1980, ch. 281, 1980 N.Y.
Laws 1225. Pennsylvania left this group just before New York on Apr. 2, 1980 when its equitable
distribution statute was signed into law. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 102(a)(6) & 401 (Purdon Supp.
1986). Only Florida, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia remained in the strict
title category. Of this group, the latter three have passed equitable distribution statutes: S.C. CODE
ANN. § 20-7-471 (Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1 (1982); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-1 & 48-2-32
(Supp. 1984). Florida has no statutory provision for dividing marital property; however, by judicial
fiat courts can equitably distribute property regardless of how title in such property is held. See
Canakaris v. Canakaris, 6 Fla. 2296, 382 So. 2d 1197 (1980). Only Mississippi remains a title state
but there are doubts as to whether it may truly be considered an exclusively title state. The Missis-
sippi Supreme Court in Reeves found the lower court award so low as to shock the conscious of the
court. Reeves v. Reeves, 410 So. 2d 1300 (Miss. 1982). The state supreme court compensated the
wife not only for her economic contributions to the marriage, but also for homemaker services. The
court noted that its holding and similar rulings do not make Mississippi a community property state,
but "further delineates the serious responsibility of a chancellor to make intelligent and fair provi-
sions for a wife." Id. at 1303.
For an overview of the diversity among the states regarding marital property distribution, see
Freed & Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 21 FAM. L.Q. 417 (1988); see also
Greene, Comparison of the Property Aspects of Community Property and Common Law Marital Prop-
erty Systems and Their Relative Compatibility With the Current View of the Marriage Relationship
and the Rights of Women, 13 CREIGHTON L. REv. 71 (1979).
257. Although New York courts could not transfer title prior to the revision of N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW § 236, they were granted some discretionary authority in the distribution of marital prop-
erty. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 234 (McKinney 1977). The court could (1) determine any ques-
tion as to the title to property arising between the parties, and (2) make such direction between the
parties, concerning the possession of property, as in the court's discretion justice requires having
regard to the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties. See Weseley v. Weseley, 58
A.D.2d 829, 396 N.Y.S.2d 455 (2d Dep't 1977) (exclusive possession of marital residence until chil-
dren reach age 21 or marry awarded to wife). Moreover, a court using its equitable powers in situa-
tions of grave injustice could grant relief in the form of a constructive trust. If the court failed to find
fraud or concealment, it would not impose this remedy unless the four elements of a constructive
trust were present. Janke v. Janke, 47 A.D.2d 445, 366 N.Y.S.2d 910 (4th Dep't 1975), aff'd, 39
N.Y.2d 786, 350 N.E.2d 617, 385 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1976); Liammari v. Liammari, 40 A.D.2d 845, 337
N.Y.S.2d 463 (2d Dep't 1972), aff'd, 33 N.Y.2d 572, 301 N.E.2d 432, 347 N.Y.S.2d 448 (19731; see
Saffv. Sail', 61 A.D.2d 452, 402 N.Y.S.2d 690, 692 (4th Dep't 1978), appeal dismissed by 46 N.Y.2d
969, 389 N.E.2d 142, 415 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1979) (for express concern by the court that it was not
undertaking the creation of a judicial version of community property law).
258. Representatives from the Coalition met with 20 state legislators to discuss legislation which
would accomplish this end. N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1971, at 47, col. 1.
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property distribution awards based on title, the amount of both alimony
and child support awards, and the failure of courts to ensure their
payment.
Between 1972, when legislation was introduced proposing revisions
in the New York Domestic Relations Law governing the distribution on
divorce of marital property,259 and 1980, when a reform was enacted,
marital property reform proposals were introduced in every session of
the New York State legislature.260 The bills were designed to give effect
to sharing principles in marriage.261 They addressed both the objective
and normative aspects of a marital relationship.262 One set of proposals
identified such sharing principles with flexible equitable distribution of
marital property.2 63 Another set of proposals connected sharing princi-
ples with a rebuttable presumption of equal distribution of marital
259. Recent Developments, 45 ALB. L. REv. 483 (1981). The original bill proposed by Assem-
blyman Blumenthal never left committee. It contained a presumption that property of a marriage
should be divided equally between divorcing parties unless circumstances dictated otherwise. Foster,
Family Law, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 8, 1973, at 1.
260. Recent Developments, supra note 259, at 483 n.3. The major difference among the bills
introduced was the inclusion or absence of a rebuttable presumption of equal distribution. Id. at 483
n.2. From 1974 to 1980, most proposed legislation supported equitable distribution, rather than a
presumption of equal distribution.
" 261. See Praeger, Sharing Principles and The Future of Marital Property Law, 25 UCLA L.
REv. 1 (1977); Comment, The Development of Sharing Principles in Common Law Marital Property
States, 28 UCLA L. REv. 1269 (1981). An express application of the sharing principle is found in
NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION BILL
(LAws 1980, CH. 281), reprinted in llc N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. app. B-8 (1988) [hereinafter
ASSEMBLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION] ("The basic premise for the
marital property and alimony (now maintenance) reforms of this legislation ( 236) is that modern
marriage should be -viewed as a partnership of co-equals.").
262. Hollinger uses "objective" to mean the reflection of actual behavior and "normative" as
expressing a view of how such relationships ought to be lived. Hollinger, Book Review, 81 MICH. L.
REv. 1065, 1077 (1983).
263. The drafters of the flexible equitable distribution bills relied, in part, on the language of the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. UMDA § 307, 9A U.L.A. 238 (1973). The UMDA lists two
alternatives for the disposition of property. Alternative A provides that a court, making a distribu-
tion, should consider the following factors:
the duration of the marriage, any prior marriage of either party, antenuptial agree-
ment of the parties, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income,
vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of each of the parties, custo-
dial provisions, whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance,
and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. The
court shall also consider the contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition,
preservation, depreciation, or appreciation in value of the respective estates, and the
contribution of a spouse as a homemaker or to the family unit.
Id. at § 307.
Alternative B proposes the following guidelines concerning the distribution of marital property.
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assets. 2 "
By 1974, the proposal for flexible equitable distribution of marital
assets had emerged as the viable political compromise. 265 The New York
State Assembly passed various versions of this measure between 1976
and 1978. Despite significant public pressure and support for some form
of equitable distribution,2 .66 however, the legislation remained bottled up
in the Senate Judiciary Committee, lacking the votes to be reported out
until 1980.267
[The Court] shall divide the marital property without regard to marital misconduct in
just proportions considering all relevant factors including:
(1) contribution of each spouse to acquisition of the marital property, including con-
tribution of a spouse as homemaker;
(2) value of the property set apart to each spouse;
(3) duration of the marriage; and
(4) economic circumstances of each spouse when the division of property is to be-
come effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live
therein for reasonable periods to the spouse having custody of any children.
Id. at § 307.
264. "Marital property shall be divided equally between the parties unless the court shall ex-
pressly declare that justice and equity require a different division." S.597L, 204th Sess., 1981 N.Y.
Laws 300 (introduced by Senator Linda Winikow).
265. "As a matter of politics (that dirty word) there is just no possibility of passing an equality
of distribution bill." Divorce Reform Bills Cause Controversy, Vesey St. Letter, Apr. 1980, at 3, col. 2
(quoting New York State Assemblymember G. Burrows). "The bill represents an equitable compro-
mise between the equality presumption in the Winikow bill and the status quo." Letter from Alfred
H. Blumenthal to Richard A. Brown (July 20, 1979), reprinted in BILL JACKET OF THE N.Y. EQUI-
TABLE DIsTRIBUTIoN LAW, 1980 N.Y. Laws ch. 281.
266. In 1978 and 1979, an ad hoc committee of representatives from various bar groups formed
a united front to push for enactment of the equitable distribution law. Several groups actively op-
posed the reform proposals. Both the Family Law Committee of the Brooklyn Bar Association and
the National Organization for Women (NOW) raised objections to the extensiveness of judicial dis-
cretion provided by the proposed statute. Foster, Commentary on Equitable Distribution, 26 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. I n.1 (1981). The Family Law Committee of the Brooklyn Bar Association maintained
that there was no need for equitable distribution because the property arrangements
determined by title reflected the desire of the parties and that if the social theory of
partnership in a marriage was the motivating factor for the legislation, then a commu-
nity property regime should be adopted to provide advance certainty regarding the rights
and obligations of the parties.
Letter from the Family Committee of the Brooklyn Bar Association to Members of the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee (May 13, 1977). Other groups, such as Operation Wake-Up, the Organization of
Women's Groups United to Defeat ERA and Defend Existing Rights, and the Committee for Fair
Divorce and Alimony Laws opposed any change in the existing divorce law. Recent Developments,
supra note 259, at 489 n.22.
267. In March 1976, when sponsors introduced the equitable distribution bill in the New York
Senate, they were optimistic about the bill's passage. Recent Developments, supra note 259, at 483
n.2. The bill was supported by important religious groups and by numerous television, newspaper,
and radio commentators, as well as the New York Times and the New York Post. It was endorsed in
principle by virtually every major bar association in the state. It was drafted by a bipartisan group of
legislators and counsel for both the Senate and Assembly Committees working with legislative draft-
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The Supreme Court ruling in Orr v. Orr,68 which declared unconsti-
tutional an Alabama statute providing alimony only to wives, helped to
break the legislative impasse. New York's gendered provision for ali-
mony suffered from the same constitutional infirmity.269 Still, New York
could have cured it by substituting the word "spouse" for "wife," thereby
ing specialists and bar associations. Yet, only five of fifteen members of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee voted to report the bill out to the full Senate. Smothers, Fiscal Equity in Divorce Dies in
Albany, N.Y. Times, June 3, 1976 at 1, col. 5; see also Recent Developments, supra note 259, at 483
n.2. Some concern was expressed that the discretion of judges would be the the law of tyrants (Sen.
Abraham Bernstein, Bx.-Demo.).
The pattern was repeated in 1977 when Senate Committee members were reluctant to report out
the bill. Some committee members objected to various portions of the bill; others speculated that the
passage of the bill would encourage divorce; others worried whether the legislation granted excessive
discretionary power to the courts. Gupta, Legislators Get Opposing Opinions on Proposed Divorce
Law Change, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1977, at 23, col 1; see also Dileo & Model, A Survey of the Law of
Property Disposition Upon Divorce in the TriState Area, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 219, 221 (1982);
Recent Developments, supra note 259, at 483 n.2. Arguments in the Senate included claims that the
proposals would encourage divorce, judge shopping, a view of marriage as a business contract, and a
religious backlash. Smothers, When a Marriage Breaks Up, Who Gets What? N.Y. Times, May 29,
1976, at 12, col. 3; Smothers, Divorce Reforms Gaining in Albany, N.Y. Times, May 20, 1976, at 1,
col. 5. To complicate matters, the Assembly attempted to tie the reporting out of the proposals from
the Senate Judiciary Committee to the pending appointment of judges to the New York Court of
Appeals.
268. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
269. A portion of the statute had been unsuccessfully challenged. Steinberg v. Steinberg, 46
A.D.2d 684, 685, 360 N.Y.S.2d 75, 76 (2d Dep't 1974) (statutory classification on the basis of sex has
a rational basis); Trask v. Trask, 85 Misc. 2d 980, 982, 381 N.Y.S.2d 584, 584 (Sup. Ct. 1976)
(gender-based statute reflected legislature's judgment that classification is reasonable). But see Thaler
v. Thaler, 89 Misc. 2d 315, 318, 391 N.Y.S.2d 331, 340 (Sup. Ct. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 58
A.D.2d 890, 396 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1977) (statutory provision facially violative of equal protection, but
construed to be gender neutral). In Thaler, the court noted that
the movement to raise the consciousness of women to an appreciation of their true rights
and their potential as functioning individuals has been distinctive and is comprehensive.
Interestingly, part of the thrust of its intellectual vanguard has been the assertion that
the liberation of women implicitly carries with it the liberation of men. The apparent
theory is that feminine emancipation eases the pressures on men to fulfill idealized and
artificially imposed roles of masculine capability and expectation. It would appear that
prohibitions against sexual discrimination mean what they say. You may not lawfully
discriminate against women, but by the same token, you may not discriminate against
men either. The edge of sex discrimination has two sides. And, there is more to it than
that. Philosophically, a benevolent grant to women of legal rights unreasonably denied
to men may help the women immediately affected but the implicit condescension and
maintenance of a protective stance in the end produces the attitude that somehow wo-
men are not equal to men. The plain language of the streets is that in the long run
"women will not have it both ways."
Id. at 316-17, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 33; see also Lissner, Payment of Alimony by Women Proposed by
Legislative Panel, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1967, at 43, col. 4. The Joint Legislative Committee on Matri-
monial and Family Law stated that women should be liable for alimony: "Equality under the law of
women has reached such a level that there is and should be an equal obligation to share their means
when one encounters misfortune."
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creating a system of bilateral alimony.270 But the pressing need to revise
the alimony section of the Domestic Relations Law accelerated the drive
for a more extensive reform than Orr required. In turn, this pressure
created the possibility for greater legislative compromise.
The substantive issue informing the compromise regarding alimony
was clear: how much would divorcing wives be awarded? Provision for
gender neutral alimony, while remedying a legal deficiency, would, in
fact, be of little benefit to husbands. The more significant benefit would
accrue from legislative intent indicating a shift in emphasis from long-
term or permanent alimony to short-term maintenance aimed at assisting
or providing an incentive for a homemaker spouse to "rehabilitate" her-
self.271 Such legislative intent would be a signal to judges to curtail ali-
mony awards and to attorneys representing wives not to rely on alimony
as a bargaining chip. In return for the statutory shift in alimony, title
would be eliminated as the crucial factor in the division and distribution
of marital assets.27 2
Legislators supporting the equitable distribution compromise argued
270. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-311 (McKinney Supp. 1980); see also Greschler v.
Greschler, 71 A.D.2d 322, 422 N.Y.S.2d 718 (2d Dep't 1979), modified by 51 N.Y.2d 368, 434
N.Y.S.2d 194, 414 N.E.2d 694 (1980) (former section 5-311 violative of equal protection because
wife had sufficient means to contribute to the support of husband on welfare).
271. An Assembly memorandum elaborates on the role of rehabilitative alimony:
The objective of the maintenance provision is to award the recipient spouse an opportu-
nity to achieve independence. However, in marriages of long duration, or where the
former spouse is out of the labor market and lacks sufficient resources, or has sacrificed
her business or professional career to serve as a parent and homemaker, "maintenance"
on a permanent basis may be necessary. In recognition of these facts the non-monetary
contribution of a spouse is a factor for consideration.
ASSEMBLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, supra note 261, at app. B-8;
see, eg., Morgan v. Morgan, 81 Misc. 2d 616, 366 N.Y.S.2d 977 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (New York trial
court justified the use of "rehabilitative" alimony by finding that the wife had a duty to mitigate the
economic damages caused by the marriage and that the husband should subsidize her in her efforts
to mitigate).
Concern for coercion in the drafting of prenuptial agreements regarding alimony led to the inclu-
sion of a remedial provision when the terms of the agreement are found unreasonable or unconscion-
able. Act of June 19, 1982, ch. 281, § 7, 1980 N.Y. Laws 1225, 1227-32 (amending N.Y. DOM. REL
LAW § 236 (1977) by the addition of paragraph (B)(3)).
272. Hearings on S.6174, A.6200 Before the Joint NY. State Senate & Assembly Committees
(Mar. 4, 1980) (testimony of Lillian Kozak, chair, Marriage & Divorce Task Force, NOW/NYS)
[hereinafter Kozak Testimony]. Kozak explained:
Mr. Burrows... told us that this bill was never intended for the $400-$500 a week wage
earner. I then asked Mr. Burrows, "Why, then, did you provide that alimony be
awarded for a limited period of time when that provision will be most harmful to just
those families?" And Mr. Burrows replied, "Don't you see? That was the trade off."
Id. at 3; see also Brown, The Uncertain Duration of Rehabilitation Alimony, FAIRSHARE, Aug. 1984,
at 5.
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that wives would fare better under the reform than under the status quo.
Under the reform, wives surrendered the possibility of long term or per-
manent alimony for an immediate equitable share of marital assets as
determined by a judge or negotiated by attorneys. Presented as a trade,
the reform package involved problematic choices, especially for women
working in the home as homemakers.
Nothwithstanding the emphasis on factors other than title in deter-
mining a property settlement, the new flexible property distribution
scheme273 identified homemaker contribution as only one of a number of
unprioritized factors to be considered in distributing marital property.
Moreover, reliance on equitable distribution only of marital property
274
could provide a windfall for a wage earning spouse whose separate prop-
erty had appreciated as a result of the contribution of a homemaker
spouse. Given prior history, reliance on alimony was unsound. Alimony
was awarded far less frequently prior to 1980 than popular culture or the
statute suggested. Arrearages were significant. Court awards or settle-
ments were largely unenforced. Yet, symbolically, alimony was impor-
tant. It articulated societal recognition of a homemaker's contribution
and status as well as her vulnerability. On the other hand, in marriages
where present and future wage earning capacity was the significant asset
in the marriage, alimony theoretically was a greater possible benefit than
a modest property settlement.
At bottom, the political compromise revealed the centrality of the
sex/gender system as inextricably bound up with the property distribu-
tion aspects of divorce law reform. Ostensibly the issue was: what is fair
for divorced women? At another level the question was: what could pre-
vent women, especially homemakers, from "getting too much?" The
evaluation of a wife's contribution was key; left untouched and undis-
cussed was the evaluation of a husband's contribution-presumably an
273. Marital property is defined as "all property acquired by either or both spouses during the
marriage and before the execution of a separation agreement or the commencement of a matrimonial
action, regardless of the form in which title is held, except as otherwise provided in agreement pursu-
ant to subdivision three of this part." Act of June 19, 1980, ch. 281 § 9, 1980 N.Y. Laws 1225, 1227-
1232 (amending N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 (1977). See Pincus, How Equitable Is New York's
Equitable Distribution Law? 14 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 433 (1982-83) (for the argument that
the most significant characteristic of the new law is its flexibility).
274. See Act of June 19, 1980, ch. 281 § 9(6) 1980 N.Y. Laws 1225, 1229 (any equitable claim
to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made to the acquisition of such marital property by
the party not having title, including joint efforts or expenditures and contributions and services as a
spouse, parent, wage earner and homemaker, and to the career or career potential of the other
party).
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income, in all likelihood a higher one, than his spouse's. The referent in
the reform was undeniably male.
In 1980 an equitable distribution bill containing the viable political
compromise was reintroduced in both houses of the New York State leg-
islature. Negotiations between the Assembly and Senate produced agree-
ment regarding the passage of the proposed bill. In their respective
chambers, however, Senator Linda Winikow and Assemblywoman May
Newburger reintroduced a proposal for a rebuttable presumption of
equal distribution. Formally, the ensuing fierce battle275 appeared to be
concerned with the desired degree of judicial discretion in property dis-
tribution. In fact, "Everybody [was] putting himself or herself in the
shoes of those faced with a divorce action." ' 6 On June 3, 1980, the New
York Senate, following the lead of the Assembly, defeated the presump-
tion of equal distribution and passed the equitable distribution
proposal.2 77
Thus two statutory provisions, strict title which was almost .200
years old and sex specific alimony which was 167 years old, were super-
seded by legislation identified with contemporary norms of fairness. The
goals of the legislation were twofold: the elimination of unconstitutional
sex discrimination27 8 and the reform of New York alimony and marital
property law. Marriage was to be viewed as a partnership, which sup-
porters of the reform noted was not fully recognized under existing New
York domestic relations law.
279
275. N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1980, at 24, col 3; see also Recent Developments, supra note 259, at
483 n.3. Many of Winikow's supporters preferred no reform to passage of the equitable distribution
bill without the presumption. See N.Y. STATE SEN. R c. 3997 (1980); see also Recent Develop-
ments, supra note 259, at 489 n.21.
276. N.Y. Times, May 30, 1980, at 22, col. 1.
277. See N.Y. STATE SEN. REC., supra note 275. "The characterization of marital property is
exclusively for dissolution of a marriage. There has been no change in Estates, Powers and Trust
Law; for testamentary and inheritance purposes, separate and jointly owned property is treated the
same as before the enactment of equitable distribution." Freed & Foster, Family Law, 32 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 335, 342 (1981).
278. But note the Times editorial which characterized the bill as a half reform. New York
Times, supra note 275 ("Equitable distribution does not erase the bias against women in contested
divorces."); see also Memorandum from Lillian Kozak, chair, Marriage & Divorce Task Force,
NOW/NYS to New York State Legislators Barclay & Burrows in Opposition to S.6174/A.6200
(May 6, 1980) (on file with author) (for concerns that the proposed equitable distribution reform
would not address the economic plight of divorced women).
279. See Governor's Memorandum On Approval of ch. 281, Husband and Wife-Equal Treat-
ment In Support Obligations, Matrimonial Actions, reprinted in 1980 N.Y. Laws 1863 (McKinney
1980) (which views the marital union as an "economic partnership"); see also G. BURROWS, ASSEM-
BLY MEMORANDUM, reprinted in 1980 N.Y. LEGis. ANN. 129, 130. The term has been the subject of
judicial confusion. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1985),
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B. The Language of Reform: Gendered and Degendered Levels
Divorce law reform, as well as divorce itself, is a prime example of
gender conflict marked by disproportionate systemic aggregations of
power and advantage along sex/gender lines. The deeply gendered struc-
ture of family is neither eliminated nor submerged in public policy de-
bates and policy formulations involving divorce law reform. More
particularly, since dissolution and reorganization of family involve re-
source allocation, the struggle in the legislature or the courts regarding
such allocation inevitably focuses on contending assumptions regarding
gendered contributions to family.
During the New York divorce law reform debates of the 1970s, it
was clear that the rules for distribution of assets had serious economic
consequences for women. Gendered social and cultural issues appeared
in the reassuring legal garb of gender neutral terms. They were said to
refer neither to women nor to men. But, given the nature of heterosexual
marriage, they referred inextricably to both women and men. Ultimately,
illustrates this point most clearly. The memorandum accompanying the 1980 reform signed by the
Assembly, Senate, and Governor stated:
the basic premise for this marital property and alimony (now maintenance) reforms of
this legislation (§ 236) is that modern marriage should be viewed as a partnership of co-
equals. Upon the dissolution of a marriage there should be an equitable distribution of
all family assets accumulated during the marriage and maintenance should not rest on
the economic basis of reasonable needs and the ability to pay. From this point of view,
the contributions of each partner should ordinarily be regarded as equal and there
should be an equal division of family assets unless such divisions would be inequitable
under the circumstances of the particular case.
ASSEMBLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, supra note 261, at app. B-8;
see also N.Y.L.J., Mar. 4, 1986, at 2, col. 6. On July 1, 1980, this memorandum was amended by
Assemblyman Burrows. G. BURRows, ASSEMBLY NEMORANDUM, reprinted in 1980 N.Y. LEois,
ANN. 129-30. The amended memorandum deleted all references to a presumption of equality. It
states, "The basic premise... is that modern marriage should be viewed as a partnership. Upon
dissolution of a marriage there should an equitable distribution of all family assets accumulated
during the marriage." The amended memorandum appears in full in I Ic N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L & R.
app. B1. This latter memorandum was not widely circulated, and the slip opinion in O'Brien relied
on the original memorandum, stating: "Equitable Distribution was based on the premise that a mar-
riage is, among other things, an economic partnership to which both parties contribute as spouse,
parent, wage earner or homemaker and that these respective contributions should ordinarily be re-
garded as equal." N.Y.L.J., Dec. 30, 1985, at 4 (quoting O'Brien slip op.); see also J. Casilio, O'Brien
v. O'Brien, New York Property Distribution and the Complete Collapse of the Co-Equal Spouse
Doctrine (student paper, SUNY at Buffalo Law School, on file with the author).
This dictum was widely circulated and interpreted as supportive of the court's liberal philosophy
regarding marriage until the court was informed that the improper memorandum was cited. The
corrected version of the opinion was published in it's official reprinting, 66 N.Y.2d 576 (1985), with
all cites to the original memorandum changed to the amended memorandum with its different the-
ory. J. Casilio, supra, at 22.
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they were connected to distinctive gendered assumptions for women and
men as wives and husbands.
Two major issues said to be separate or at least separable were, in
fact, inextricably linked. One issue concerned reform of the rules for the
distribution of property designated as marital at divorce. The other issue
focused on the role of alimony in a proposed marital property dissolution
reform. Facially, they involved an assessment of the contribution of each
party to the marriage. In fact, they became an assessment of a woman's
contribution to a marriage.
During the 1970s the marital property distribution debate focused
on the choice between alternative rules: equitable distribution or a pre-
sumption of equal distribution. Both rules shared a common feature: the
setting aside of New York's common law, strict title, marital property
rule at divorce. Both rules, like strict title, were facially gender neutral.
Consequently, it appeared that both would structure gender neutral mar-
ital property distributions.
Beyond these commonalities, each legal rule was said to embody a
distinctive philosophical/jurisprudential approach to distributive jus-
tice28° at marital dissolution. The language of one spoke to judicial dis-
cretion on the determination of distribution, while the terms of the other
spoke to an equalitarian partnership at divorce through a significant cur-
tailment of judicial discretion. But what appears at first reading as ab-
stract legal difference may, on further analysis, reveal predictable
similarities. Reforms which seem to be different may be committed to
280. See J. HOCHSCHILD, WHAT'S FAIR: AMERICAN BELIEFS ABOUT DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
(1981) (discussing various theories of distributive justice: strict equality, proportional investments or
results, and ascription); see also M. DEUTSCH, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVE (1985); Deutsch, Equity, Equality and Need: What Determines Which Value Will Be
Used as the Basis of Distributive Justice? 131 J. Soc. IssuEs 137-50 (1975) (discussing differing pre-
dominant values of distributive justice-based on type of relational context, eg. family, friendship, or
competitive). While Deutsch's work is a critique of the development of equity theory through social
psychology experiments, which rely on questionable assumptions regarding human behavior, his
comments have a wider applicability. Deutsch argues that equity theory assumes a common cur-
rency underlying diverse rewards and costs. It assumes that it makes no difference how one is re-
warded but rather only how much and that equitable rewards increase productivity. Equity theory is
premised on a set of cognitive assumptions identified with economic rationality which presumes
sufficiently accurate knowledge of self and the others with whom there is an exchange relationship so
that an accurate appraisal of the parties' interests and contributions to their relationship can be
made. Moreover, equity theory assumes a universal value underlying systems of distributive justice:
that outcomes should be distributed among individuals in proportion to their inputs or contribu-
tions. Id. at 25-29.
For a discussion of the relationship between capitalism and various principles of equity, see E.
SAMPSON, JUSTICE AND THE CRITIQUE OF PURE PSYCHOLOGY (1983).
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the same values.281
Proponents of equitable distribution began with the prima facie as-
sumption that people legitimately may make varying claims on resources
based on their differing life situations. Equity requires that each claim
receive an individualized determination on the merits.28 2 Like other life
situations, each marriage situation was said to be different.283 From this
assumption of differences among marriages, it followed that marital
property ought not be divided according to a preconceived or designated
formula. But the nature of these differences and, more importantly, the
legal significance to be attached to them for the distribution of marital
property, were not specified. Rather, a set of unprioritized factors which
presumably identified a range of differences were included in the reform
as statutory guidelines to assist judges in rendering awards or parties in
negotiating a settlement.28 4
281. I am indebted to Martha Fineman for this observation.
282. See Major, Gender, Justice, and the Psychology of Entitlement, in 7 SEX AND GENDER,
REVIEW Of PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 124 (P. Shaver & C. Hendrick eds. 1987).
283. During the Senate floor debate on June 3, 1980, Senator May B. Goodhue, a supporter of
equitable distribution, summed up the opposition to the presumption of equality with the comment:
"If there was no difference in the various marriages around this state, then we should have equal
distribution, but I suggest to you that there are not two marriages alike." Recent Developments,
supra note 259, at 488 n.20 (quoting N.Y. SEN. REc., June 3, 1980, at 4061).
284. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(l)-(10) (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1985). These ten
factors are:
(1) the income and property of each party at the time of marriage, and at the time of
the commencement of the action;
(2) the duration of the marriage and the age and health of both parties;
(3) the need of a custodial parent to occupy or own the marital residence and to use
or own its household effects;
(4) the loss of inheritance and pension rights upon dissolution of the marriage as of
the date of dissolution;
(5) any award of maintenance under the Act;
(6) any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made to the
acquisition of such marital property by the party not having title, including joint efforts
or expenditures and contributions and services as a spouse, parent, wage earner and
homemaker, and to the career or career potential of the other party;
(7) the liquid or non-liquid character of all marital property;
(8) the probable future financial circumstances of each party;
(9) the impossibility or difficulty of evaluating any component asset or any interest in
a business, corporation or profession, and the economic claim or interference by the
other party;
(10) any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper.
It should be noted that the factors are not prioritized or weighted. The tenth factor, known as the
"wild card," allows marital fault to be considered in property distribution. In 1986 § 236(b)(5)(d)
was amended to add subsection (10)-the tax consequences of each party; (11) the wasteful dissipa-
tion of assets by either spouse; (12) any transfer or encumbrance made in contemplation of a matri-
monial action without fair consideration and to redesignate former subsection (10) as subsection
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Support for the reform rested on a belief that it would provide equal
access for both parties, the opportunity to present the case for their inter-
ests, and equitable consideration of those interests. That the context was
one of broad, systemic, social and economic inequality285 was down-
played or ignored. The claim of partisans of equitable distribution was
said to possess symbolic intuitive appeal. At bottom, however, what was
designated as intuitive coincided with the ideological presumption of re-
spect for the private ordering of a marital relationship.
Equitable distribution was identified as the tempering of harsh or
unjust outcomes under common law strict title. Whereas the common
law spoke to form through title, equitable distribution spoke to substance
by reviewing the contributions of both spouses to a marriage. The re-
form's ambiguities and elusiveness were presented as the embodiment of
flexibility. In turn, flexibility was said to be likely to lead to fair dissolu-
tion outcomes. 286 Judges and attorneys could tailor the distributional
outcomes situationally or, in other words, constrict appropriate division
of property for different marriages.
The beauty of equitable distribution for reform-coalition purposes
was that it could be interpreted to please a wide range of constituents.
For persons concerned with the implementation of sharing principles, the
reform invoked sharing and partnership.287 For persons concerned with
the need to bring economic fairness into traditional marriages, the reform
listed in the statutory guidelines a homemaker's nonmonetary contribu-
tions to a marriage, such as nonmonetary contributions to the career or
career potential of the other spouse.288 For persons troubled by the possi-
bility of a windfall award to one spouse, the reform included the duration
of marriage in the statutory guidelines. 8 For persons concerned with
(13). Act of Sept. 1, 1986, ch. 884, 1986 N.Y. Laws 2172 (codified as amended at N.Y. DOM. REL
LAW § 236(b)(5)(d)(1)-(13) (McKinney 1988). All references to this subdivision will be prior to its
1986 changes unless otherWise noted. Lord v. Lord, 124 A.D.2d 930, 508 N.Y.S.2d 676 (3d Dep't
1986); Melnik v. Melnik, 118 A.D. 2d 902, 499 N.Y.S.2d 470 (3d Dep't 1986); Wilbur v. Wilbur, 116
A.D.2d 953, 498 N.Y.S.2d 525 (3d Dep't 1986), appeal after remand, 130 A.D.2d 853, 515 N.Y.S.2d
636 (3d Dep't 1987); Pacifico v. Pacifico, 101 A.D.2d 709, 475 N.Y.S.2d 952 (4th Dep't 1984); see
also supra note 214.
285. See J. FISHKIN, JUSTICE EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND THE FAMILY 47-51 (1983).
286. But see Kozak Testimony, supra note 272, at 2 (quoting N. SHERESKY, UNCOUPLING 14
(1973) ("Judges are harried and unpredictable. Their decisions reflect their own experiences in mar-
riage. Judges in different courts and different judges in the same court very often render entirely
disparate decisions on almost identical sets of facts.").
287. See Comment, supra note 261, at 1308.
288. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(6) (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1985); see also supra
note 284 (providing text of statute).
289. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(b)(5)(d)(2) (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1985).
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foregone opportunity costs, the reform was sufficiently flexible to con-
sider the years of each spouse under the catchall final factor in the statu-
tory guidelines.29 For persons preferring that the parties and the bench
develop a mindset favoring (if not implicitly presuming) a fifty/fifty dis-
tribution, supporters could point to the guidance offered by the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act; it indicated the policy underlying equitable
distribution "is that the distribution of property upon the termination of
a marriage should be treated, as nearly as possible, like the distribution of
assets incident to the dissolution of a partnership." '291
Equitable distribution was framed to appeal to all and to appeal in
gender neutral language. Nevertheless, it could not escape a paradox. Eq-
uitable distribution was identified as a facially gender neutral rule which
allowed for recognition and reward of a broad range of claims of contri-
bution to a marriage. But marriage itself is a gendered structure and di-
vorce is gendered conflict. Appearance notwithstanding, gender neutral
equitable distribution could not be other than contextually gendered.
For many feminists, the rebuttable presumption of equal distribu-
tion was a far more attractive reform proposal. Unlike the sex-based dis-
criminatory presumptions which courts had struck down as violative of
the fourteenth amendment, the rebuttable presumption of equal distribu-
tion was consistent with the emerging trend in constitutional law aimed
at institutionalizing gender-free norms of equality and justice.
Identifying and balancing the different aspects of equality has been
and is a significant ongoing component of American political and juris-
prudential discourse. The complexity of the discourse reveals the ambiva-
lent nature of equality in the United States. While the principle of
equality starts from a prime facie assumption that all people may legiti-
mately make the same claims on resources and requires that differences
in treatment be justified, that principle is compromised by a commitment
to the market economy which creates wide disparities in income, a feeble
government commitment to welfare, especially redistribution, and a long
history of race and sex inequality. Moreover, Americans distinguish
spheres in which equality claims are cognizable; culturally, there is a
stronger taste for political than economic equality.292
290. See id. § 236(B)(5)(d)(10).
291. UMDA § 307 n.93, 9A U.L.A. 238 (1973).
292. S. VERBA & G. ORREN, EQUALITY IN AMERICA: THE VIEW FROM THE Top 2 (1985); see
id. at 10 (comparative analysis of government commitment to policies fostering economic equality);
id. at 148-80 (data indicating widespread acceptance of significant income inequality); see also D.
RAE, EQUALITIES 64-81 (1981) (equal opportunity can be distinguished from equal results); Scharr,
Equality of Opportunity and Beyond, in EQUALITY 228 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1967) (dis-
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Such equality norms could be made palatable because they were
identified with liberal ideology and jurisprudence which sought to create
and reinforce an abstract representation of an individual without sex or
gender participating in a society committed to formal equality. Symboli-
cally, the equal distribution presumption was said to constitute signifi-
cant, meaningful, legal recognition of marriage as a partnership.293
Marriage was presumed to be a partnership of contributors who were
economic equals, at least for property distribution purposes.2 94
Of course, new marital property distribution rules could neither
remedy the entire range of inequalities generated by gender-based role
differentiation nor reform deeply rooted cultural patterns. The harsh so-
cial realities are likely to be that a married woman's role is horizontally
diffuse because women, including married women, work both inside and
outside the home in low wage, sex-stereotyped jobs295 which cross class,
race, and in many cases, age cohort lines, and that women's work outside
the home is hierarchically defined by men.296
cussion of the distinguishability and inconsistency of opportunity and results). Once heralded as a
"weapon for changing a vast social system, the principle of equality of opportunity, is now seen as
leading to a new hierarchy. . ." Bell, On Meritocracy and Equality, 1972 PuB. INTEREST 40 (Fall).
Dissatisfaction with the outcomes of the equality of opportunity principle has encouraged demands
for the reduction of all inequality or the creation of equality of result. Id. at 46-48. For an explication
of the equality issue in the divorce law reform context, see Fineman, supra note 5, at 789.
293. The rebuttable presumption of equal distribution, tagged as suspect by some because it
appeared to incorporate a rule identified with community property, was in fact a far cry from such a
system. Unlike the community property system in which the non-acquiring spouse has a vested
present interest in one half of the marital property, the proposed New York reform did not address
either issue of ownership during the marriage or the issue of management and control of marital
property. In effect a non-acquiring spouse's interest in any property remained an inchoate expec-
tancy until divorce from the property acquiring spouse.
294. See Mario Cuomo's 1985 State of the State Message at 52, reprinted in Joint Public Hear-
ings on N. Y. Equitable Distribution Law (Dom. Rel. Law § 236) Hearing Before the New York State
Assembly (Mar. 6 & 15, 1985) [hereinafter Joint Public Hearings on Equitable Distribution (app. C to
statement of Judith Avner, Ass. Dir. of N.Y. State Div. for Women); see also Statement in Support
of a Presumption of Equality in the Distribution of Marital Assets by D. Sassower, in connnection
with Women's Lobby Day Convocation Albany, N.Y. (May 6, 1980), at 5, cited in Recent Develop-
ments, supra note 259, at 488 n.21.
295. Despite the changes of recent years, the U.S. labor market is still largely segregated by sex.
See NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON PAY EQUITY, THE WAGE GAP: MYTH AND FACTS (1982). In 1982,
50% of employed women worked in only 20 occupations, out of the 427 occupations detailed by the
U.S. Dept. of Labor. More than half of all employed women worked in occupations which were 75%
female and 22% of employed women were in jobs that were more than 95% female. See Experts Say
Job Bias Against Women Persists, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1984, at Al, col. 2. The article notes that
women still account for 99% of secretaries, 97% of typists, and 96% of all registered nurses.
296. See generally Z. EISENSTEIN, supra note 24. Eisenstein argues that the priorities of patri-
archy, as a system of power, are to keep the choices limited for women so that their role as mother
remains primary. "The capitalist need for women workers has developed along with the not always
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Notwithstanding these realities, the new rules could be more or less
consistent with the contemporary struggle to encourage images and
norms of formal, if not substantive, equality for women and men as indi-
viduals in families. At the moment of divorce, the marriage relationship
could be recast and presumed to be a partnership involving equal reci-
procity, obligation, investment, and risk taking. The assertion and imple-
mentation of notions of equality were thought to possess the potential for
relieving the harsh consequences attendant upon the economic vulnera-
bility of the overwhelming preponderance of married women. Equal dis-
tribution of marital assets might mitigate married women's economic
vulnerability and dependence.
The position of the rebuttable presumption proponents was in-
formed by a bitter historical legacy of gendered arguments, discussions,
and negotiations. Their focus was on alimony, more particularly on an
assessment of the nonmonetary contribution of a wife who worked in the
home. Such contributions often were deemed invisible or were down-
graded. The economic contribution of a husband as head of household
and, in middle class households the primary if not the sole wage earner,
was culturally acknowledged, identifiable in monetary terms, and rarely
subject to evaluative scrutiny. It was said that the rebuttable presumption
would eliminate the gendered, differential evaluation of contributions to
a marriage depending on whether work was inside or outside the home
and hence eliminate the possible gender-based disparities in the distribu-
tion of assets.
Proponents of the rebuttable equal distribution presumption also
identified instrumental arguments which supported their position. The
presumption was touted as a means to decrease court loads and unclog
dockets by facilitating settlements.297 Since public policy endorsed the
recognition of equal contribution, a challenger to the policy would as-
sume a substantial burden of proof.2 98 Yet, by its rebuttability, the pre-
successful attempt to protect the system of patriarchal hierarchy through the sexual segregation of
the labor force. Women have been relegated to the low-productivity sector of the market and their
pay is unequal to men's even when the work is of the same or of comparable worth." Id. at 51.
297. A supporter of Winikow's presumption of equal distribution bill noted that "private settle-
ments would mirror the pattern of the courts-anything other than a 50-50 arrangement would
bring a threat of court action by the aggrieved partner." Divorce New York-Style, N.Y. Times, May
30, 1980 at A22, col. 1; see also Legislating Fairness into Divorce Law, Newsday, May 12, 1980.
298. Equal presumption partisans suggested that the equitable distribution bill would produce
results paralleling those in Connecticut and New Jersey, where equitable distribution laws resulted in
women receiving one third less of the assets of the marriage. See STATE OF CONNECTICUT PERMA-
NENT COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, MARITAL DISSOLUTION: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT
ON CONNECTICUT MEN AND WOMEN (Nov. 1979) [hereinafter MARITAL DISSOLUTION: THE Eco-
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sumption was said to permit flexibility and fairness in the interpretation
of the law for exceptional cases.299 Equal distribution recognized mar-
riage as a gendered institution and divorce as a gendered conflict. It at-
tempted to contain the gendered aspects of the conflict to avoid specific
disadvantageous outcomes for women.
Significantly less discussion was focused on existing statutory provi-
sions for alimony and its role in divorce settlements and court awards.
Nevertheless, the subject of alimony was not without a long history in
New York."°° Consequently, members of the legislature were informed in
their considerations by two related perspectives. One perspective, the
traditional one, connected an evaluation of marital conduct to worthiness
for alimony.3"1 The other perspective considered it unjust to allow a de-
pendent or economically vulnerable spouse's misconduct to serve as a
complete bar to alimony regardless of such considerations as age, health,
contributions to or the duration of a marriage. Rather than surrender the
evaluation of marital conduct as a threshold determination of worthiness
for alimony in litigated cases, the reform statute provided for continued
judicial discretion in alimony awards.
Unstructured judicial discretion regarding the threshold determina-
tion of worthiness for alimony was not paralleled by unstructured discre-
tion regarding the amount and term of an alimony award. The 1980
reform contained language taken from the pre-1980 statute:302 a general
standard of reasonable need in such amount as justice requires, having
regard for the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties. The
general standard was supplemented by a list of ostensibly gender neutral
factors to assist the bench in the determining the amount and term of a
maintenance award and the bar in negotiating an alimony settlement.3 °3
Despite the facial gender neutrality of the 1980 provisions, it was
apparent that the discussions of alimony were informed by, filtered
through, and grounded in gendered cultural norms.3°4 Historically, the
NOMIC IMPACT]; see also Note, New York's Equitable Distribution Law: A Sweeping Reform, 47
BROOKLYN L. REv. 67, 69 n.2 (1980).
299. The burden of proving the exception ought to rest with the party claiming it. N.Y. Times,
Feb. 8, 1980, at A31, col. 2.
300. See supra notes 205-28 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
302. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 (historical note on 1980 amendments) (McKinney 1986).
303. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(6)(a)(1-10) (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1985).
304. Ideas cannot be independent of the culture, though they may be critical, resistant or rebel-
lious. They are in tension with, but not independent of, stereotypical images. M. FRYE, supra note
21, at xii; see S. GILMAN, DIFFERENCE & PATHOLOGY: STEREOTYPES OF SEXUALITY, RACE, AND
MADNESS 15 (1985) ("We all create images of things we fear or glorify. These images never remain
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origins of alimony, like those of access to and distribution of marital
property, connected gender with status. Despite the technical severance
of property, gender, and status which occurred with the nineteenth cen-
tury development of married women's separate legal identity, alimony
remained a prime example of a gendered category. Married women were
the ones who were dependent and vulnerable in a male dominated legal
and economic system. Gender remained the predictor of alimony.
Cultural responses to such gendered dependence and vulnerability
are ambiguous. On the one hand, at least some gendered dependency is
viewed as desirable. It reinforces the privileged position of men in a most
flattering manner. On the other hand, dependency (especially at divorce)
is reformulated as maladaptive. Women's dependence and vulnerability
becomes men's financial burden. For women, it can assume paralyzing
dimensions characterized by fear or ambivalence regarding change in or
loss of dependent status.3 °5
abstractions; we understand them as real world entities."); see also P. BERGER & B. BERGER, THE
WAR OVER THE FAMILY: CAPTURING THE MIDDLE GROUND (1983) (analyzing family as an ideo-
logical battleground).
305. Lerner, Female Dependency in Context: Some Theoretical and Technical Considerations, 53
AM. J. ORTHo. PSYCHIATRY 697-99 (Oct. 1983). Lerner maintains that psychology has failed to take
into account the structural or contextual factors which evoke women's dependent behavior, has
maintained a dignified fraternal silence regarding the obvious facts that men have dependency needs
(the fulfilling of which has been a role assigned to women), and has failed to appreciate the protective
and systems-maintaining function for significant others of women's displays of passive-dependency.
Our gender arrangements as well as our very definitions of "femininity" contain an im-
portant metacommunication which remains an unconscious guiding rule for many wo-
men. The message is that the weaker sex must protect the stronger sex from recognizing
the strength of the weaker sex lest the stronger sex feel weakened by the strength of the
weaker sex
Id. at 700-01.
See P. CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF WOMEN'S MASOCHISM (1985) (mislabeling as a masochistic per-
sonality disorder much of women's learned behavior, especially being nurturant and self-denying);
see also Willis, The Politics of Dependency, Ms. July/Aug. 1982, at 181. "If women are coerced into
submission by a variety of social pressures, they are also lured into acquiescence with the promise
(however illusory) of a compensatory reward: the right to abdicate responsibility for their fate and
enjoy a childlike security." Id. A gloss on this theme also emerges in conservative women's opposi-
tion to ERA. These women identify claims to individual rights as selfish because they destroy tradi-
tional family relationships and thereby lead to the abandonment of women. In anti-feminist
discourse, gender-based dependency is recast as "freedom." The loss of such dependency becomes
equated with anarchy and, ultimately, the destruction of the "right to be a mother." P. SCHAFLY,
THE POWER OF POSITIVE WOMEN (1977); see also M. DECTER, THE NEW CHASTITY AND OTHER
ARGUMENTS AGAINST WOMEN'S LIBERATION (1972). Paradoxically, such conservative discourse
relies on the prospect of women becoming vulnerable through the passage of feminist-oriented re-
forms to mask the existing vulnerability of women in the absence of such reforms.
See Newman, supra note 231, at 238 (for an analysis of generational differences in perception of
financial "dependence" and downward mobility). Depression cohort women viewed alimony as an
entitlement for the years they devoted to childrearing and homemaking. Sixties cohort women felt
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Alimony viewed as gendered dependency resurrects and relies on
the cultural theme of good girl/bad girl-one signifying virtue, the other
indulgence." 6 Popular culture insists that the good girl be rewarded or at
least not punished and that the bad girl suffer or renounce her ways. A
particular version of this cultural theme emerged in the relationship be-
tween alimony and the evaluation of homemakers' lives. Women as
homemakers were either deserving or undeserving.
The image of the deserving wife embodying culturally acknowledged
virtue was the innocent, selfless homemaker. At divorce she was pun-
ished by the application of the harsh, but ostensibly gender neutral, com-
mon law of strict title for division of marital property. Possibly because
she lacked interest in or understanding of financial matters, or was preoc-
cupied with her societally approved role of nurturer, this homemaker
may have failed to insist that her name be put as co-owner on any prop-
erty or assets acquired during the marriage. Despite the purity or nobility
of her motives, her deserts might be poverty. Cast as a victim, 30 7 she was
worthy and helpless. She challenged none of the popularly approved
images of lifestyle for married women. She had fulfilled the gendered re-
quirement that she uphold the social fabric by caring and self-sacrifice.
At divorce, that caring was devalued. In fact, as worthy victim, she con-
stituted proof of the dependence of women on their husbands.
The mirror image of the deserving wife was the undeserving embit-
tered "alimony drone. '30 8 She viewed alimony as a right, a permanent
almost as angry about their need to remain dependent on their former husband's financial resources
as with late or partial payment (viewed as an attempt to interfere in their post divorce lives and
described in terms of a discourse of control and an extension of unequal power relations).
306. The good/bad girl theme is paralleled by the notion that boys will be boys. See Peterson v.
Widule, 157 Wis. 641, 147 N.W. 966 (1914) (upholding a requirement that only men submit to test
for venereal disease before issuance of marriage license). The court felt it was clearly within the
police power of the state to protect the "pure" women from men who had been participating in
"illicit sexual relations before marriaie." Apparently, to require women to take the test would be to
admit that they too were participating in "illicit sexual relations before marriage."
307. "The concept of woman as victims has its roots in early nineteenth century abolitionism."
Fineman, supra note 5, at 814. Fineman discusses the image of woman as victim embodied in Wis-
consin's divorce reform statute. "The victim image... depicts a 'woman who has sacrificed her goals
and ambitions for the marriage and should be compensated for this sacrifice. Id. at 835.
308. The image of the alimony drone was conjured up by Hofstadter and Levittan:
Alimony was never intended to assure a perpetual state of secured indolence. It should
not be suffered to convert a host of physically and mentally competent young women
into an army of alimony drones who neither toil nor spin and become a drain to society
and a menace to themselves.
Hofstadter & Levittan, Alimony--A Reformation, 7 J. FAM. L. 51, 55 (1967). The authors' categories
include the helpless older matron who has no specialized skills and has become accustomed to com-
fortable living in her suburban home as well as and the greedy younger wife who, regardless of her
1988/89]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37
entitlement" 9 to her former husband's resources to subsidize her aimless
activity, uselessness, and lack of imagination. Her prior work in the
home, viewed as integral to heterosexual nuclear family life, was recast as
meaningless activity should she choose to continue to work in the home
and live alone. To thwart her former husband, she might even refuse to
remarry and thereby shift her dependence to another male.310
To counter the allegation that some alimony awards under the pre-
1980 rules were excessively generous to women in amount or in duration,
the legislative history of the 1980 reform spoke of limited-term or reha-
bilitative maintenance as the anticipated norm.311 The use of the term
own abilities or resources, depends on her husband as the sole means of support. See Doyle v. Doyle,
5 Misc. 2d 4, 7, 158 N.Y.S.2d 909, 912 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
Note that the choice of the term "drone" requires a sex/gender reversal when talking about
humans rather than bees.
Their [drones] only role in the colony is to mate with nubile queens. They are not physi-
cally equipped to collect nectar or pollen, nor can they defend the hive, for they have no
stingers.... Drones are found in bee colonies during the spring and early summer, when
the workers regard them with favor.... But after the queens have mated the drones are
no longer needed, and they are a drain on resources, so when the nectar flow begins to
taper off in the summer the workers banish the remaining drones from the hives and they
die.
Hubbell, Annals of Husbandry, The Sweet Bee II, THE NEW YORKER, May 16, 1988, at 75, 83-84.
(Consider this misogynist description of the problems caused by alimony):
The present system of alimony, which legally enslaves man through his lower passions,
or, as he calls them, love and marriage, builds for the feminist a throne of splendor and
power whereon she rules over a society where much female sexual anarchy generally sets
in. Soon, if the flood waters of present rampant feminism under its alimony laws are not
checked, the entire texture of our social and moral fiber will give way, as it always has in
the past in those cultures and civilizations in which women gained dominance.
C. WILNER, supra note 220, at xi-xii.
309. Feminist groups such as NOW viewed alimony as an entitlement and did not accept male
definitions of alimony as a provision to keep women off the welfare rolls. Interview, supra note 254.
See Hearings on S.9076, A.11555 Before the Judiciary Comm. of the N. Y. State Assembly (Nov. 10,
1976) (statement of Betty Blaisdell Berry). "Allowance puts one in the category of a child. Maintc-
nance sounds as if it were an automobile. Women want the term entitlement used." Id. at 3.
310. See Joint Public Hearings on Equitable Distribution, supra note 294 at 5 (exchange between
L. Kozak and Assemblyman Burrows). But see Address by Lillian Kozak, Chairperson NOW/NYS
Marriage and Divorce Task Force, Law Women Symposium at 4 (New York University School of
Law, Apr. 26, 1980), reprinted in BILL JACKET OF N.Y. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION LAW, 1980
N.Y. LAWS. "In 1974, 71.4% of divorced women participated in the labor force. In 1974, 78.4% of
divorced men participated in the labor force. That should dispel the myths of the Gay Divorcee and
the Alimony Drone." Id.
311. G. BURROWS, Ass. MEM., reprinted in 1980 N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 129-30. "The objective of
the maintenance provision is to award the recipient spouse an opportunity to achieve indepen-
dene.... This legislation proposes the adaptation of law to current social values. It is hoped that it
will serve to bring New York law into today's reality which will serve the best interests of the
family." Id. at 130.
Compare the open-endedness of the New York statute with the New Hampshire statute, limiting
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"rehabilitative" reveals the male-centered normative system in divorce
law reform. It is a highly charged word with clear positive and negative
casts to it.312 It connotes societal recognition of and limited societal sup-
port for the "problem condition." It requires affirmative efforts on the
part of the alimony recipient to change her life. It connotes social sin and
laziness. It places blame for her situation and the burden of change on
the divorced woman, without reference to her contribution to her hus-
band and to society and without alluding to the societal structures that
constrain women and devalue their contributions. 313 The construction of
a new life through the market has as an unspoken premise the invalida-
tion of a culturally acceptable prior life and set of skills. Such construc-
tion necessitates a move from the home-now no longer the warm center
of family life but rather the locus of dependency or disabling helpless-
ness-to the world of wage labor outside the home-formerly a heartless
monetized world, now the place for mastery of self and the development
of marketable skills. The now culturally appropriate form of worthiness
and virtue for a divorced woman is work outside the home, no matter
how disadvantaged the woman might be in the labor market.314
the award to three years unless it is renewed, and the Delaware statute, limiting alimony to two years
if the marriage has lasted less than 20 years. The Delaware law has been interpreted to require an
express finding that the wife could never achieve financial self-sufficiency to qualify for a permanent
alimony award. Compare N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(6)(a) & (b) (McKinney 1986) with N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 458.19 (1983) (but note that 1985 amendments contain open-ended provisions)
and DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 1512(a)(3) (1981). Marshall suggests that elastic standards and the
freedom with which the judges may apply them has resulted in "doctrinal chaos." Marshall, Reha-
bilitative Alimony: An Old Wolfin New Clothes, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 667, 686 (1984-
85). For long-term alimony perceived as judicially imposed servitude, see Olsen v. Olsen, 98 Idaho
10, 12, 557 P.2d 604, 606 (1976) (Shephard, J., dissenting).
312. Rehabilitative alimony "contemplates sums necessary to assist a divorced person in regain-
ing a useful and constructive role in society through vocational or therapeutic training or retraining
and for the further purpose of preventing financial hardship on society or individuals during the
rehabilitative process." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1157 (5th ed. 1979) (citing Mertz v. Mertz, 287
So. 2d 691, 692 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973)).
313. Compare the treatment of unemployed steel workers, who have received job retraining and
recognition that their prior life and work was constructive with women working in the home as
homemakers. See T. Buss & F. REDBURN, SHUTDOWN AT YOUNGSTOWN: PUBLIC POLICY FOR
MASS UNEMPLOYMENT 98-103 (1983) (examining the effects of "retraining" on unemployed steel
workers). However, Buss and Redburn conclude that most of the workers in the wake of the
Youngstown Sheet and Tube plant closing appeared to find new jobs on their own. Retraining pro-
grams trained former steel workers for entry level positions elsewhere, which were undesirable due
to lower pay and status as compared to former positions. The retraining programs were of some
value, however, in allowing the unemployed worker to receive extended unemployment compensa-
tion during enrollment, a situation not applicable to "unemployed housewives."
314. Like the Tudor poor laws, work is viewed as a solution to poverty. D. GrrrENS, supra note
21, at 137; Marshall, supra note 311, at 667.
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The spouse charged with payment of rehabilitative alimony can look
forward to the promise of a clean financial break between self-supporting
adults315 (though it does not affect any child support obligation). Reha-
bilitative maintenance assists in lessening the longer term financial incon-
venience a former husband might experience should he desire to establish
another family. It can assist in avoiding adequate compensation for the
economic value of housework, child care, emotional support, and invest-
ment in a husband's earning capacity by a wife.31 6
As the discussion in this narrative suggests, the gap between form
and substance in the reform was a clear one. The text in the divorce law
reform discussion, both for property distribution and alimony, was one of
formal gender neutrality; the subtext was a gendered one reflecting deep
cultural images and continuities. Denial of the latter is not the equiva-
lence of its demise, elimination, or even its lessened significance within a
culture. As the final narrative reveals, the gendered subtext 31 7 continues
to inform the implementation of New York's divorce reform.
Narrative 5-Implementing Reform: Distributional Results
As the preceding narrative suggests, the 1980 reform of the New
York divorce law was premised on marriage as a partnership. The sub-
stantive ordering and internal valuation of the activities within the part-
nership were left to the parties during the relationship. At the
termination of a marriage, however, the reform provided that courts
could assess and evaluate the contributions of each partner in order to
distribute marital assets and liabilities.318
Any analysis at such distribution must be informed by several crit-
315. See B. EHRENREICH, THE HEARTS OF MEN: AMERICAN DREAMS AND THE FLIGHT
FROM COMMITMENT (1983) (on the elimination of responsibility). Self-actualization meant the elim-
ination of responsibility by a former marriage partner. Men could have it both ways: limits on their
obligation and the full benefit of a woman's homemaking skills. The language of liberation turned on
women by undercutting male responsibility. Interview, supra note 254.
316. See generally Marshall, supra note 311, at 673.
317. See generally P. MACHEREY, A THEORY OF LITERARY PRODUCTION (1978) (texts have
double meanings-their overt ideologies and their absences, the "not said" of these ideologies).
318. Four different approaches available for the valuation of behavior or services under a contri-
bution theory. They are: market value of the services provided; partnership; foregone opportunities
theory, which attempts to compensate the stay-at-home spouse for the difference between what she
can be expected to earn for the rest of her working life and what she might have earned had she not
foregone her career during marriage; and compensation for the implicit contributions to the spouse
working outside the home (the enhanced earning capacity of the spouse working outside the home
that resulted from the stay-at-home spouse's contributions). J. AREEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
FAMILY LAW 594-95 (2d ed. 1985); see also Avner, Divorce, Money, Property Examined at Sympo-
sium on Women and Law, 7 FAM. L. RPTR. 2334 (1981).
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cal considerations. First, marital assets or property are no more than a
statutory creation. This creation relies on socially constructed notions of
property. In other words, marital property need not be equated with
traditional concepts of property319 including title. Second, such distribu-
tion is not simply material; it is symbolic as well. In dividing assets, a
dissolution identifies the just deserts of each partner. Each partner has a
gendered identity as wife or husband with the concomitant cultural bag-
gage attached to that identity. And that gendered identity affects the dis-
tributional outcomes since just deserts have a strongly gendered
normative component.320 In theory, at least, the partner whose waged
labor was said to result in the ability of the partnership to accumulate
assets would not be advantaged in the distribution process. Indeed, pur-
suant to the reform, there were paeans to marital partnership in some
judicial opinions.
Marriage is a joint enterprise whose vitality, success, and endurance
is dependent upon the conjunction of multiple components, only one of
which is financial. The nonmonetized, unremunerated efforts of raising
children, making a home, performing a myriad of personal services, and
providing physical and emotional support are, among other noneconomic
ingredients of the marital relationship, at least as essential to its nature
and maintenance as are the economic factors. Their worth is conse-
quently entitled to substantial recognition. Thus the extent to which each
of the parties contributes to the marriage is not measurable only by the
amount of money contributed to it during the period of its endurance,
but rather by the whole complex of nonfinancial components contrib-
uted. The function of equitable distribution is to recognize that when a
marriage ends, each of the spouses, based on the totality of contributions,
has a stake in and a right to a share of the marital assets accumulated
while it endured, not because that share is needed but because those as-
sets represent the capital product of what was essentially a partnership
319. Fouresque, The O'Brien Case, N.Y.LJ. Mar. 17, 1986, at 1, col. 1; see O'Brien v. O'Brien,
66 N.Y.2d 576, 584-85, 489 N.E.2d 712, 715-16, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 746-47 (1985); see also Winter,
Equitable Distribution of Degrees and Licenses: Two Theories Toward Compensating Spousal Contri-
butions, 49 BROOKLYN L. REV. 301 (1983).
320. It was recognition of this reality which prompted proponents of the rebuttable presumption
of equal distribution to express concern that the courts might be less likely to treat marriage as a
partnership of equals in the absence of the statutory guidance provided by the presumption. See N.Y.
Times Nov. 7, 1985, at C6, col. I (quoting Professor Mary Ann Glendon, saying "New York is the
best laboratory we've got for what's really going on .... The problem is the education of the judges
who are still overwhelmingly male and who tend consciously or unconsciously to take as a starting
point what they think a man needs to get along. That's not the function of fault or no-fault and that's
happening in every state.").
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But, in the preponderance of the reported cases since 1980, it is ap-
parent that the term partnership is rarely equated with wives and hus-
bands as equals in the relationship.3 22 Courts do not view contributions
to the marriage and its assets from unwaged work in the home as the
equivalent of contributions to the marriage and its assets from waged
work.3 23 Income and value or worth appear to be separable. Despite the
legal irrelevance of title for divorce distribution awards, property usually
connected with waged work outside the home appears to be sex/gender
identified.3 24 At the time of distribution, gender as an evaluative category
appears difficult to avoid either explicitly or implicitly.
325
321. Wood v. Wood, 119 Misc. 2d 1076, 1078-79, 465 N.Y.S.2d 475, 476-77 (Sup. Ct. 1983)
(cited with approval in O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 587, 489 N.E.2d at 717, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 748).
322. H. Cohen & A. Hillman, Analysis of Seventy Select Decisions After Trial Under New
York State's Equitable Distribution Law from January 1981 Through October 1984 (Nov. 1, 1984)
(unpublished manuscript) (analysis of 26 decisions from Jan. 1981 through Feb. 1983, confirmed by
followup study of 70 selected decisions after trial from Jan. 1981 through Oct. 1984). See REPORT Or
THE NEW YORK TASK FORCE, supra note 135, at 98 (testimony of Herbert Siegel) ("[T]he economic
partnership that I thought was established by way of passage of the law is a long way off."); see also
MARITAL DISSOLUTION: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT, supra note 298. For a critique of the methodol-
ogy of the Cohen-Hillman study, see Foster, A Second Opinion: New York's EDL Is Alive and Well
and Is Being Fairly Administered, 17 FAM. L. REv. 3 (1985).
323. Three procedures for measuring the value of effort for home and child care have been
developed: replacement cost method, lost opportunity cost method, and presumption of equal value.
The replacement cost method values homemaker services by calculating the amount of money
needed to replace the homemaker's services at market rates. See Hauserman, Homemakers and Di-
vorce: The Problems of the Invisible Occupation, 17 FAM. L.Q. 41 (1983); Hauserman & Fethke,
Valuation of.4 Homemaker's Services, 22 TRIAL LAW GUIDE 249, 251-54 (1978).
324. Cohen & Hillman report:
Dependent wives, whether they worked in the home or in the paid market place, were
were relegated to one or a combination of the following in an aggregate of 49 out of 54
cases susceptible of this analysis; less than 50% overall share of marital property; short
term maintenance, de minimis shares of business and professional practice which, in
addition, the courts undervalued; terminable and modifiable maintenance in lieu of inde-
feasible equitable distribution or distributive awards and inadequate or no counsel fee
awards.
Cohen & Hillman, Is Equitable Distribution Fair? The New York Experience, 4 N.J. FAM. LAW. 85
(1984).
325. In a survey of attorneys who have handled equitable distribution cases during the last two
years (based on 659 responses) conducted by the Task Force on the Status of Women in the Courts
respondents (F%/M%) reported that equitable distribution awards reflect a judicial attitude that
property belongs to the husband and a wife's share is based on how much the husband could give her
without diminishing his current life style: Always (12/2); Often (35/10); Sometimes (25/20); Rarely
(13/3 1); Never (7/3 1); No answer (9/6). REPORT OF THE NEW YORK TASK FORCE, supra note 135,
at 109. Respondents (F%/M%) reported that judges refuse to award 50% of property or more to
wives even though the probable financial circumstances indicate that even with such an award hus-
bands will not have to substantially reduce their standard of living but wives will: Always (10/2);
Often (41/16); Sometimes (19/26); Rarely (12/31); Never (6/18); No answer (11/8). Id. at 110.
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The irony contained in these results gives pause. Reformers who
claimed that ignoring title to marital property in divorce distribution of-
fered greater opportunity to acknowledge married women's equal contri-
bution and separate legal identity failed to learn from the history of
divorce law reform. Moreover, they failed to take account of the
gendered context of divorce. Arguments from supporters of equitable dis-
tribution, that judicial discretion informed by standards of fairness, was
preferable to mathematical precision,32 6 may have been misguided but
appealing. On the other hand, the concerns of advocates for the presump-
tion of equal distribution, that unequal treatment of like cases at the
hands of different judges would occur under equitable distribution, may
have been somewhat inaccurate. The gendered context of conflict over
distribution of assets provides the basis for predictable, consistent legal
patterns-men as husbands are likely to have their contribution valued
more highly than women as wives.
Not only are contributions to a marriage valued differentially based
on historically and culturally gendered understandings of worth, but a
pattern in reported cases also suggests that different types of property,
some which again have historically and culturally gendered identifica-
tions, are treated differently. One of the best examples of this gendered
identification of property is the family home. It is the physically identifi-
able locus of many women's contributions to a marriage. In the reported
cases, it is the one marital asset which is most likely to be divided
equally.327 But, since the vast majority of houses are jointly owned and
326. "Property need not be distributed equally but in a manner which reflects individual needs
and circumstances unlike community property jurisdictions. Fairness not mathematical precision is
guidepost." Rodgers v. Rodgers, 98 A.D.2d 386, 470 N.Y.S.2d 401 (2d Dep't 1983); see also Semen-
tilli v. Sementelli, 102 A.D.2d 78, 477 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1st Dep't 1984). For the use of a mathematical
ratio, see Kobylack v. Kobylack, 110 Misc. 2d 402, 442 N.Y.S.2d 392 (Sup. Ct. 1981), modified, 96
A.D.2d 831, 465 N.Y.S.2d 581 (2d Dep't 1983). In a divorce action to terminate the ten-year mar-
riage of two relatively young working people who did not have children, where, plaintiff husband
had consistently earned approximately two and one-half times the salary earned by defendant wife,
each of the parties was capable of supporting himself, and the parties' contributions to the house-
hold-including the purchase of the marital residence-were in proportion to their incomes, value of
premises was distributed in a 2-1/2 to 1 ratio, notwithstanding that the property was held as a tenancy
by the entirety. The value of the parties' automobile and home furnishings were also to be distributed
according to that ratio. Id.
See also Arendell, Women and the Economics of Divorce in the Contemporary United States, 13
SIGNS 121, 132 (1978). Arendell concludes that no matter what the divorce distribution scheme,
divorce courts typically award women less than one half of the couples' property, given the varying
determinations and definitions of "contribution."
327. In a few cases where the wife has been awarded the whole marital residence, she has been
deprived of far greater interests in income-producing property, including businesses and in pension
plans or to obviously hidden wealth. Cohen & Hillman, supra note 322, at 105. But see Comment,
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may have been divided equally under strict title, the equal division of
houses, while a reflection of the continuing gendered identification of
property, is hardly evidence of an equalitarian perspective. In fact, there
is evidence that it may fuel custody disputes.328
In reported cases involving property other than the marital home,
the distributional patterns also reveal a gendered identification of prop-
erty. In cases where marital assets included other real property and liq-
uid assets32 9 or the distribution of business property 330 or pensions, 331
The Marital Home: Equal or Equitable Distribution, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 1089, 1091, 1102-04 (1983)
(claim that courts in equitable distribution states are better able to give special consideration to the
place of the home, while courts in states requiring equal division of assets are more likely to make
awards that result in the sale of the home). Special consideration of the home in property settlements
is based on a number of considerations: recognition of the divorce's impact on children as well as the
general trend to limit periodic support payments and consolidate the entire monetary settlement in
the property award. Id. at 1090; see also UMDA § 307, 9A U.L.A. 238 (1973) (framework enabling
a court to make special provisions for the home); Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and
Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REv. 1181,
1204-07 (1981).
328. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(3) (McKinney 1986) (requiring the court to consider
the desirability of awarding the marital home to the spouse receiving custody of the children). See
Polikoff, Gender & Child Custody Determinations: Exploring the Myths, in FAMILIES, POLITICS &
PUBLIC POLICY: A FEMINIST DIALOGUE ON WOMEN AND THE STATE 183 (B. Diamond ed. 1983);
see also Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used in Child Custody Deter-
minations, 7 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 235 (1983).
329. In the 28 reported cases in which liquid investments and real property (other than the
marital home) were part of the distributive award, the wife received more than 50% in 4cases 50%
in 15 cases, and less than 50% in 9 cases. Cohen & Hillman, supra note 322, at 105.
330. In the 15 reported cases in which the distribution of business property was involved, wives
received 50% in 2 cases and 0% in 6 cases (of which one involved a marriage of less than 7 years). In
the rest, the wife received between 15% and 40%, with 5 cases clustered at 25% or less (of which 1
involved a marriage of less than 7 years). Id. at 104.
Some investment banking houses, closely held corporations, and other partnerships require single
partners to sign a prenuptial pact with the firm providing that a future spouse or ex-spouse will not
interfere in the business operation or make the firm's financial affairs public in a divorce. N.Y.
Times, Dec. 29, 1985, § 3, at 1, col. 1. When asked why businesses were treated differently than
other assets in both litigated and out-of-court settlements, one lawyer in the author's pilot study
remarked, "Because judges are lawyers. They may have struggled to build a business." The same
logic may well apply to lawyers in negotiation sessions for out of court settlements.
331. In the 30 reported cases (27 of which involved long marriages of at least 7 years) in which
pensions were distributed women received 100% in one case, 50% in 12 cases (of which 2 were
short-term marriages), and less than 50% in 17 cases. Of these 17 cases, in 3 of the 7 cases in which
the wife received no part of the pension as part of the distributive award, the pension was an offset
against 50% of the marital home or other marital property. Cohen & Hillman, supra note 322, at
106; see also Pottala v. Pottala, 112 A.D.2d 553, 490 N.Y.S.2d 936 (3d Dep't 1985) (in a 9 year
second marriage, wife awarded 30% of husband's pension). Regarding the distribution of benefits
received as a consequence of early retirement, see Biddlecom v. Biddlecom, 113 A.D.2d 66, 495
N.Y.S.2d 301 (4th Dep't 1985) (absent a specific agreement, benefits received as a consequence of
early retirement are not marital property). But see Turnbull v. Turnbull, 129 Misc. 2d 683, 493
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wives were less likely to receive an equal distribution. A similar pattern
emerges in cases involving the distribution of such marital assets as pro-
fessional licenses and practices.332
Given the consistent pattern for the distribution of various types of
marital property, it is not unreasonable to assume that even an expansion
in the definition of marital property may not have a significant impact on
the distributional ratios. For example, an increase in the value of separate
property attributable to the indirect contribution of a nontitled spouse as
homemaker or parent, 333 may be subject to an evaluation which relies on
N.Y.S.2d 717 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (court divided pension rights equally, including all fringe benefits, as
part of plan including disability benefits "in lieu" of early retirement).
332. In the 13 reported cases (of which all but one involved marriages of at least 7 years) involv-
ing the inclusion of professional licenses and practices, 7 wives were awarded between 10% and 50%
of a dollar amount of the value of the professional practice, with one half of the awards for 25% or
less. In the 6 remaining cases (of which only one involved a marriage of less than 7 years), limited
maintenance was awarded in 4 of the cases, including the case of the shorter term marriage. Cohen &
Hillman, supra note 322. See O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1985); see also Raff v. Raft, 120 A.D.2d 507, 501 N.Y.S.2d 707 (2d Dep't 1986) (value of medical
license for distributive award is "the enhanced earning capacity it affords the holder") (quoting
O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 588, 489 N.E.2d at 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 749); Kutanovski v. Kutanovski, 109
A.D.2d 822, 486 N.Y.S.2d 338 (2d Dep't 1985), vacated, 120 A.D.2d 571, 502 N.Y.S.2d 218 (2d
Dep't 1986) (trial court must comply with N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW 236(b)(5)(g) with respect to the
distribution of the value of the medical license; distributive award to wife 60% marital house and
50% other marital property representing her share of value of husband's medical license affirmed).
New York is viewed as a minority jurisdiction in its treatment of professional licenses as marital
property.
In general, wage and salary income is more valuable than property. See Weitzman, supra note
327, at 1188-94. In one year, the average couple can earn more than the total value of their marital
assets. The tangible assets of a marriage typically are worth less than the spouses' earning capacities.
Id. at 1192. Though this finding is based on California data, there is no evidence to suggest that it is
geographically limited in its applicability.
333. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(1)(d)(3) (McKinney 1986) ("separate property includes
the increase in value of separate property, except to the extent that such appreciation is due in part
to the contribution or efforts of the other spouse."). See Price v. Price, 69 N.Y.2d 8, 503 N.E.2d 684,
511 N.Y.S.2d 219 (2d Dep't 1986) (increase in the value of a divorcing spouse's separate business
property attributable to the indirect contributions of the other spouse as homemaker and parent is
marital property subject to equitable distribution). In cases prior to Price, there had been disagree-
ment about the significance of the fact that an explicit reference to the "contributions and services as
a spouse, parent.., and homemaker" appears in N.Y. DOM. REL. LAWS § 236(B)(5)(d)(6) (McKin-
ney 1977 & Supp. 1985) (marital property) and id. § 236(B)(6)(a)(8) (maintenance) but does not
appear in id. § 236(B)(1)(d)(3) (appreciation in separate property), which lists no factors to define
the term "contributions or efforts of the other spouse". Compare Jolis v. Jolis, 111 Misc. 2d 965, 446
N.Y.S.2d 138 (Sup. Ct. 1981), aff'd, 98 A.D.2d 692, 470 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1st Dep't 1983) (wife's
homemaker services did not entitle her to share in the appreciated value of husband's separately
owned stock) with Wegman v. Wegman, 129 Misc. 2d 968, 494 N.Y.S.2d 993 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (wife's
contributions to husband's business as spouse, homemaker, parent, and social partner justified classi-
fying increase in their value as marital property). For a discussion of the nature of a homemaker's
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prevailing gendered cultural definitions of the nature and measure of the
indirect contribution.
In sum, there is little evidence in the reported cases that the bench is
inclined to distribute property equally unless exceptional circumstances
are involved. Moreover, the propensity to differentiate among types of
property has had a less obvious but equally important impact on the pro-
jected economic status of the parties . 3 4 Long-term, disadvantaging,
recognition under equitable distribution, see Roffman v. Roffman, 124 Misc. 2d 636, 476 N.Y.S.2d
713 (Sup. Ct. 1983):
The non-remunerated efforts of raising children, making a home, performing a myriad of
personal services and providing physical and emotional support are, among other
noneconomic ingredients of the marital relationship at least as essential to its nature and
maintenance as are the economic factors, and their worth is consequently entitled to
substantial recognition.
Id. at 637-38, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 715 (emphasis added) (quoting Wood v. Wood, 119 Misc. 2d 1079,
1079, 465 N.Y.S.2d 475, 483 (1983)).
The court in Price recognized spousal emotional and moral support necessary to sustain the other
spouse in coping with the vicissitudes of life outside the home." Price, 69 N.Y.2d at 14, 503 N.E.2d
at 687, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 222 (quoting Brennan v. Brennan, 103 A.D.2d 48, 52, 479 N.Y.S.2d 877
(3rd Dep't 1984)), Even if the marriage was a troubled one, a homemaker may still contribute to her
spouse's business sucess. Scherzer v. Scherzer, 131 N.J. Super. 397, 401, 346 A.2d 434, 436 (1975).
But, as the court noted in Price concerning the active/passive appreciation distinction.
As a general rule... where the appreciation is not due, in any part, to the efforts of the
titled spouse but to the efforts of others or to unrelated factors including inflation or
other market forces, as in the case of a mutual fund, an investment in unimproved land,
or in a work of art, the appreciation remains separate property, and the non-titled spouse
has no claim to a share of the appreciation.
69 N.Y.2d at 18, 503 N.E.2d at 690, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 225. In determining the appreciation, New
York courts have rejected both the replacement cost approach, Bidwell v. Bidwell, 122 A.D.2d 364,
366, 504 N.Y.S.2d 327, 329 (3d Dep't 1986), and the opportunity cost aproach, Connor v. Conner,
97 A.D.2d 88, 96-104, 468 N.Y.S.2d 482, 489-93 (2d Dep't 1983), as have courts in other jurisdic-
tions. See Sementilli v. Sementilli, 102 A.D.2d 78, 88, 477 N.Y.S.2d 626, 633 (1st Dep't 1984); In re
Gallagher, 5 Faro. L. Rep. 2908, 2910 (Ill. Cir. Ct. July 18, 1979) (court refuses to place dollar value
on services of homemaker); In re Marriage of Briggs, 225 N.W.2d 911, 913 (Iowa 1975) (division of
property at divorce is not on "price-per-hour basis"); In re Marriage of Schulte, 546 S.W.2d 41, 47
(Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (wife need not prove value of her contributions on dollar-per-hour basis);
Scherzer, 136 N.J. Super. at 401, 346 A.2d at 436 (homemaker's contribution cannot be given a
monetary worth and its value may be gleaned from earnings of employed spouse).
Compare COLO. REv. STAT. § 14-10-113 (entire increase in value of separate property is marital
property) with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-21 (Michie 1988). But see Phillips v. Phillips, 73 N.C. App. 68,
326 S.E.2d 57 (1985) (distinguishing between "active" and "passive" appreciation in value of sepa-
rate property); see also VA. CODE § 20-107 (repealed 1982) (increase in value of any separate prop-
erty is separate).
334. Attorneys in a pilot study conducted by the author believe that courts frequently operate
under the illusion that a property distribution should be used by a wife to create an income produc-
ing fund. Frequently the assets received by such a woman cost money to maintain, operate and
repair (e.g., residence, contents, car) and are depreciating rather than appreciating assets (e.g., car
and household contents), as opposed to liquid or appreciating assets (profit sharing plans, pensions,
investments, businesses).
LOCKED IN AND LOCKED OUT
gendered consequences for the parties are produced by distributional
awards geared to the present.
Counterclaims have been made that each reported case is unique or
so situationally individuated, so richly textured and complex, that a sta-
tistical compilation of the distributional ratios is a misrepresentation.335
It has been said that reported awards cannot provide sufficient accurate
data for pattern recognition purposes. This position ignores or denies the
gendered context in which reported cases, as well as negotiated settle-
ments, occur. The gendered context, which includes perceptions and ste-
reotypes, frames the events and affects the outcomes. It is the major
unifying factor across seemingly disparate situations.
Since reported cases constitute a minute proportion of divorce
awards, 336 it is important to know whether the patterns identified in the
reported cases hold true in out-of-court negotiation 337 and settlement.
Such private ordering 38 of marital dissolution is subject to judicial ap-
proval. Despite the fact that litigated cases have limited precedential
value, distributional awards may provide cues for lawyers regarding local
judicial norms of fairness.33 9 Such cases may form the basis for a practi-
335. Foster, supra note 322.
336. "The principal institution of law in action is settlement out of court not trial." H. Ross,
SETTLED OUT OF COURT 3 (2d ed. 1980); see Mnookin and Korhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). The overwhelming majority of divorcing
couples resolve distributional questions without bringing any contested issue to court for adjudica-
tion. "Although there are no data that permit reliable estimates on a national basis, available esti-
mates are that only a very small percentage of divorces-probably less than 10%- involve disputes
that are contested in court." Id. at 951 n.3; see also H. Erlanger, E. Chambliss & M. Melli, Co-
operation or Co-ercion? Information Settlement in the Divorce Context, Working Papers Series 7,
#6 Inst. for Legal Studies U. Wis. Law School, March 1986.
337. Mnookin, Divorce Bargaining: The Limits on Private Ordering, in THE RESOLUTION OF
FAMILY CONFLICT 364 (J. Eekelaar & S. Katz eds. 1984); Sarat & Felstiner, Law and Strategy in the
Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20 LAW AND Soc'y REv. 93 (1986). As Sarat and Felstiner note:
More is at stake, however, in the interaction between lawyers and clients than a unidi-
rectional movement of information and advice from lawyer to client.., this interaction
provides one important setting where law and society meet and where legal norms and
folk norms come together to shape responses to grievances, injuries and problems.
Id. at 94. "Lawyers must help their clients view the emotional process of dissolving an intimate
relationship in instrumental terms." Id. at 116.
338. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 336; see also Mnookin, supra note 337. Mnookin iden-
tifies the advantages of private ordering as: support for the liberal ideal that individuals have rights
and should largely be left free to make of their lives what they wish, efficiency including consistency
with the preferences of each spouse and savings (both financial and emotional) as well as the avoid-
ance of risk and uncertainty in litigation. Id. at 366-67.
339. Reported judicial decisions set the parameters for the 90% of matrimonial cases that end in
a negotiated settlement. REPORT OF THE NEW YORK TASK FORCE, supra note 135, at 99 (citing
Cohen-Hillman testimony). But see Sassower, Looking Anew for Fair Divorce Law, N.Y. Times, May
11, 1980, at 11, col. 1 (suggesting that the proposed equitable distribution statute would offer no
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tioner's advice to a client; they may impact on negotiations with oppos-
ing counsel.
To compare the distributional pattern in reported cases with the dis-
tributional pattern in out-of-court settlements,3  less readily available
data must be utilized. In New York, judicially approved out-of-court set-
tlements are placed in sealed files and a certificate of dissolution is filed in
Albany. An alternative source of such data is attorney files. Efforts to
determine property distribution patterns through a random sampling of
the fies of high volume matrimonial practitioners were unsuccessful in
the pilot study conducted by the author. 41 Yet another source of data is
more informal. It consists of lawyers' self-reporting the results and the
observations of judges regarding the distributional ratio in out-of-court
guidance to parties settling out of court). But note also the findings in a study on divorce negotiation
which concluded:
Judicial oversight of bargaining must be assessed as a factor in the negotiation process
.... Parties who settled were clearly influenced by their lawyers' predictions of what the
court would decide.., however what was most striking about our data was the evidence
which documented the minimal role of the judge as the reviewer of the substance of the
parties' agreement.
M. Melli, H. Erlanger & E. Chambliss, The Process of Negotiation: An Exploratory Investigation in
the Divorce Context 3, 8, 9 (Disputes Processing Research Program, Working Papers Series 7, #1
Inst. for Legal Studies, U. of Wisconsin Law Sch., Dec. 1985) [hereinafter Working Paper # 1]. The
authors report that the courts' main concern was not to review the substance of the parties' decision
but to establish that the parties had actually reached the particular stipulation and understood its
terms and that in many cases the judge did not have the necessary information on which to review
the stipulations for content. Id. at 10-11. "And among lawyers who think there are set standards and
who do say they can predict outcomes there are differences of opinion as to the content of those
standards." M. Melli, H. Erlanger & E. Chambliss, supra note 336, at 29-30.
- 340. The Chair of the Matrimonial Law Committee of the New York City Bar explained:
Settlements have been harder to come by than anticipated at the time the law was
changed. Many of us thought that the movement away from fault oriented disputes to
the more business like questions of finding the right mix of property distribution distrib-
utive awards and support to provide an equitable result would reduce the "leveraging"
use of fault and lead to speedier conclusion.
Joint Public Hearings on Equitable Distribution, supra note 294 (statement of Stanley Plesent, Chair
of the Matrimonial Law Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York).
341. Researcher access to sealed court files requires the permission either of the chief adminis-
trative judge of a judicial district, or of the individual parties, or their attorneys. Efforts by the
author to undertake a pilot study to determine the distributional patterns in out-of-court settlements
revealed that her plan to develop a random sample of out-of-court settlements from court files would
be difficult to implement. Powerful matrimonial practitioners in the locale selected for the pilot study
convinced the chief administrative judge not to allow the files to be unsealed for the study by threat-
ening to enjoin him. Their reasons for non-cooperation included technical concerns of time and
money, seemingly unallayable concerns regarding confidentiality, regardless of the safeguards built
into the research protocol, and lawyer biases against the utility of social science research.
Moreover, the author discovered that the court records were not segregated by subject matter nor
was their subject matter identifiable through numerical assignment. Even if permission to break the
seal had been granted, the development of a random sample would have been a complicated matter.
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settlements which they review. Such data, despite the limitations of self-
reporting, make it abundantly clear that the patterns in the reported
cases are consistent with norms for out-of-court settlements.342
Supporters of equitable distribution insisted that each out-of-court
negotiated marital property distribution would reflect the individual mar-
riage arrangement. In reality, attorneys appear to use tailoring principles
in negotiating settlements.343 Such tailoring principles are framed by the
same gendered context as court-ordered awards. They reflect the same
gendered differential assessment of contribution to marriage and
gendered identification of types of marital property. Bargaining does not
occur in the shadow of the law3 " but in the shadow of the culture.
345
A review of the pattern of alimony awards indicates that mainte-
nance remains a gendered issue. Much of the concern focuses on the con-
flicting principles governing maintenance as an economic allocation at
dissolution.346 More particularly, criticism has been directed toward the
primary goal of the maintenance provision-rehabilitation and self-sup-
port. The statute itself offers no guidance to the meaning of the term
"self-supporting."347 Nor does the legislative history of the reform speak
clearly to a prioritization of crucial factors: the consideration to be given
to sex segregation in work outside the home, employment opportunities
and wage scales for women, especially middle-aged women now destined
342. Reports indicate that women seem to be averaging awards of roughly 25-30% of the mari-
tal estate. Statement of Lester Wallman, Chair, Legislative Committees of the Family Law Section
of the New York State Bar Association and the New York State Chapter of the American Academy
of Matrimonial Lawyers in a televised editorial on November 14, 1982 for WNBC-TV, Channel 4,
reprinted in Joint Public Hearings onn Equitable Distribution, supra note 294 (app. B to statement of
Judith Avner); see also id. (testimony of Myrna Felder, Chair, Matrimonial Law Committee, Wo-
men's Bar Association of the State of New York).
343. See Spiegelman, Remedies for Victim Group Isolation in the Workplace: Court Orders, Prob-
lem Solving and Affirmative Action in the Post-Stotts Era, 29 How. L.J. 191 (1986); see also Memphis
Fire Dept. v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
344. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 336, at 950.
345. See Working Paper #1, supra note 339, for a further gloss on this theme. The authors
claim "that rather than a system of bargaining in the shadow of the law, divorce may well be one of
adjudication in the shadow of bargaining." Id. at 12. "Informal settlement is not synonymous with
the negotiation.... Because of a lack of procedural choice informal processes also can be extremely
coercive." Working Paper #6, supra note 336, at 7; see also id. at 11-19, 39-42.
346. "Arguably the four factors deemphasized by rehabilitative alimony are those that may
favor women in divorce settlements, whereas the rehabilitation factor favors men by curtailing the
amount they will have to pay." Marshall, supra note 311, at 670.
347. "Of the 10 factors to be considered in determining the amount and duration of mainte-
nance, only two relate to self support, yet ... this is frequently the main factor that is addressed."
Joint Public Hearings on Equitable Distribution, supra note 294 (statement of Diane White, Exec.
Dir., Legal Awareness for Women, Inc.).
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to be self-supporting, and the extension of maintenance should a recipi-
ent fail to "rehabilitate" herself.
348
New York has followed the national trend regarding maintenance
awards. Alimony is considered an exceptional consequence of divorce.
The overall pattern is one of significant limitation in the number and
duration of maintenance awards, 349 as well as a continuing failure to en-
force compliance.3
The pattern regarding maintenance awards in the reported New
York cases reveals an unwillingness to recognize the full contribution
and/or long-term economic vulnerability of the unwaged worker in the
home.35 1 Judges in more than half of the cases involving a long-term
marriage did not award long-term or permanent maintenance. 35 2 Rather
348. The legislature appears to have intended to provide the courts with a short-term mainte-
nance option for a younger spouse with a strong potential to become self-supporting after a period of
support for education and training. REPORT OF THE NEW YORK TASK FORCE, supra note 135, at
113.
We only meant and intended to have that short period of maintenance for the short
marriage where the young lady might be 23 and he was 25; she was a teacher, she could
go back to teaching or maybe even quit. That's what we intended, and we have allowed
the leeway to those judges thinking that they would have the intelligence to follow
through accordingly.
Joint Public Hearings on Equitable Distribution, supra note 294 (statement of Assemblyman
Burrows).
349. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY: 1983, SERIES P-23,
No. 141 (July 1985). In 1984, of all ever divorced or currently separated women (17.4 million), only
14% had been awarded spousal support. The average amount was $3,980 which is the equivalent of
the $3,000 average of 1981 after adjusting for inflation. Of the women awarded alimony, 43.5%
received the full amount, 23.9% received a partial amount, and 32.6% did not receive payment. U.S.
BUREAU OF CENSUS: CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY; 1981, SERIES P-23, No. 124 (May 1983); see
also id. at 41-50 (analysis of selected characteristics of women awarded alimony payments).
The California figure for alimony awards in 1977 was 16.7% (close to the national figure of 14%).
The judges estimated that about half of the women they saw were awarded spousal support and the
attorneys estimated that two-thirds of divorced women are awarded spousal support. Generally
speaking, there appears to be an overriding concern for the welfare of men who might be supporting
two households (including children in both households), which has been manifested by efforts to
encourage- if not accelerate-the situation of self-sufficiency for a former wife. This concern ap-
pears to supersede the value of supporting a full-time custodial parent who works in the home, or of
preventing a drastic permanent decline in a former wife's standard of living. Weitzman & Dixon,
supra note 135, at 167.
350. REPORT OF THE NEww YORK TASK FORCE, supra note 135, at 120. Female and male
survey respondents (F%/M%) reported that the courts effectively enforce maintenance awards: Al-
ways (1/4), Often (12/27), Sometimes (27/38), Rarely (45/22), Never (10/3), No Answer (4/5). See
also Arendell, supra note 326, at 33.
351. In a traditional marriage, the entire economic worth of the wife is absorbed into the marital
unit while the husband's is absorbed only to the extent of support. Note, Marital Property: A New
Look at Old Inequities, 39 ALB. L. REv. 52, 61-62 (1974).
352. See Cohen & Hillman, supra note 322, at 106. Since the passage of the reform, in 49 re-
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than viewing the individual's worth in the marketplace as the product of
joint decisions, courts and attorneys approach the issue of worth in terms
of individual actions. Moreover, the bench reflects the gendered context
in which alimony is awarded by remarking negatively on the continuing
economic dependency on a former husband 353 and by scrutinizing a
wife's behavior for marital fault which can affect the maintenance award.
In addition, judges appear all too willing to limit enforcement for ali-
mony payments. 4 In combination with marital property distribution
patterns since 1980, judicially ordered maintenance awards have resulted
in a disparate burden of support on the former wife who is likely to have
significantly different gendered economic vulnerabilities and earning ca-
pacities. The former wife is often the custodial parent as well.
Like negotiated out-of-court property settlements, maintenance
agreements are likely to reflect the norms and values embodied in the
reported cases. Lawyers' negotiations tend to result in minimal short
term maintenance awards, even for older women who have worked in the
ported decisions maintenance was waived in 3 cases (none of these marriages was less than 10 years),
denied in 12 cases (2 cases involved marriages of less than 7 years, 1 case involved a husband who
was in prison from whom maintenance was uncollectible), awarded for a limited or short term de-
spite the length of the marriage in 15 cases, and awarded for a long term or permanently for a long
term marriage in 19 cases. Marriages in 44 cases ranged from 7 1/2 to 57 years duration. In 10 cases,
economically dependent wives married between 10 and 57 years (with 18 years of marriage the
median) were totally denied a maintenance award. In 15 cases, women who had been married for
between 8 and 36 years (20 years of marriage the median) were awarded only rehabilitative mainte-
nance for periods ranging from 1 1/2 to 5 years. But see Gannon v. Gannon, 116 A.D.2d 1030, 498
N.Y.S.2d 647 (4th Dep't 1986) (trial court award of $80 per week maintenance inadequate and
termination upon wife's receipt of share of retirement pension or social security benefits improper in
27-12 year marriage where 46 year old wife who raised 5 children earned $10,000 annually while
husband earned $24,000); see also REPORT OF THE NEw YORK TASK FORCE, supra note 135, at
113-14. Survey respondents (F%/M%) reported that older displaced homemakers with little chance
of obtaining employment above minimum wage are awarded permanent maintenance after long-term
marriages: Always (4/5), Often (24/43), Sometimes (36/24), Rarely (21/10), Never (5/2), No An-
swer (10/6).
353. Moreover, there is evidence that the physical appearance of the wife becomes part of the
calculus. The appearance of women litigants may be the subject of comments by male attorneys as a
negotiating tool. For instance, if an attorney represents a woman seeking maintenance, he will de-
scribe her as unattractive and argue that the chances of remarriage are slight. If he represents the
husband, he'll describe the same woman as gorgeous with great chances of remarriage. Conversation
by author with a matrimonial attorney participating in pilot study.
354. Stevens v. Stevens, 107 A.D.2d 987, 484 N.Y.S.2d 708 (3d Dep't 1985), appeal after re-
mand, 112 A.D.2d 1091, 492 N.Y.S.2d 519 (3d. Dep't 1985); McMahan v. McMahan, 100 A.D.2d
826, 474 N.Y.S.2d 974 (1st Dep't 1984); Blickstein v. Blickstein, 99 A.D.2d 287, 472 N.Y.S.2d 110
(2d Dep't 1984); see REPORT OF THE NEW YORK TASK FORCE, supra note 135, at 120. Respondents
(F/M)reported that interest on arrears is awarded as provided by statute: Always (2%/4%), Often
(10%/5%), Sometimes (19%/17%), Rarely (40%/39%), Never (20%/17%), No Answer (10%/
7%).
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home at a high opportunity cost to themselves. 355 These outcomes are
based on tailoring principles informed by gender applied to mainte-
nance,356 as well as to property distribution. Reliance on such culturally
acceptable principles ensures that women have little or no chance of be-
coming self-supporting at a standard of living in any way commensurate
with their standard of living during the marriage.357
In theory, consideration of an award of rehabilitative alimony is pre-
mised on the presumption that marital property has been divided.3" 8 In
reality, rehabilitative alimony is not considered as a separate matter and
often substitutes for a fair distribution of marital property.35 9 In theory,
355. Homemaking is immensely valuable unpaid work that exacts a unique opportunity cost,
often apparent only at dissolution of a marriage. It is unpaid labor for which the homemaker cannot
develop a resume demonstrating prior experience utilizing skills recognized in the paid labor force.
Her education, experience, and skills become outmoded and earning capacity is permanently dimin-
ished. See, eg., Minnesota Marriage Dissolution Law, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.552(d) (West Supp,
1989). Or, in her efforts to juggle her work as a homemaker with family income needs, she may take
part or full-time low-wage service sector jobs, thereby incurring opportunity costs. Studies show that
women continue to shoulder the major responsibility for homemaking, child care, and the care of
elderly parents. Parkman, The Recognition of Human Capital as Property in Divorce Settlements, 40
ARK. L. REv. 439-67 (1987); Parkman, The Economic Approach to Valuing a Sacrificed Career in
Divorce Proceedings, 2 J. Am. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAWS 45 (1986); Beninger & Smith, Career
Opportunity Cost: A Factor in Spousal Support Determination, 16 FAM. L.Q. 201 (1982).
356. REPORT OF THE NEW YORK TASK FORCE, supra note 135, at 116-17. Respondents (F/M)
reported the duration of rehabilitative maintenance awards based on length of marriage as: 3/3 years
of maintenance for a marriage of less than 10 years, 4/5 years of maintenance for a marriage of 10-20
years, 6/8 years of maintenance for a marriage of 20-30 years, and 8/9 years of maintenance for a
marriage of more than 30 years. See also Note, supra note 352, at 65. "The phrase ability to pay has
never been precisely defined. Some courts go by rule of thumb, uniformly awarding '/4 to I/t of the
husband's income when there are children to support."
357. In practice, the statutory subjective reasonable need standard has led to widespread abuse.
It often means the judge asks the husband what his needs are and then, after allowing for his rent, his
car payments, his cleaning services, his meals out, his entertainment and so forth, the judge makes an
award to the wife and children our of what is left. See Bruch, Of Work, Family Wealth and Equality,
17 FAM. L.Q. 99 (Summer 1983).
Because we more readily understand tangible or traditional assets than potential future
income, it is easy to conclude that a reasonable division of a couple's home, furniture,
cars and savings accounts alone has fulfilled equity between the spouses. Similarly, be-
cause judges often lack sophistication about the costs of rearing children, or the difficul-
ties for women in finding reasonable, fairly compensated employment, rose-colored
glasses often control a divorce court's support awards. Unsubstantiated, seriously harm-
ful financial practices are consequently the norm, not the exception, in contemporary
American divorce ....
Id. at 106. Note, however, that the 1986 legislative amendment to the statutory provisions for tem-
porary maintenance or maintenance substituted "standard of living of the parties established during
the marriage" for "to meet the reasonable needs of a party to the matrimonial action." 1986 N.Y.
Laws ch. 884, 2173.
358. See Freed & Foster, Economic Effects of Divorce, 7 FAM. L.Q. 275, 277-78 (1973).
359. Marshall, supra note 311, at 668.
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rehabilitative alimony is awarded on the basis of economic need rather
than punishment for the marital breakup. In practice, rehabilitative ali-
mony reduces the likelihood that alimony will be used to punish former
husbands, but maintains the practice of punishing former wives.3 6 ° Eq-
uity has been all too likely to result in a disparate burden of support on
two former spouses with significantly different economic vulnerabilities
and earning capacities. "Short term rehabilitative maintenance is analo-
gous to severance pay."
361
Though the interval during which the reform has been operative is a
relatively brief one, clearly identifiable implementation patterns have
emerged. Not surprisingly, these patterns exist both in litigation and in
out-of-court settlements. They reflect the continuing power of the sex/
gender system, using men's lives as the referent, to utilize a reform mea-
sure designed ostensibly to help women which, in fact, accelerates their
impoverishment.
IV. POST-PARTUM REFLECTIONS
Like other stories about law, this set of narratives about historic and
contemporary relationships among law as ideology, the sex/gender sys-
tem, and property, focuses on rules and their interpretation. Unlike many
other stories about law, this analysis of rules and their interpretation is
critically informed by an understanding of the operation and power of
the sex/gender system. More particularly, treatment of women and men
as wives and husbands at the time of marital dissolution.
Until the mid-nineteenth century in the United States, a married
woman had no separate legal identity. Her identity was appropriated by
her husband as a matter of law. Commencing in the 1840s, the century
was punctuated by a series of major social and legal struggles to establish
a separate legal identity for married women in New York. The results of
the struggle were a series of statutes which eliminated marriage as a bar
to women's access to all forms of property and endowed married women
with a portion of that privileged legal identity possessed by males in New
York regardless of marital status. Married women were reclassified.
They became capable of owning and managing property, of earning
wages in their own names, and of having access to all such property ac-
cumulated in their names during a marriage and at its dissolution.
360. Id. Former husbands benefit unjustly when rehabilitative alimony is awarded in circum-
stances in which permanent alimony would be appropriate, by limiting the amount which they
would otherwise pay.
361. M. GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 82 (1981).
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Such reclassification is said to be a significant step for a legal system.
When it involves a hitherto marginalized group, reclassification may pro-
vide that group with the formal legal bases362 for making new claims on
resources and their patterns of distribution. But reclassification does not
eliminate prior history. Nor does it avoid the complex dynamic between
dominator and dominated, privileged and subordinate. Prior historical
experience of this dynamic can continue to inform and structure ongoing
social interactions,36 3 especially in institutionalized relationships such as
husband and wife. Such experience is a powerful force which contributes
to the setting of limits and constraints upon the exercise by reclassified
persons of their newly recognized competence and capacity. In the inter-
action with former dominators, members of a marginalized and hitherto
dominated group may reveal what has been identified as "the paradox of
domination"-acknowledgment of and self-identification as dependent 3"
despite formal reclassification as competent, autonomous individuals.
Despite their separate legal identity and concomitant formal access
to marital property, most married and divorced women remained eco-
nomically vulnerable. The gap between the symbolic significance ac-
corded to the creation of a married woman's legal identity and the
material results consequent upon the reform reflect the reality of contin-
ued gender-based privileging. Thus, this story of reform, of the first step
in the creation of a separate legal identity for married women, the story
362. See J. NOONAN, supra note 39, at 14-19 (discussing the indispensability of impersonality
and the complementarity of rules and persons).
363. For example, patriarchy can be viewed as a continuing set of social relations among men
enabling them to dominate women. See Hartmann, The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Femi.
nism, in WOMEN AND REVOLUTION: THE UNHAPPY MARRIAGE OF MARXISM AND FEMINISM (L.
Sargent ed. 1981); see also R. CONNELL, supra note 5, at 184 (hegemonic masculinity as the operat-
ing principle for the organization of private and cultural processes).
364. 0. PATrERSON, supra note 39, at 334-42; see also A. MEMMI, DEPENDENCE: A SKETCH
FOR A PORTRAIT OF THE DEPENDENT 181 app. A (1984) (distinction between domination and
dependence.) For a discussion of the confusion between economic dependence and emotional depen-
dency in women, see L. EICHENBAUM & S. ORBACH, WHAT Do WOMEN WANT: EXPLODING THE
MYTH OF DEPENDENCY (1983).
Women are raised to be depended upon; to place their emotional needs second to those
of others.... At the same time that women are depended upon for emotional support
and nuturance, they learn to behave dependently. Girls learn from very early on that it is
dependent behavior (passivity, helplessness, submissiveness) that will get them what they
are searching for-someone to consistently care for them.
Id. at 9. But "[g]irls learn early that in the most profound sense, they must rely on themselves, there
is no one to take care of them emotionally." Id. at 25; see also, Finley, Choice and Freedom: Elusive
Issues in the Search for Gender Justice, 96 YALE L.J. 914, 916-17 (1987) (discussing oppression
theory, i.e. how patterns of male domination create an atmosphere that makes women acquiesce in
their roles).
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of degendering or gender neutralizing formal rules regarding access to
property, is also the story of the power of a cultural context-that of the
continuing gender based privileging of men.
A second major divorce law reform campaign involved expanded
access to divorce through the expansion of the facially gender neutral
number of fault-based grounds for divorce. This campaign is usually
viewed historically as unconnected with marital property distribution re-
forms and the development of a legal identity for married women. In
fact, however, the expansion of fault was culturally deeply connected to
married women's identity and economic vulnerability. Understanding
the legal and cultural implications of this campaign requires recognition
of the historical importance and gendered nature of the institution of
marriage in American culture.
Both men and women were encouraged to.marry, but prevailing cul-
tural reasons for this encouragement were gender specific. American cul-
ture identified work and association outside the home as a legitimate if
not compulsory path for men seeking fulfillment and social recognition.
For women, marriage was generally understood to be the focal point of
adult life.365 It provided social and cultural fulfillment and hopefully, a
measure of economic security.
Marriage was a major determinant of gender roles, as well as their
reflector and legitimator. The gendered roles for husbands as well as
wives were embodied in cultural norms containing behavioral prescrip-
tions and constraints in a marital relationship. The salience and ideologi-
cal power of these norms were clearest at divorce, which triggered
operation of the system of fault-based grounds for dissolution.366 In New
365. See D. GITINS, supra note 21; see also A. DOUGLAS, supra note 123; P. HILL, THE
WORLD THEIR HOUSEHOLD: THE AMERICAN WOMAN'S FOREIGN MISSION MOVEMENT AND
CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION 1870-1920 (1985); M. RYAN, THE EMPIRE OF THE MOTHER:
AMERICAN WRITING ABOUT DOMESTICITY 1830-1860 (1985); L. SHAPIRO, PERFECTION SALAD:
WOMEN AND COOKING AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY (1986); M. VICINUS, INDEPENDENT WO-
MEN: WORK AND COMMUNITY FOR SINGLE WOMEN 1850-1920 (1985).
366. May explains this phenomenon:
Women discarded husbands if they failed in the fundamental duty of providing the ne-
cessities of life: a comfortable place to live, enough to eat, and adequate means for rea-
sonable well being. If they polluted the domestic environment through overindulgence in
vices such as drinking or gambling, they were deemed unworthy. Sexual excess was also
beyond the bounds of reasonable behavior. The limits and duties were clearly defined:
husbands were to provide the necessities of life, treat their wives with courtesy and pro-
tection, and exercise sexual restraint. Men who found that their wives deviated from
proper norms of conduct also sought redress. A wife's duty was to maintain a comforta-
ble home, take care of household chores, bear and tend to the children, and set the moral
tone for domestic life. She was to remain chaste and modest in her behavior, frugal in
1988/891
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York, the fault statute recognized adultery as the sole ground for di-
vorce. It was written in gender neutral terms-but a different signifi-
cance367 attached to the moral shortcomings of an "errant" adulterous
spouse depending on gender. In turn, this valuation supported and rein-
forced prevailing gender roles in marriage.
Reform campaigns to expand the fault grounds for divorce during
the nineteenth and twentieth century relied on a series of rationales.
Prominent among them were a set of gendered images which played
upon cultural sensibilities of women as victims-of good women trapped
in bad marriages by the rigid New York statute. The prescription for
such situations was said to be greater access to divorce. At first glance, a
push for expansive gender neutral statutes coupled with a reliance on
gendered images to evoke a favorable response to such proposals appears
inconsistent. But formal gender neutrality can readily exist in a gendered
context. Notwithstanding the influence and impact of context, the results
of form can be considered coequal with justice and with fairness.
The 1966 reform involved the belated expansion of fault grounds for
divorce and the inclusion of an option of separation leading to a no-fault
divorce. This reform likewise failed to transcend the gendered reality un-
derpinning divorce. Devotion to homemaking led to economic vulnera-
bility; hence, the cultural recognition that good women could be caught
in bad marriages. Economic vulnerability was reinforced by the prevail-
ing common law, strict title, marital property and divorce distribution
matters of household expenses, and her conduct was never to reflect badly upon her
home and her husband's good name. A woman who was not genteel in her demeanor,
who acted like (or indeed was) a "whore," or who violated the boundaries-physical as
well as moral-of a woman's proper sphere, might be shed in the divorce court. The
roles for both husbands and wives, then, were well understood. These norms formed the
basic requirements for attaining domestic peace and building solid communities around
well-disciplined homes.
E. MAY, GREAT EXPECTArIoNs: MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN POST-VIcrORIAN AMERICA 157
(1985).
367. According to Nicholson,
[T]hough the home and family were viewed as a necessary refuge and antidote to the
external world, they were also denied an aspect of the seriousness granted to the latter
domain. The consequence was that those activities which were allied with the home and
family were also denied a certain seriousness.
L. NICHOLSON, supra note 25, at 46. By the end of the 19th century
both the growth of an individualized social sphere outside the home and the increased
individualization of social relations within it raised particular contradictions for middle
class women. Increased autonomy within the family and new opportunities to function
autonomously outside it remained tied to existing beliefs about women as necessarily
dependent and private beings.
Id. at 52.
[Vol. 37
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rule, as well as an unsatisfactory system of alimony awards and enforce-
ment once these women were relieved of their wifely duties and obliga-
tions. No effort was made to address these effects in the 1966 reform.
Historically, fault grounds for the dissolution of a marriage have
operated in tandem with alimony. Like access to marital property and
unlike the grounds for fault-based divorce, the original statutory provi-
sions for alimony were written in gender specific language. Only divorced
women were eligible for alimony until 1980 in New York. Gender speci-
ficity for alimony persisted for one hundred thirty-two years after the
passage of the first Married Women's Property Act.
Alimony reveals the power of the sex/gender system operating
through law. Alimony has served either as a device for recognition of
contribution to a marriage or as compensation for marital property dis-
tribution rules which have had a drastically disparate impact on women.
On the one hand, provisions for alimony reflect a measure of recognition
of married women's economic vulnerability. On the other hand, alimony
is identified with powerful cultural images of married women's depen-
dence, helplessness, and inability to participate in complex financial af-
fairs. Such images are reinforced by the cultural assumption that the
status of a married woman is derivative from her husband. In turn, such
an assumption clearly differentially values gender. Not surprisingly, re-
course to and reliance upon a post hoe evaluation of a wife's contribution
to a marriage or a determination of her post-divorce living needs pro-
duces results which further reinforce married women's economic
vulnerability.
Despite one hundred thirty-two years of legally degendered access
for married women to physical property, one hundred twenty years of
legally degendered access for married women to their own wages, four-
teen years of expanded access to divorce, and one hundred ninety-one
years of gender specific alimony provisions said to benefit women seeking
divorce, the issues which surfaced in recent divorce law reform discus-
sions in New York continued to focus on the differentially gendered eco-
nomic consequences of marriage. Despite the gender neutral premises of
common law strict title and fault-based dissolution, each was seen to
have gender-biased effects. Despite the supposed compensation for these
effects by gender specific alimony, dissolution outcomes were still per-
ceived as fundamentally unfair to women. Women whose names were not
on the title to marital assets and were dependent on gender specific ali-
mony were highly unlikely to have their contribution to a marriage or
1988/89]
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their need for support adequately recognized by alimony awards, if and
when they were granted.
In 1980, after a decade of extensive discussion regarding the need
for divorce law reform, the New York legislature replaced gender neu-
tral, common law, strict title, marital property rules for marriage and
divorce with gender neutral, equitable distribution rules applicable only
in divorce proceedings. It also replaced gender specific alimony with bi-
lateral alimony. The competing distributional principles for marital prop-
erty, equitable distribution and a rebuttable presumption of equal
distribution, were framed in facially gender neutral language. Neverthe-
less, the discussion between 1970 and 1980 in New York regarding di-
vorce law reform remained informed by gendered values. For marriage
and divorce in our society, there is no external referent beyond women
and men as wives and husbands. The primary reform issue was the his-
toric one-the valuation of a woman's contribution to a marriage and
ultimately, the worth of a married woman. This issue was glossed over by
attractive cultural prescriptions for autonomy and independence for each
spouse. The legislature's choice of equitable distribution reflected a desire
to continue this discussion at each divorce negotiation or litigation.
Litigated outcomes and out-of-court settlements during the seven
years since the passage of the reform reveal the extent of the continued
systematic privileging of men as husbands in the divorce process. In New
York, as well as in other jurisdictions, equal numbers of men and women
get divorced, but women are far more likely to become poor as a result of
divorce.36 Poverty is a more common experience for divorced women
368. Nicholson explains:
Since men's participation in non domestic activity historically followed from their posi-
tion as head of household, such activity has been less problematic, more sustained, and
better paid than women's. When initially men took on jobs outside the home, this was
viewed as necessary to their role as head of household, and not in contradiction to it.
Moreover, their wages were set to cover the needs of a family and were not perceived, as
were those of women, as supplementary. As a result, when men today abandon family
ties they bring on themselves very different economic consequences than when women
perform the same abandonment.
Id. at 61. See L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECO-
NOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985); WOMEN AS SINGLE
PARENTS: CONFRONTING INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS IN THE COURTS, THE WORKPLACE, AND TIlE
HOUSING MARKET (A. Mulroy ed. 1988). Recent analyses suggest that men who adopt even some
homemaker duties frequently find that the resulting demands on their time and energy require them
to cut back on their commitment to paid work, often with a resulting decrease in income. See Gregg,
Putting Kids First, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1986, § 6 (Magazine), at 47; see also Thompson, Il Califor-
nia: Unswinging Singles, TIME, June 15, 1981, at 8. An overwhelming percent (77%) of single fathers
are reported in a recent survey to have difficulty balancing the demands made by working and rais-
ing children. See Collins, Single-Father Survey Finds Adjustment a Problem, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21,
[Vol. 37
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than for divorced men; almost one in three female headed households
lives in poverty.3 69 Women caught in this economic struggle to rear chil-
dren with inadequate incomes and the prospect of cuts in welfare pro-
grams370 simultaneously confront a range of debilitating psychological
states.371 For statistical purposes they are single. But, in economic and
social reality, they are not. Many are mothers who are no longer mar-
fled. They carry with them the contradictory cultural definition of two
identities: single woman and primary parent.
Although poverty is as common among younger formerly married
women as among their older counterparts, the causes are somewhat dif-
ferent. Poverty among young unmarried women is closely associated
with the presence of children to be supported on modest earnings. Mid-
dle-aged and older women are less likely to have dependent children, but
low earnings potential, disability, and difficulty in finding and keeping
steady jobs are more common.3 72 Furthermore, older divorced women
are much less likely than their younger divorced counterparts to rise out
of poverty through remarriage.373
Contemporary analyses suggest a plurality of explanations for the
marked decline in the economic status of divorced women. One set of
1983, at B17. Nearly a third travel, a third had to go to work late or leave early because of the
demands of being a parent, and 10% had quit or been dismissed because responsibilities of
parenthood had interfered with their work. Id.
369. U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, A GROWING CRISIS: DISADVANTAGED WOMEN AND
THEIR CHILDREN (1983); see Weiss, The Impact of Marital Dissolution on Income and Consumption
in Single Parent Households, 46 J. MARIAGE & FAM. 115 (1984).
See also N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1986, A17, col. 1. ("[T]he median income for families headed by
women was 13,660 last year, slightly less than half the median for all families .... The median
income for families with both husband and wife living in the household was $31,100 last year, up 1.4
percent from 1984. If the woman worked at a paid job, the median was $36,431. If the woman was
not in the paid labor-force, the median was $24,556.").
370. See generally Aldous, Cuts in Selected Welfare Programs: The Effects on U.S. families, 7 J.
FAM. ISSUES 161 (1986).
371. LIVES IN STRESS: WOMEN AND DEPRESSION (D. Belle ed. 1982); L. HALEM, SEPARATED
AND DIVORCED WOMEN 221 (1982); T. L'HoMMEDIEU, THE DIVORCE EXPERIENCE OF WORKING
AND MIDDLE CLASS WOMEN (1984).
372. See B. STOLZ, STILL STRUGGLING: AMERICA'S Low INCOME WORKING WOMEN CON-
FRONTING THE 1980s (1985).
373. At ages 45-54, unmarried women outnumber unmarried men by 50% and by age 65 by
four to one. See Goldman, Westoff & Hammerslough, Demography of the Marriage Market in the
United States, 50 POPULATION INDEX (1984) ("After age 24 the prospects for a woman [finding a
mate] deteriorate rapidly, with the odds in favor of men growing from a 20% male advantage at 25-
29 to an advantage over 13 times greater by age 60-64."); see also BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEPT. OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. CDS-80-8, SPECIAL DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSES-AMERICAN WO-




explanations focuses on the economic context in which divorce occurs.
Women who are part or full-time wage earners in a wage discriminatory
sex-segregated labor market 374 continue to remain economically vulnera-
ble, though they may appear to be better off to a court than a fulltime
homemaker. Homemakers faced with the impossibility of transferring
skills utilized while working in the home, limited job retraining options,
and ineligibility for unemployment compensation or workers compensa-
tion, continue to be economically disadvantaged. While no quarrel can be
generated with policy recommendations and programs designed to di-
minish sex discrimination in the market, it is unclear whether a modest
bettering of women's economic condition in the market will lead to dra-
matic changes in the economic status of divorced women.
Another set of explanations focuses on the mechanisms of the legal
system which reinforce and perpetuate a disparate economic impact on
divorced women. Factors such as the availability of custody as a bargain-
ing chip, inadequate child support awards 375 and enforcement mecha-
nisms,37 6 the availability of no-fault divorce, 377 and the pattern of
property and alimony awards, even with equitable distribution, all con-
tribute to this situation. While these problems are usually addressed sin-
gly or serially by reformers, their impact is cumulative and magnified by
their occurrence within a relatively short time period. The economic re-
sults reveal the true worth of married women.
These results can be attributed to bureaucratic imperfections or mis-
understandings of the alleged intent of the reform. Alternatively, they
can be understood through a critical analysis of the ideology and the
values378 implicit in a statute which reflects prevailing gendered norms.
374. See MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, supra note 261.
375. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SERIES P-23, No. 148, CUR-
RENT POPULATION REPORTS-CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY: 1983, at 2 (1986). Of those women
due alimony payments, about half received the full amount they were due. The remaining women
received partial payment (25.5%) or no payment (24%). See also D. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS
PAY (1979); L. WEITZMAN, supra note 369, at 272 (recommendation that child support awards be
based on an income sharing approach).
376. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 236 Part B(9), 244, 244-a, 245 (McKinney & Supp. 1986); N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT §§ 449, 842(F) (McKinney 1983).
377. The claim that women suffered less in fault-based systems is premised on the undocu-
mented belief that property awards were substantial and/or alimony awards were generous and the
rate of arrearages low. Weitzman and Dixon, supra note 135. But see Jacob, Faulting No-Fault, 1986
AM. BAR FOUND. REs. J. 773.
378. Reform efforts and the rhetoric surrounding them are rife with contradictions, paradoxes,
anomalies, distortions, and selective appropriations of the past. But such seeming confusion is useful
data. Reform talk must be understood at its face value but analyzed by questioning that face value.
See S. COHEN, VISIONS OF SOCIAL CONTROL: CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND CLASSIFICATION 100
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The former approach leads to gap studies ad infinitum.379 The latter ap-
proach underscores the nature of domination in the sex/gender system.
Distributive justice at divorce continues to be gendered justice and, not
surprisingly, property distribution replicates status quo power relations.
One type of reform, the nineteenth century Married Women's Prop-
erty Acts and the 1980 bilateral alimony provisions, replaced gender spe-
cific law with a gender neutral statute. The other type of reform, the
expansion of fault-based marital dissolution and the substitution of equi-
table distribution for strict-title distribution of marital property, replaced
one gender neutral statute with another. Both types of reforms were
designed to remedy a perceived systemic unfairness toward married wo-
men which resulted, initially, from the appropriation of their identity and
continuingly, from the married gendered identity accorded them by the
culture. In fact, all of the reforms were touted as assisting or benefitting
married women. Such a law reform strategy-creation and maintenance
of formal gender neutrality-is identified with liberal political, social,
and legal theory380 in which rule equality or equal opportunity is largely
a procedural matter without a context.
Formal degendering may be a societal statement proclaiming the de-
sirability of removing gender-based barriers. Supplemented as it has been
by almost two decades of litigation, it has led to a qualified guarantee of
equal treatment through integration into a preexisting predominantly
male world in which ostensibly neutral rules are susceptible to interpreta-
tion which buttresses male hegemony.381 But desirability is neither a
force for the elimination of a gendered social, economic, and cultural
context nor does it necessarily have a significant impact on it. Legal
degendering or systematic neutrality in a deeply gendered structure still
results in overwhelmingly gendered outcomes.
(1985). See also Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Anti-Discrimination Law: A
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049, 1052 (1978). See generally J.
ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN LABOR LAW (1983); K. Klare, Labor Law as Ideology:
Toward A New Historiography of Collective Bargaining Law, 4 IND. REL. L.J. 450 (1981).
379. For a theoretical perspective, see Berman, The Study of Macro and Micro Implementation,
26 PUB. POLICY 157 (Spring 1978); see H. JACOB, supra note 191, at 146-48 (consequences of lack of
institutional responsibility for implementation of divorce law reforms including extreme decentrali-
zation, lack of responsibility to collect information regarding emerging implementation patterns and
absence of publicity to potential users of the law).
380. See Fineman, supra note 5, at 789 (critique of liberal feminism); see also Z. EISENSTEIN,
supra note 24; Z. EISENSTEIN, THE RADICAL FUTURE OF LIBERAL FEMINISM 159-60, 164 (1981); J.
ELSHTAIN, supra note 242; A. JAGGER, FEMINIST PoLrrICS AND HUMAN NATURE 27-48, 173-203
(1983); MacKinnon, supra note 19.
381. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts and Feminism, 7 Wo-
MEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175 (1983).
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As implementation patterns for the New York divorce law reform
have become increasingly clear, various proposals and recommendations
have been made to correct the emerging pattern of inequities in the equi-
table distribution of property by court order and court approved settle-
ments. These proposals have been characterized as "precise and modest."
They are, in fact, classic tinkering responses. 382 They include: (1) increas-
ing of the pool of divisible property by including increases in the value of
separate property if the increases occur as a result of the efforts of either
spouse;383 (2) considering the wasteful dissipation of family assets by
either spouse 384 and the tax consequences to each party of an equitable
distribution;385 (3) making available to the nonmonied spouse the serv-
ices of court appointed appraisers and other experts386 to collect financial
382. The Chair of the New York City Bar Matrimonial Law Committee suggested:
The gestation period and birth of Equitable Distribution was long and arduous. Its early
childhood has been somewhat stormy but so much better than what existed before, that
we should be supremely careful to guide its continued growth with precise and modest
changes and a maximum opportunity for case by case growth.
Joint Public Hearings on Equitable Distribution, supra note 294 (statement of Stanley Plesent); see
also H. JACOB, supra note 191, at 9-15 (routine policy making characterizes divorce law reform
process); Glendon, Family Law Reform in the 1980s, 44 LA. L. REv. 1553, 1556 (1984) (critique of
marital property distribution law reforms which address the needs of rich divorcing couples and
which permit excessive judicial discretion). For a critique of "tinkering" in the area of divorce law
reform, see Fineman, Illusive Equality: On Weitzman's Divorce Revolution (Review Symposium),
1986 AM. BAR. FOUND. RES. J. 781, 786.




386. See id. (statement of Lynn Hecht Schaffran, Esq., Special Council to the New York City
Commission on the Status of Women) (discussing the "prove it or lose it" aspect of divorce litigation
under EDL which has "recreated much of what was wrong when New York was a title state"); see
also Hirschfeld v. Hirschfeld, 114 A.D.2d 1006, 495 N.Y.S.2d 445 (2d Dep't 1985), aff'd, 69 N.Y.2d
842, 514 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1987); Gottlieb v. Gottlieb, 108 A.D.2d 120, 488 N.Y.s.2d 180 (1st Dep't
1985) (although husband believed to have converted and secreted vast amounts of marital property,
he is awarded more than 50% of marital property); Wilson v. Wilson, 101 A.d.2d 536, 476 N.Y.S.2d
120 (3d Dep't 1984), appeal dismissed, 64 N.Y.2d 607, 487 N.Y.S.2d 1027 (1984); Muller v. Muller,
18 A.D.2d 1067, 239 N.Y.S.2d 519 (Ist Dep't 1963) (although Court acknowledged husband's sub-
stantial hidden income and questionable business deductions, wife awarded only 35% of marital
graphics business); Nehorayoff v. Nehorayoff, 108 Misc. 2d 311, 437 N.Y.S.2d 584 (Sup. Ct. 1981)
(husband's failure to report $26,000 in cash income not held against him).
"The burden of proof is on the partner who doesn't hold title. If you can't prove you
deserve it you don't get it. The wife comes in pushing a snowball up a hill" said Manhat-
tan divorce lawyer Louis I. Newman. "She has to say 'Judge here's why I think I am
entitled to a share.' She not only has to say it," Newman went on, "she has to prove it-by
hiring accountants and appraisers, tax and pension specialists, and, of course, a very
good lawyer. The spouse with the assets-the 'deep pocket' as he's known in the matrimo-
nial trade-tries to divulge as little information as possible. Or," as Newman said, "the
golden rule applies: He who has the gold makes the rules."
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information from the monied spouse;387 (4) reintroducting the presump-
tion of equal distribution;388 (5) developing guidelines for equitable distri-
bution awards in limited marital property cases;389 and (6) revising the
statutory provision regarding alimony to move from "reasonable need"
to "standard of living during the marriage. ' ' 3 '
Taken singly or collectively, the proposals are designed in large part
to counter criticisms of the present statute and focus on the needs of
women seeking divorce. As such, they constitute a recognition of the cen-
trality of identity to ideology, of gender as a source of identity, and of
gender as a source of power.
For supporters of equitable distribution, the emerging imperfections
in the 1980 reform can be eliminated by passage of some if not all of the
preceding proposals. Supplementing such proposals is a call for judicial
education.39 ' The premise underlying such a call is that once judges are
made aware of the implicit if not explicit gender privileging of men which
underpins their determinations, they will consciously avoid such out-
comes. Should this change occur in litigated case outcomes, a trickle
down effect would occur in settlements negotiated by lawyers.
Supporters of a rebuttable presumption of equal distribution argue
that these proposals are no more than tinkering. So long as the crucial
issue in litigation or negotiation is the evaluation of a woman's contribu-
tion, equitable distribution will skew outcomes because courts use the
Bouton, Women and Divorce: How the New Law Works Against Them, 17 NEW YORK MAGAZINE
34 (Oct. 8, 1984).
387. Inmost instances, the husband is in a better position to finance the preparation of proof. In
marriages with substantial assets, avoidance of accurate financial disclosure appears to be fairly com-
mon. Misrepresentations as to a husband's resources are made with abandon, knowing that the
burden of proof to the wife is so heavy and costly that the dependent spouse will not have the means
to aggressively prosecute the misrepresentations. One attorney in the author's pilot survey of matri-
monial practitioners and judges reported that one of the most effective techniques to force adequate
disclosure was a threat to call in the IRS to review the husband's business records.
388. See eg., N.Y.S. A.175, (Jan. 9, 1985) 1985-1986 Regular Sessions (sponsored by Assembly
members Newburger, Weprin, Fink and Nadler); N.Y.S. A.8211, 1979-1980 Regular Sessions;
N.Y.S. A.7111, 1983-1984 Regular Sessions. Bill A.175 passed the Assembly and died in the Senate
Rules Committee.
389. Abrams, Equitable Distribution-A Time for Objective Reform, 19 FAM. L. REV. 1, 20-21
(1987). Abrams suggests using the criteria of length of marriage plus years the non-propertied spouse
worked. For example: a non-propertied spouse in a three year marriage would receive 30% of the
marital assets, plus an additional 2% for each year working outside the home.
390. See Act of Aug. 2, 1986, ch. 884, 1986 N.Y. Laws 3325 (codified at N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
236(b)(6)(a) (McKinney 1986)).
391. Kay, supra note 201, at 310-11 n.155 (legislation requiring an annual one-week judicial
training and education program in family law including instruction on the effects of gender bias on
family law proceedings and the economic consequences of dissolution).
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evaluation of gendered contributions to a marriage to disadvantage wo-
men. Current analytic models for arriving at a dollar value of the home-
maker's work tend to undervalue such work392 and trivialize it. Or courts
undertake an evaluation of the quality of the homemaker's work without
doing a comparable evaluation of quality of work for a male employed
outside the home.393 Assuming that the supporters of a presumption of
equal distribution are accurate in their critique, it is not apparent that
continuing to press for a presumption will solve the problem they have
identified; gender neutral rules such as a presumption of equal distribu-
tion do not produce gender neutral results in a cultural context where
gender is a major source of power.
Perhaps a more fruitful approach to prevent the post-divorce impov-
erishment of women would be to require that if possible, a distributional
award should provide a custodial spouse and children whether in a sole
or joint custody situation, with the preseparation standard of living. If
this is not possible, the award should leave both households in similarly
disadvantaged economic circumstances.3 94 Such a proposal takes into ac-
count the systemic longer term and largely irreversible disadvantaging
generated by the cultural, social, and economic implications of divorce.
But even such a seemingly radical approach to property distribution is in
fact premised on a set of liberal assumptions; it presupposes the family as
an autonomous private economic unit fully responsible for the economic
lives of its members.395 It does not begin to suggest how the cost or the
many functions performed by the family could be socialized. It relies on
distributive relations rather than on the relations of production and re-
production and their transformation.
The choice appears to be between gender neutral or gender specific
statutes. Critics of gender specificity argue that both types of statute can
produce the same result on a material level. They recognize that gender
neutral laws can be defined to either male or female advantage depending
on who has political power. Such laws can replicate status quo relation-
392. Kozak Testimony, supra note 272, at 2.
393. See Avner, Valuing Homemaker Work: An Alternative to Quantification, 4 FAIRSHARE 11
(1984).
394. Joint Public Hearings on Equitable Distribution, supra note 294 (testimony of Judith
Avner); see also M. GLENDON, supra note 362, at 1559 (proposal distinguishing between "marital"
property available for division in a childless marriage and "family" property distributed to guarantee
the financial security of children and their custodian after divorce).
395. 0. PATrERSON, supra note 39, at 250.
482 [Vol. 37
LOCKED IN AND LOCKED OUT
ships and preserve the relative position of groups.396 On a symbolic level,
they argue that the disadvantage of gender specificity outweighs gender
neutrality, for a gender specific legislative classification reinforces one
ideal about the construction of gender and gender roles. What such crit-
ics prefer is the acquisition or articulation of a gender-based understand-
ing of the effects of substantive choices on women's power and status.
Such understanding would presumably then inform our substantive
choices.397
As this study indicates, a desire to erase gender is not enough. We
must understand how law and legalism in our culture and history are
best viewed as an instance of ideology. Second, we must never underesti-
mate the constitutive power of stereotypical gender roles which inform
our daily lives 398 . Third, we must understand the power of power, espe-
cially the power associated with ownership or control of property.399 Fi-
nally, we must understand that gendered identity and economic
inequality reinforce one another's effects, not only in the context of mar-
riage, but in the context of divorce as well. Marriage conditions eco-
nomic dependence on gendered identity. Divorce not only destroys the
economic basis for many women's lives; it often destroys the psychic and
social basis as well. The fact that economic dependence in marriage is
conditioned on gendered identity does not mean that economic indepen-
dence can be achieved by and for women by ignoring or denying
gendered identity in the name of formal neutral legal identity.'
396. Dworkin, What Liberalism Isn't (Book Review), 29 NEW YORK REV. BooKS 47 (Jan. 20,
1983) (reviewing B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1982)).
397. Letter from Professor Wendy Williams to the author.
398. See eg., E. SCHUR, LABELING WOMEN DEVIANT: GENDER, STIGMA, AND SOCIAL CON-
TROL 22-48 (1983) (discussing the devaluation process).
399. See I. BALBUS, THE DIALECTICS OF LEGAL REPRESSION: BLACK REBELS BEFORE THE
AMERICAN CRIMINAL COURTS (1973) (the combination of formal legal equality and extreme eco-
nomic inequality is a distinctive characteristic of the liberal state).
400. "We have no simple a priori formula that we can apply to decide whether to support legal
reforms," Olsen, The Politics of Family Law, 2 LAW AND INEQUALITY 1, 4 (1984); see A. BRrITEN,
THE PRIVATIZED WORLD (1977). "There is no way that human beings in the late 20th century can
claim that they are solely responsible for the integrity of the self or the uniqueness of their biology."
Id. at 148.
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